Abstract
When individuals detect an inconsistency in a set of propositions, they tend to change their minds about at least one proposition to resolve the inconsistency. The orthodox view from William James (1907) onward has been that a rational change should be minimal. We propose an alternative hypothesis according to which individuals seek to resolve inconsistencies by explaining their origins. We report four experiments corroborating the explanatory hypothesis. Experiment 1 showed that participants’ explanations revised general conditional claims rather than specific categorical propositions. Experiment 2 showed that, when explanations did revise the categorical proposition, participants also tended to deny the consequences of a second generalization. Experiment 3 showed that this tendency persists when participants previously affirmed these consequences explicitly. Experiment 4 showed that, when participants could easily explain an inconsistency by revising a generalization, they were more likely to accept the consequences of a second generalization. All four results contravene minimalism but support the explanatory hypothesis.
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The research was supported by a postdoctoral fellowship to C.R.W. from the Educational Testing Service, Princeton, and by grants to P.N.J.-L. from the National Science Foundation (BCS-0076287 and SES 0844851) to investigate strategies in reasoning and deductive and probabilistic reasoning.
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Walsh, C.R., Johnson-Laird, P.N. Changing your mind. Memory & Cognition 37, 624–631 (2009). https://doi.org/10.3758/MC.37.5.624
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/MC.37.5.624