The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott

  • Lydia Mechtenberg


In this commentary on Rott’s paper “Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge”, I discuss two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. I conclude that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes.


Stability Problem Stability Theory True Belief Belief Revision Truth Machine 
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  1. DeRose, K.: 1992, ‘Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52(4), 913–929.Google Scholar
  2. Gabbay, D. M., G. Pigozzi and J. Woods: 2003, ‘Controlled Revision: An Algorithmic Approach for Belief Revision’, Journal of Logic and Computation 13(1), 3–22.Google Scholar
  3. Gädenfors, P. and H. Rott: 1995, ‘Belief Revision’, Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming 4: Epistemic and Temporal Reasoning, in D. M. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger and J. A. Robinson (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 35–132.Google Scholar
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  5. Rott, H.: 2004, ‘Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge’, Erkenntnis 61, 469–493.MathSciNetGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lydia Mechtenberg
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyJohannes Gutenberg UniversityMainzGermany

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