Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Veto Players, Reform Processes and Policy Change: Concluding Remarks

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Reform Processes and Policy Change

Part of the book series: Studies in Public Choice ((SIPC,volume 16))

  • 1507 Accesses

Abstract

We recapitulate the main findings of the contributions of this book, which provides an evaluation of the current state of veto player theory for the analysis of reform making in modern democracies. The contributions of this book provide for further insights into three central aspects of veto player analysis in order to explain reforms in modern democracies. Given Tsebelis’ framework on the interaction between political actors’ institutional power, their preferences, and the location of the status quo, the book chapters stress (1) the identification of veto players’ preference for measuring their reform-making behaviour, (2) the interpretation of other phenomena in complex veto player systems, which can provide additional insight into reform making, and (3) the modelling of strategic reform-making behaviour in veto player systems.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Basinger S, Hallerberg M (2004) Remodeling the competition for capital: how domestic politics erases the race to the bottom. Am Polit Sci Rev 98(2):261–276

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bawn K (1999) Money and majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany: evidence for a veto players model of government spending. Am J Polit Sci 43(3):707–736

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benoit K, Laver M, Mikhaylov S (2009) Treating words as data with error: estimating uncertainty in the comparative manifesto project measures. Am J Polit Sci 53(2):495–513

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benz A (2004) Path-dependent institutions and strategic veto players – national parliaments in the European Union. West Eur Polit 27(5):875–900

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Binder SA (1999) The dynamics of legislative gridlock, 1947–96. Am Polit Sci Rev 93(3):519–533

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bräuninger T, Debus M (2009) Legislative agenda-setting in parliamentary democracies. Eur J Polit Res 48(6):804–839

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Budge I, Klingemann H-D, Volkens A, Bara J, Tanenbaum E (2001) Mapping policy preferences. Estimates for parties, electors and governments 1945–1998. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Carrubba C, Volden C (2000) Coalitional politics and logrolling in legislative institutions. Am J Polit Sci 44(2):261–277

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clinton J, Jackman S, Rivers D (2004) The statistical analysis of roll call data. Am Polit Sci Rev 98(2):355–370

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cox GW, McCubbins MD (2005) Setting the agenda: responsible party government in the US House of Representatives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Debus M (2008) Office and policy payoffs in coalition governments. Party Polit 14(5):515–538

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Downs A (1957) An economic theory of democracy. Harper, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Duch RM, Stevenson RT (2006) Assessing the magnitude of the economic vote over time and across nations. Elect Stud 25(3):528–547

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duch RM, Stevenson RT (2008) The economic vote: how political and economic institutions condition election results. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Erikson RS, MacKuen MB, Stimson JA (2002) The macro polity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Ganghof S (2003) Promises and pitfalls of veto player analysis. Swiss Polit Sci Rev 9(1):1–25

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ganghof S, Bräuninger T (2006) Government Status and legislative behaviour: Partisan veto players in Australia, Denmark, Finland and Germany. Party Polit 12(4):521–539

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haggard S, Kaufman RR (1995) The political economy of democratic transitions. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Hallerberg M, Basinger S (1998) Internationalization and changes in tax policy in OECD countries: the importance of domestic veto players. Comp Polit Stud 31(3):321–353

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hellman JS (1998) Winners take all: the politics of partial reform in postcommunist transitions. World Polit 50 (2):203–234

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hix S, Noury A, Roland G (2006) Dimensions of politics in the European parliament. Am J Polit Sci 50(2):494–511

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klingemann H-D, Volkens A, Bara J, Budge I, McDonald M (2006) Mapping policy preferences II: estimates for parties, electors and governments in central and eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990–2003. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • König T (2007) Divergence or convergence? From ever-growing to ever-slowing European legislative decision making. Eur J Polit Res 46(3):417–444

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • König T, Bräuninger T (1997) Wie wichtig sind die Länder für die Politik der Bundesregierung bei Einspruchs- und Zustimmungsgesetzen? Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 28(4):605–628

    Google Scholar 

  • König T, Bräuninger T (1999) Finnland auf dem Weg zum Mehrheitssystem? Eine vergleichende Analyse der politischen Willensbildung vor und nach den finnischen Verfassungsreformen der 90er Jahre. Polit Vierteljahresschr 40(1):40–64

    Google Scholar 

  • König T, Bräuninger T (2005) Gesetzgebung im Föderalismus. Speyerer Forschungsberichte 237. Deutsches Forschungsinstitut für Öffentliche Verwaltung, Speyer

    Google Scholar 

  • König T, Luig B (2009) German ‘LexIconSpace’: policy positions and their legislative context. Ger Polit 18(3):345–364

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • König T, Tröger V (2005) Budgetary politics and veto players. Swiss Polit Sci Rev 11(4):47–75

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • König T, Blume T, Luig B (2003) Policy change without government change? German gridlock after the 2002 election. Germ Polit 12(2):86–146

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • König T, Volkens A, Bräuninger T (1999) Regierungserklärungen von 1949 bis 1998. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung ihrer regierungsinternen und -externen Bestimmungsfaktoren. Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 30(3):641–659

    Google Scholar 

  • Krehbiel K, Meirowitz A, Woon J (2005) Testing theories of lawmaking. In: Smith DA, Duggan J (eds) Social choice and strategic decisions: essays in honor of Jeffrey S. Banks. Springer, New York, pp 249–269

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Kreppel A (1997) The impact of parties in government on legislative output in Italy. Eur J Polit Res 31(3):327–350

    Google Scholar 

  • Laver M, Garry J (2000) Estimating policy positions from political texts. Am J Polit Sci 44(3): 619–634

