Advertisement

Unconditionally Secure Authentication Schemes and Practical and Theoretical Consequences

  • Yvo Desmedt
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 218)

Abstract

The Vernam scheme protects the privacy unconditionally, but is completely insecure to protect the authenticity of a message. Schemes will be discussed in this paper that protect the authenticity unconditionally. The definition of unconditional security is defined. Stream cipher authentication schemes are proposed. The consequences on information protection using RSA and DES are discussed.

Keywords

Authentication Scheme Security Level Stream Cipher Theoretical Consequence Plaintext Attack 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. [1]
    S. G. Akl, “On the security of compressed encodings,” Advances in Cryptology, Proc. Crypto 83, Santa Barbara, California, U. S. A., August 21–24, 1983, pp. 209–230.Google Scholar
  2. [2]
    E. F. Brickell, “A few results in message authentication,” Congressus Numerantium, vol. 43, December 1984, pp. 141–154.MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  3. [3]
    H. Cloetens, personal communication.Google Scholar
  4. [4]
    D. E. R. Denning, “Cryptography and Data Security”, Addison — Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1982.zbMATHGoogle Scholar
  5. [5]
    Y. Desmedt, J. Vandewalle and R. Govaerts, “The mathematical relation between the economic, cryptographic and information theoretical aspects of authentication,” IEEE Intern. Symp. Inform. Theory, St. Jovite, Quebec, Canada, September 26–30, 1983, Abstract of papers, pp. 93.Google Scholar
  6. [6]
    Y. Desmedt, “Analysis of the Security and New Algorithms for Modern Industrial Cryptography”, Doctoral Dissertation, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, October 1984.Google Scholar
  7. [7]
    Y. Desmedt, F. Hoornaert and J.-J. Quisquater, paper in preparation.Google Scholar
  8. [8]
    W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. IT-22, no. 6, pp. 644–654, November 1976.CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  9. [9]
    H. Feistel, “Cryptography and computer privacy,” Scientific American, vol. 288, no. 5, May 1973, pp. 15–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. [10]
    FIPS publication 46 “Data Encryption Standard,” Federal Information Processing Standards Publ., National Bureau of Standards, January 1977.Google Scholar
  11. [11]
    FIPS publication 81, “DES modes of operation,” Federal Information Processing Standard, National Bureau of Standards, U. S. Department of Commerce, Washington D. C., U. S. A., 1980.Google Scholar
  12. [12]
    E. N. Gilbert, F. J. MacWilliams, and N. J. A. Sloane, “Codes which detect deception,” Bell Syst. Tech. Journ., vol. 53, no. 3, March 1974, pp. 405–424.MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  13. [13]
    F. Hoornaert, J. Goubert, and Y. Desmedt, “Efficient hardware implementations of the DES,” Advances in Cryptology, Proc. Crypto 84, Santa Barbara, California, U. S. A, August 19–22, 1984 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1985), pp. 147–173.Google Scholar
  14. [14]
    R. R. Jueneman, “Analysis of certain aspects of output feedback mode,” Advances in Cryptology, Proc. Crypto 82, Santa Barbara, California, U. S. A, August 23–25, 1982, pp. 99–127.Google Scholar
  15. [15]
    R. R. Jueneman, S. M. Matyas and C. H. Meyer, “Authentication with manipulation detection code,” Proceedings of the 1983 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, April, 1983, pp. 33–54.Google Scholar
  16. [16]
    D. Kahn, “Modern Cryptology,” Scientific American, July 1966, pp. 38–46.Google Scholar
  17. [17]
    A. Konheim, “Cryptography: A Primer,” John Wiley, Toronto, 1981.zbMATHGoogle Scholar
  18. [18]
    J.-J. Quisquater, Y. Desmedt and M. Davio, “The importance of “good” key scheduling schemes (How to make a DES* scheme with ≤ 48 bit keys?)”, presented at Crypto’ 85, Santa Barbara, August, 1985, to appear in: Advances in Cryptology, Proc. Crypto 85, (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1986).Google Scholar
  19. [19]
    R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “On digital signatures and pulic-key cryptosystems,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology Technical Report LCS/TN-82, Cambridge, Massachusetts, April 1977.Google Scholar
  20. [20]
    R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir and L. Adleman, “A method for obtaining digital signatures and public key cryptosystems,” Commun. ACM, vol. 21, pp. 294–299, April 1978.CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  21. [21]
    C. E. Shannon, “Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems,” Bell Syst. Tech. Journ., vol. 28, pp. 656–715, Oct. 1949.MathSciNetzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  22. [22]
    G. Simmons, “Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption,” ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 11, no. 4, December 1979.Google Scholar
  23. [23]
    G. Simmons, “Authentication theory/coding theory,” Advances in Cryptology, Proc. Crypto 84, Santa Barbara, California, U. S. A, August 19–22, 1984 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1985).Google Scholar
  24. [24]
    G. S. Vernam, “Cipher Printing Telegraph Systems for Secret Wire and Radio Telegraphic Communications,” Journal American Institute of Electrical Engineers, v. XLV, pp. 109–115, 1926.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yvo Desmedt
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer ScienceUniversity of New MexicoAlbuquerqueUSA

Personalised recommendations