Abstract
Twenty-eight subjects, trained in basic probability, were asked to judge the likelihood of one trait (A) given another trait (B), as well as the likelihood of Trait B given Trait A. Judgments were made relative to the base rate of the trait whose conditional probability was to be judged. A substantial proportion of paired judgments (.21) were of the form p(A|B) = p(A) and p(B|A) ≠ p(B), a relationship that violates the product rule for independent events. We concluded that estimates were made on the basis of some judgmental heuristic that did not include application of probabilistic reasoning. Alternatives, such as Tversky’s (1977) model for similarity judgments, were considered.
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Nahinsky, I.D., Ash, D. Unidirectional independence and judgmental heuristics. Bull. Psychon. Soc. 23, 467–469 (1985). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03329855
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03329855