Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine launched in February 2022 gave rise to a strong opposition from the United States, European countries, and dozens of other nations. According to Richard Fountain, Executive Director of the Center for a New American Security, the United States has been “involved in this war in virtually every way except direct fighting against the Russians”Footnote 1. It has exerted economic pressure, rendered military and technical assistance to Kyiv, provided it with access to Western intelligence, and tried to achieve the desired results through diplomatic, interstate, and unofficial channels. Such steps are in line with the counter–Russia course within the “integrated deterrence” concept, which the Biden administration enshrined in the new U.S. National Security StrategyFootnote 2 (October 2022). The doctrine stipulated the comprehensive use of all directly intertwined instruments in competing powers’ standoff—military (without crossing the threshold to armed conflict), political, economic, and informational—as well as the integration of efforts with the U.S. allies and partners, which is seen as an effective American asymmetric advantageFootnote 3.

At the same time, Washington deliberately avoided direct military intervention in Ukraine, emphasizing the need to circumvent the threat of an all-out regional or global armed conflict, as well as to prevent escalation of the confrontation to the stage of nuclear weapons use. Sanctions, along with arms deliveries to Ukraine, became the main tool of U.S. policy in particular and Western strategy in general with regard to Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

In this article, we have considered sanctions and other anti-Russian measures of Western states and corporations in different economic sectors that affect directly the domestic military–industrial complex. Restrictions in such industries as the consumer goods production, catering, pharmaceuticals, construction, woodworking, and socio–cultural sphere are either left out of the analysis, or are touched upon only indirectly. Accordingly, the grain supplies problem is not considered, although discussions hereof are going on in light of military and political issues, and national security measures are being taken.

INTRODUCTION OF SANCTIONS

An unprecedented number of sanctions were imposed against Russia. According to some estimates, the total number of measures exceeded eleven thousand, and the sanctions policy entailed a kind of “non-cooperation renaissance” (Afontsev, 2019)Footnote 4. The United States revoked the most-favored-nation (MFN) status in trade for Russia and raised duties on a whole number of locally-produced goods (metallurgical products, fertilizers, etc.). EU member states also deprived Russia of the MFN status and imposed various restrictions on it. Besides the United States, the Baltic countries, the UK and Poland were particularly active in introducing sanctions. Despite the fact that Belarus stayed out of the special military operation, it was also considered a party to the conflict and was subjected to restrictive measures, since Russian troops and military equipment were setting off from its territory.

In parallel, both personal sanctions against the Russian government and elites and sectoral restrictions against defense–related industries of the Russian Federation and other sectors of the Russian economy were applied, with consequences for the population at large. Both individuals and legal entities became the target of blocking sanctions. The sectoral sanctions implied specific bans on particular industries. However, under the Executive Order 14024 signed by Joe Biden back in 2021, so-called “hybrid” sanctions (a combination of personal and sectoral restrictions) were also introduced against individuals and legal entities that collaborated with companies from the sanctioned industries of the Russian economy.

The EU, Great Britain, Japan, and then the United States imposed restrictions on the Russian high state officials, which then were expanded repeatedly to include their deputies, relatives, and inner circle. The Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, deputies of the State Duma, and the Duma itself as an institution, as well as owners, CEOs and top managers of leading Russian corporations, and heads of Russian banks got onto the sanctions lists. Sanctions were announced against appointed heads of local authorities in the Luhansk People’s Republic, Donetsk People’s Republic, and Kherson and Zaporozhye oblasts. Russia imposed retaliatory measures, and on May 3, 2022, Presidential Decree no. 252 banned transactions, settlements, and trade with individuals and legal entities under Russian sanctions.

The West was introducing its state–imposed sanctions “from the top” in parallel with the mass exodus of international companies from Russia. More than 1400 firms, mostly Western, but also Japanese, Taiwanese, South Korean, Australian, etc., terminated or suspended their local operations (800 of them reported that they closed their business in Russia)Footnote 5. The withdrawal of international corporations from the Russian market and their punitive measures had consequences for the domestic economy that were perhaps on par with the effect of the sanctions themselves. The situation was exacerbated by the capital flight and the mass departure of foreign and highly qualified local specialists from Russia. A significant general increase in emigration occurred immediately after the special military operation onset and then again, after the partial mobilization was announced. The initial purpose of sanctions was to influence Russia’s “behavior” and to get it to cease its special military operation in Ukraine. It is indicative, for example, that this very purposeFootnote 6 of the sanctions was specified when (at the initiative of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky) the international expert group Yermak–McFaulFootnote 7 was created, which was set up specifically to develop recommendations regarding sanctions. However, it seems that later on the U.S. and other Western countries’ goals changed in the direction of inflicting maximum damage on the Russian economy, weakening, and isolating Russia in order to deprive it of the financial, industrial, and military–technological base for future military acts outside the country. The U.S. National Security Strategy, adopted in October, stated that the imposition of sanctions and export restrictions was intended to “degrade Russia’s ability to wage future wars of aggression.”Footnote 8

The sanctions were not in line with traditional international relations and did not fit into the diplomatic actions’ category. In fact, they belonged to the arsenal of coercive policies. Russian President Vladimir Putin compared the restrictions against Russia to a “declaration of war.”Footnote 9 Prime Minister Michail Mishustin said in turn that the sanctions represented a total economic war.Footnote 10

The United States, European countries (despite all their contradictions), and quite a number of other states around the globe showed a high level of solidarity on the issue of anti-Russian sanctions. Sixty-five of 193 UN member states joined them. The policy of Japan, which also imposed restrictions along with South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, was particularly tough compared to the measures that Tokyo took after the events in Crimea back in 2014. At that time, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe continued to pursue the development of relations with Russia despite the sanctions that Japan imposed.

