Abstract
Two empirically well-supported research findings in the judgment literature are (1) that human judgments often appear to follow an averaging rule, and (2) that judgments in Bayesian inference tasks are usually conservative relative to optimal judgments. This paper argues that both averaging and conservatism in the Bayesian task occur because subjects produce their judgments by using an adjustment strategy that is qualitatively equivalent to averaging. Two experiments are presented that show qualitative errors in the direction of revisions in the Bayesian task that are well accounted for by the simple adjustment strategy. Also noted is the tendency for subjects in one experiment to evaluate sample evidence according to representativeness rather than according to relative likelihood. The final discussion describes task variables that predispose subjects toward averaging processes.
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The writing of this paper and the research reported were supported by the Office of Naval Research (Contract NOOO14-81-K-0069). I am grateful to Gregg Oden and Martin Tolcott for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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Lopes, L.L. Averaging rules and adjustment processes in Bayesian inference. Bull. Psychon. Soc. 23, 509–512 (1985). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03329868
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03329868