Abstract
This paper shows how a well-balanced trade-off between a generic workstation and dumb but fast reconfigurable hardware can lead to a more efficient implementation of a cryptanalysis than a full hardware or a full software implementation. A realistic cryptanalysis of the A5/1 GSM stream cipher is presented as an illustration of such trade-off. We mention that our cryptanalysis requires only a minimal amount of cipher output and cannot be compared to the attack recently announced by Alex Biryukov, Adi Shamir and David Wagner[2].
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Marc Briceno, Ian Goldberg, David Wagner, A pedagogical implementation of A5/1, web publication, http://www.scard.org/gsm/body.html, 1999.
Alex Biryukov, Adi Shamir, David Wagner, Real Time Cryptanalysis of A5/1 on a PC, presented at FSE2000.
Jovan Dj. Golić, Cryptanalysis of Alleged A5 Stream Cipher Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology, proceedings of EUROCRYPT’97, pp. 239–255, 1997.
Ross Anderson, A5 (Was: HACKING DIGITAL PHONES) Usenet communication on sci.crypt, alt.security and uk.telecom, June 17th 1994.
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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Pornin, T., Stern, J. (2000). Software-Hardware Trade-Offs: Application to A5/1 Cryptanalysis. In: Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds) Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems — CHES 2000. CHES 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1965. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44499-8_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44499-8_25
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