Abstract
This chapter surveys a different version of SR that does not rely on set/model-theoretic structures. Ladyman J, Ross D, Collier J, Spurrett D (Every thing must go. Oxford University Press, Oxford. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.001.0001, 2007) version of Informational SR (ISR) (ISR is usually used to refer to Floridi’s version of Informational Structural Realism. Here, I extend the term to also include Ladyman and Ross’ version.) offers an information-theoretic account of the underlying structure of scientific theories. At times it seems that Ladyman and Ross’ version of ISR relies on John Collier’s development of the notion of physical information. This may facilitate connecting the underlying informational structures to the physical world. However, as I will discuss in this chapter, despite its promising approach, Ladyman and Ross’ version of ISR cannot tell us a full story about grounding the representational relation between theories and the world. I shall argue that this version of Informational SR cannot address the problem of representation satisfactory either.
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Notes
- 1.
These are Emergence of complex higher-level entities, Emergence of higher-level properties, The unpredictability of emergent properties, The unexplainability/irreducibility of emergent properties, The causal efficacy of the emergent. As I will explain shortly, Ladyman and Ross (p.193) only accept The unpredictability of emergent properties, The unexplainability/irreducibility of emergent properties as the main concepts that support a weak form of emergentism.
- 2.
For example, Newman’s classical formulation of the problem indicates that “the doctrine that only structure is known involves the doctrine that nothing can be known that is not logically deducible from the mere fact of existence, except (“theoretically”) the number of constituting objects” (Newman 1928, 144 original emphasis).
- 3.
While I think this implication about a solution to the weak version of the problem is worth taking seriously, I do not have enough space to develop it here. Instead, we consider the results for the strong form of the problem of representation.
- 4.
It should be noted that at times, Ladyman and Ross’ theory finds a Kantian, epistemological undertone. For example, in clarifying their notion of information, they asserted that the world is not made of anything and information is a fundamental concept for understanding the objective modality of the world, for example, laws, causation, and kinds (Ladyman et al. 2007, 189). This assertion is in line with Kantian or even instrumentalist nature of information. But then again, there are numerous instances of paying homage to the ontic form of ISR in the book.
- 5.
Ladyman and Ross presumed that being a counterfactual-supporting generalization is identifiable with being projectible by the maximally efficient computer that is physically capable of performing the projection in question (given the actual physical limitations on computers) (Ladyman et al. 2007, 225–26). But they did not explain why this characterization of counterfactual supporting generalization should carry metaphysical weight, instead of being understood in accordance with Kantian or even instrumentalist views.
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Beni, M.D. (2019). The Problem of Representation, Real Patterns, and Rainforests. In: Cognitive Structural Realism. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05114-3_4
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