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Laver M, Shepsle KA (1996) Making and breaking governments. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Laver M, Benoit K, Garry J (2003) Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data. Am Polit Sci Rev 97(2):311–331

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis-Beck MS (1986) Comparative economic voting: Britain, France, Germany, Italy. Am J Polit Sci 30(2): 315–346

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis-Beck MS, Stegmaier M (2000) Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. Annu Rev Polit Sci 3:183–219

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart A (1999) Patterns of democracy. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin LW (2004) The government agenda in parliamentary democracies. Am J Polit Sci 48(3):445–461

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Martin LW, Vanberg G (2004) Policing the bargain: coalition government and parliamentary scrutiny. Am J Polit Sci 48(1):13–27

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Martin LW, Vanberg G (2005) Coalition policymaking and legislative review. Am Polit Sci Rev 99(1):93–106

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mayhew DR (1974) Congress: the electoral connection. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayhew DR (1991) Divided we govern: party control, lawmaking, and investigations, 1946–1990. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • Mikhaylov S, Laver M, Benoit K (2008) Coder reliability and misclassification in comparative manifesto project codings. Paper presented at the 66th MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hilton Hotel and Towers, 3–6 April 2008

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller WC, Strøm K (eds) (1999) Policy, office or votes? How political parties in western Europe make hard decisions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller WC, Strøm K (2008) Coalition agreements and cabinet governance. In: Strøm K, Müller WC, Bergman T (eds) Cabinets and coalition bargaining: the democratic life cycle in western Europe. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 159–199

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Reilly RF (2005) Veto points, veto players, and international trade policy. Comp Polit Stud 38(6):652–675

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom E (1986) An agenda for the study of institutions. Public Choice 48(1):3–25

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Plott CR (1979) The application of laboratory experimental methods to public choice. In: Russell CS (ed) Collective decision making: applications from public choice theory. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 137–160

    Google Scholar 

  • Poole KT, Rosenthal H (1997) Congress: a political-economic history of roll call voting. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Powell GB (2000) Elections as instruments of democracy: majoritarian and proportional visions. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • Powell GB (2004) The chain of responsiveness. J Democracy 15(4):91–105

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Powell GB (2006): Election laws and representative governments: beyond votes and seats. Br J Polit Sci 36(2):291–315

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Przeworski A (1991) Democracy and the market: political and economic reforms in eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sartori G (1976) Parties and party systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Scharpf FW (1988) Von Fug und Unfug institutioneller Erklärungen. Replik zu Josef Schmid. Wo schnappt die Politikverflechtungsfalle eigentlich zu? Polit Vierteljahresschr 29(2):271–275

    Google Scholar 

  • Scharpf FW (2002) The European social model: coping with the challenges of diversity. J Common Mark Stud 40(4):645–670

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scharpf FW (2006) The joint-decision trap revisited. J Common Mark Stud 44(4):845–864

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt MG (2001) Thesen zur Reform des Föderalismus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Polit Vierteljahresschr 42(3):474–491

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shikano S (2006) Modellgestützte Rekonstruktion und Simulation des Ergebnisses der Bundestagswahl 2005. In: Bräuninger T, Behnke J (eds) Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie. Band 4: Schwerpunkt Parteienwettbewerb und Wahlen. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, Wiesbaden, pp 47–78

    Google Scholar 

  • Slapin J, Proksch S-O (2008) A scaling model for estimating time-series party positions from texts. Am J Polit Sci 52(3):705-722

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sundquist J (1968) Politics and policy. Brookings, Washington

    Google Scholar 

  • Sundquist J (1988) Needed: a political theory for the new era of coalition government in the United States. Polit Sci Q 103(4):613–635

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Timmermans A (2006) Standing apart and sitting together: enforcing coalition agreements in multiparty systems. Eur J Polit Res 45(2):263–283

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis G (1994) The power of the European parliament as conditional agenda-setter. Am Polit Sci Rev 88(1):128–142

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis G (1995) Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. Br J Polit Sci 25(3):289–325

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis G (1999) Veto players and law production in parliamentary democracies: an empirical analysis. Am Polit Sci Rev 93(3):591–608

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis G (2002) Veto players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis G (2006) Coalition theory: a veto players approach. Unpublished Manuscript. University of Los Angeles

    Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis G, Money J (1995) Bicameral negotiations: the Navette system in France. Br J Polit Sci 25(1):101–129

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis G, Garrett G (1996) Agenda setting power, power indices, and decision making in the European Union. International Review of Law and Economics 16(3):345–361

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van der Brug W, van der Eijk C, Franklin M (2007) The economy and the vote: economic conditions and elections in fifteen countries. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Volkens A (2007) Strengths and weaknesses of approaches to measuring policy positions of parties. Elect Stud 26(1):108–120

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Warwick PV (2001) Coalition policy in parliamentary democracies. Who gets how much and why. Comp Polit Stud 34(10):1212–1236

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zohlnhöfer R (2009) Der Politikverflechtungsfalle entwischt? Die Effekte der Föderalismusreform I auf die Gesetzgebung. Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 19(1):39–76

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany

    Thomas König

  2. MZES, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany

    Thomas König & Marc Debus

Authors
  1. Thomas König
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Marc Debus
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Thomas König .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, 68131, Germany

    Thomas König

  2. Mannheim Center for European Research, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, 68131, Germany

    Marc Debus

  3. Dept. Political Science, University of Michigan, S. State St. 505, Ann Arbor, 48109-1045, USA

    George Tsebelis

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

König, T., Debus, M. (2011). Veto Players, Reform Processes and Policy Change: Concluding Remarks. In: König, T., Debus, M., Tsebelis, G. (eds) Reform Processes and Policy Change. Studies in Public Choice, vol 16. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9_13

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation