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Introduction and Overview

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Social Choice and Strategic Decisions

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Northwestern University, USA

    David Austen-Smith

  2. University of Rochester, Rochester

    John Duggan

Authors
  1. David Austen-Smith
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  2. John Duggan
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60208-2009, USA

    David Austen-Smith (Earl Dean Howard Distinguished Professor of Political Economy) (Earl Dean Howard Distinguished Professor of Political Economy)

  2. W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, 14627, USA

    John Duggan (Associate Professor of Political Science and Economics) (Associate Professor of Political Science and Economics)

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Austen-Smith, D., Duggan, J. (2005). Introduction and Overview. In: Austen-Smith, D., Duggan, J. (eds) Social Choice and Strategic Decisions. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-X_1

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