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The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott

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Contextualisms in Epistemology
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Abstract

In this commentary on Rott’s paper “Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge”, I discuss two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. I conclude that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes.

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References

  • DeRose, K.: 1992, ‘Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52(4), 913–929.

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  • Rott, H.: 2001, Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Oxford University Press (Oxford Logic Guides 42), Oxford.

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  • Rott, H.: 2004, ‘Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge’, Erkenntnis 61, 469–493.

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© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Mechtenberg, L. (2004). The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott. In: Brendel, E., Jäger, C. (eds) Contextualisms in Epistemology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3835-6_21

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