Veto Players, Reform Processes and Policy Change: Concluding Remarks

  • Thomas KönigEmail author
  • Marc Debus
Part of the Studies in Public Choice book series (SIPC, volume 16)


We recapitulate the main findings of the contributions of this book, which provides an evaluation of the current state of veto player theory for the analysis of reform making in modern democracies. The contributions of this book provide for further insights into three central aspects of veto player analysis in order to explain reforms in modern democracies. Given Tsebelis’ framework on the interaction between political actors’ institutional power, their preferences, and the location of the status quo, the book chapters stress (1) the identification of veto players’ preference for measuring their reform-making behaviour, (2) the interpretation of other phenomena in complex veto player systems, which can provide additional insight into reform making, and (3) the modelling of strategic reform-making behaviour in veto player systems.


Policy Preference Party System Policy Position Coalition Government Veto Player 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Social SciencesUniversity of MannheimMannheimGermany
  2. 2.MZESUniversity of MannheimMannheimGermany

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