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Complexity, Hypersets, and the Ecological Perspective on Perception-Action

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Abstract

The ecological approach to perception-action is unlike the standard approach in several respects. It takes the animal-in-its-environment as the proper scale for the theory and analysis of perception-action, it eschews symbol based accounts of perception-action, it promotes self-organization as the theory-constitutive metaphor for perception-action, and it employs self-referring, non-predicative definitions in explaining perception-action. The present article details the complexity issues confronted by the ecological approach in terms suggested by Rosen and introduces non-well-founded set theory (hyperset theory) as a potentially useful tool for expressing them. The issues and the tool are brought to focus in the concept of affordance that is the basis for explanation of prospective control of action in the ecological approach.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind Program, Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, PA, USA

    Anthony Chemero

  2. Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

    M. T. Turvey

Authors
  1. Anthony Chemero
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  2. M. T. Turvey
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Correspondence to Anthony Chemero.

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Chemero, A., Turvey, M.T. Complexity, Hypersets, and the Ecological Perspective on Perception-Action. Biol Theory 2, 23–36 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1162/biot.2007.2.1.23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/biot.2007.2.1.23

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