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Game-theoretic-based modelling of Krishna waters dispute: equilibrium solutions by Metagame Analysis

  • Regular Article - Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
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Abstract

Conflicts are inevitable concerning sharing of the resources. Most of the time, due to the opacity of the conflict resolution technique, players involved do not accept the final solution. Therefore, any method adopted for resolving a conflict should involve players to get the equilibrium solution. Besides, the conflict resolution technique needs to be transparent, and the procedure must be the same for all the players involved. Metagame Analysis has the potential to accommodate the above conditions. In this study, we have discussed Metagame Analysis and its application to resolve India’s Krishna river basin dispute. Since the environment is an integral part of the river ecosystem, it has also been included as a conflict resolution player. We have also defined and derived Fair and Equitable (F&E) allocation in this regard, considering the factors that form the basis for their right as a rightful owner of the resource. The factors considered for F&E allocation are drainage area, cultivable area, and virgin runoff. The derived F&E allocation is then selected as one of the options for the Metagame Analysis. Metagame Analysis is carried out using two scenarios before and after Andhra Pradesh’s reorganization (in 2014). In scenario 1, equilibrium outcomes are 454, 458, and 469. Our results show that excessive demands may harm the water allocation if it violates the total flow. Outcome 469 is the F&E outcome in which all the players are going for cooperated negotiations which maximize their share. Outcomes 454 and 458 are those outcomes in which Karnataka is benefitted as it is getting its first option share. AP’s demand cannot be accommodated in any strategy as it exceeds the total flow, while there is a strategy available in which Karnataka’s first option can be sustained. The paper shows that the game-theoretic-based techniques can solve real-world disputes and that too as complex as water sharing.

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Data Availability Statement

This manuscript has no associated data or the data will not be deposited. [Authors’ comment: Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated and analysed data is provided in Table 1.]

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Acknowledgements

AA acknowledges the funding support provided by the Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee through Faculty Initiation Grant number IITR/SRIC/1808/F.I.G and COPREPARE project funded by UGC and DAAD under the IGP 2020–2024. RM acknowledge the funding provided by DST under the Inspire Faculty Fellowship. DPP acknowledges the support provided by UPES under its doctoral program.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of HSE and Civil Engineering, School of Engineering, University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Bidholi campus, Energy Acres, Dehradun, Uttarakhand, 248007, India

    Durga Prasad Panday

  2. Department of Water Resource Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi, 110016, India

    Rakesh Khosa

  3. Department of Civil Engineering, MVGR College of Engineering, Vizianagaram, 535005, India

    Rathinasamy Maheswaran

  4. Department of Civil Engineering, VNR Vignana Jyothi Institute of Engineering and Technology, Pragathinagar, Hyderabad, 500090, India

    K. Ravikumar

  5. Department of Hydrology, Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee, Roorkee, 247667, India

    Ankit Agarwal

  6. Section Hydrology, GFZ German Research Centre for Geosciences, Telegrafenberg, 14473, Potsdam, Germany

    Ankit Agarwal

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  1. Durga Prasad Panday
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Correspondence to Ankit Agarwal.

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Panday, D.P., Khosa, R., Maheswaran, R. et al. Game-theoretic-based modelling of Krishna waters dispute: equilibrium solutions by Metagame Analysis. Eur. Phys. J. B 94, 101 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00107-w

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