Abstract
In this commentary on Rott’s paper “Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge”, I discuss two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. I conclude that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
DeRose, K.: 1992, ‘Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52(4), 913–929.
Gabbay, D. M., G. Pigozzi and J. Woods: 2003, ‘Controlled Revision: An Algorithmic Approach for Belief Revision’, Journal of Logic and Computation 13(1), 3–22.
Gädenfors, P. and H. Rott: 1995, ‘Belief Revision’, Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming 4: Epistemic and Temporal Reasoning, in D. M. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger and J. A. Robinson (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 35–132.
Rott, H.: 2001, Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Oxford University Press (Oxford Logic Guides 42), Oxford.
Rott, H.: 2004, ‘Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge’, Erkenntnis 61, 469–493.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mechtenberg, L. (2004). The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott. In: Brendel, E., Jäger, C. (eds) Contextualisms in Epistemology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3835-6_21
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3835-6_21
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-3181-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-3835-8
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)