Abstract
My aim in this paper is to chart what I see as parallels between the ontology of self in Charles Taylor’s work and that of various Buddhist ‘no-self’ views, along with parallels between Taylor’s commitment to reviving republican ideas (in a ‘communitarian’ form) and some aspects of Buddhist ethics.
I would like to thank Gordon Davis, Steven Thompson, Kathy Behrendt, Nigel DeSouza , Rebekah Johnston, Gary Foster, Renato Cristi, Emily Jull, John Abraham, Christopher F. J. Ross, and Angela Brown for sharing their insight and their helpful suggestions; of course, all shortcomings are my own.
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Notes
- 1.
This is a different usage of ‘punctual’ than the one employed by Mark Siderits to spell out construal(s) of the no-self claim in Buddhism (a usage that is discussed above, in Chap. 5, by Gordon Davis and Mary Renaud ).
- 2.
There is a widespread and prevalent misconstrual of the Upaniṣadic notion of ātman as being identical with a substance-like eternal individual ego-self, purportedly held by “Hindus” versus the no-self views of Buddhists. No doubt some at the time of the Buddha employed the concept of ātman in this way; nevertheless, the concept of ātman is frequently used in many of the Upaniṣads to refer to exactly the opposite of the self as a substance-like individual ego-self with a unique essence. Rather, ātman is used to denote an unconditioned reality, or a pre-reflective form of pure consciousness , which gives rise to the false sense of individual ego-self ; indeed, it gives rise to the very ideas of time and space themselves. Time- and space-dependent concepts, such as “eternal ” and “substance ,” strictly speaking, fail to apply to ātman; see e.g., Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.4; see also Śaṅkara’s (8th c. CE) later interpretation of ātman (no doubt influenced by Buddhists and sometimes derisively referred to as a crypto-Buddhist). For a contemporary discussion of this issue, see Albahari (2002), Werner (1996), and Lindtner (1999). I should also like to point out that Daisetz Suzuki , the eminent Zen philosopher, does not fall prey to any such misconception and is clear on the distinction between ātman construed as unconditioned being versus phenomenal ego-self (1900, 106). In addition, see Thompson (2015, 1–20) for a contemporary and insightful reading of some of the principal Upaniṣads with regard to ātman and consciousness .
- 3.
N.B. the footnote near the beginning of this chapter, in which this objection is dissociated from those that might be addressed to what Mark Siderits calls ‘punctualism ’, a very different position in philosophy of mind .
- 4.
For an insightful analysis of the differing and extended sense in which many Buddhist schools use the idea of causation , see Cook 1977, 67–74.
- 5.
I thank Emily Jull for bringing this passage to my attention.
- 6.
See the Cowherds (i.e., Garfield et al. 2016, 54–76) for an illuminating history of this text; like most Indian philosophical texts, some passages may have been added later. Various different translations and readings of these passages depend on the exact nature of one’s interpretation of anātman , the self that is the subject of suffering , and its relation to the other. My favoured reading is from a Chan/Zen perspective. See also Edelglass (2017) for an insightful contextualization of Śāntideva’s ethics as embedded within a bodhisattva ideal .
- 7.
This attribution to Aśvaghoṣa is questionable because – among other reasons – no Sanskrit text has been found; however, the text is an influential work, and I take Suzuki’s reading and interpretation as offering legitimate insight into Mahāyāna views of Suchness, śūnyatā, and ethics.
- 8.
See also the discussion of Naess and deep ecology in the chapter following, by Gordon Davis and Pragati Sahni .
- 9.
I argue elsewhere that toleration, as a political phenomenon , apart from being simply an individual virtue , was first constructed by Emperor Aśoka (268–232 BCE) based on Buddhist interpretations of ahiṃsā or non-violence long before it was constructed as such in Europe (see Peetush 2015) .
- 10.
Daisetz Suzuki utilizes R.H. Blyth’s reading of Bashō’s haiku in a similar regard:
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Fleas, lice,
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The horse pissing
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Near my pillow
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– Bashō
We are urged to understand that “these things too,” the fleas, the lice, the horse urinating, as well as “butterflies,” are an intimate part of the real, a part of what it is to live in the real world, a part that cannot simply be dismissed in favor of some heavenly realm (Suzuki 1973, 237–238; see also Cook 1977, 11) .
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Peetush, A. (2018). The Ethics of Interconnectedness: Charles Taylor, No-Self, and Buddhism. In: Davis, G. (eds) Ethics without Self, Dharma without Atman. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67407-0_12
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