In adopting anti-Russian measures, many foreign governments and companies demonstrated their willingness to act against their commercial interests, yet consistently with the “set of values” expected of them by both Western world leaders and these countries’ public circles. According to independent studies (Sonnenfeld, Tian, Zaslavsky, Bhansali, and Vakil, 2022), foreign companies incurred some losses when they curtailed their business in Russia, yet largely compensated for their losses by having their share prices increased due to the broad public support of their actions.

However, the sanctions issue began to reveal discrepancies among Western countries after a while. The sixth package of EU sanctions was being negotiated for more than a month. As a result, the document was adopted in a much softened version (an incomplete oil embargo, which extended only to tanker traffic; no mention of the intention to gradually abandon Russian gas; disconnection from SWIFT of several, but not all, banks—in particular, Gazprombank remained outside the sanctions framework). Upon those rather difficult negotiations, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz even suggested in late August 2022 that decisions in the EU should be taken not by consensus, but by majority vote.Footnote 11

Two “camps” have appeared in the Western world. The first, led by the United States and the Great Britain,Footnote 12 includes Poland, the Baltic countries, and some other Eastern European states, which support increasing weapons shipments to Ukraine and tougher sanctions. The second group includes Germany, France, Italy, and Hungary, the countries that are wary of a protracted conflict prospect and stand for finding ways to settle it (although, with time the position of French President Emmanuel Macron has shifted toward a tougher one). The countries that were most dependent on Russian oil supplies have sought to avoid worsening relations with Russia.

At the same time, the sanctions policy has exposed a fundamental contradiction in the U.S. strategy. Domestically there is a focus on democracy and its promotion abroad, while on the international scene Washington seeks hegemony and exerts pressure on other countries, particularly, in this case, in favor of sanctions.

SANCTIONS AND THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY

The sanctions, however, did not lead to a complete blockade of the Russian economy or its rapid collapse. In October 2022, the Bank of Russia improved its forecast for the annual decrease in Russia’s GDP to 3.0–3.5%.Footnote 13 Its economy turned out to be more stable than predicted by Western politicians and experts (Sonnenfeld and Tian, 2022). The accumulated federal reserves (although half of them along with private assets were frozen by the West), soaring prices on hydrocarbons (while they were still being sold to Europe, albeit in smaller volumes), and emergency measures of the Russian financial authorities to adapt the economy, mitigate, and overcome the consequences of sanctions helped to avoid a major drop.Footnote 14 Among other things, Russian banks managed to make significant gains on the stress in the second and third quarters of the year. At the same time, a law was passed that established the possibility to temporarily introduce external administration by court decision as regards assets of companies that had left Russia if they were producing essential goods and there was no economic reason for them to exit.Footnote 15 Besides, some of these foreign enterprises did not immediately cease their activities. Quite a few of them sold their businesses to Russian operators, and this largely preserved their potential for the domestic economy, even if the new owners did not have technological and financial support from the West. At the same time, workarounds were created for financial relations and commerce. Foreign trade was being reoriented in the southern and southeastern directions, and “alternative import” schemes were being built (although they implied high losses and increase in transactions cost).

Sanctions, especially sectoral ones, carried significant economic implications for Russia, which were further exacerbated by increased federal spending on defense and security. The banking industry became the first target of restrictions,Footnote 16 which was rather common for the American sanctions policy in the 20th century (Timofeev, 2020, p. 74). Among the harshest measures undertaken by the United States were: freezing the Russian Central Bank’s reserves held abroad (more than $300 billion) and private assets of Russian clients connected with the Russian policy in Ukraine; cutting off many Russian banks from the SWIFT system; and introducing blocking sanctions against banks on the U.S. SDN list.Footnote 17 The European Commission Head Ursula von der Leyen in turn formulated the following financial sanctions policy objectives: to ensure that Russian banks “are disconnected from the international financial system and harm their ability to operate globally,” to “block Russian exports and imports,” and to “paralyse the assets of Russia’s Central Bank.”Footnote 18 The EU also imposed sanctions on the Russian National Settlement Depository (NSD), the largest securities depository in Russia and the only one in the country with access to the international financial system. The United States further imposed personal sanctions on the former and current heads of the NSD, Eddie Astanin and Viktor Zhidkov.

The seventh EU sanctions package included a ban on government procurement of the Russian Federation and on the acceptance of Russian deposits, as well as on the purchases of Russian gold. At the same time, sanctions on gold imports were imposed by the UK, which accounted for 90% of its exports from Russia.Footnote 19 International auditing firms and leading rating agencies ceased their activities in Russia, and domestic banks and companies were restricted in their ability to borrow from abroad. Thus, the largest local companies were cut off from the capital markets. U.S. president’s Executive Order of April 6 prohibited any new investment in the Russian economy for American citizens.Footnote 20 International payment cards issued to Russian citizens were no longer accepted abroad, and the Russian Mir cards were no longer serviced in most countries. Russian payments on federal loans were blocked,Footnote 21 resulting in a default in the summer, which Russia, however, refused to acknowledge, since it actually tried to make payments in full and on time.Footnote 22 Yet the “willy–nilly default,” had only a minor impact on Russia’s economic and financial situation, since the sanctions had already limited the country’s access to the international investment market.

The oil and gas industry is the backbone of the Russian economy and the main resource of financial revenues for the country’s budget (40% in 2022Footnote 23), as well as it is the source of energy for domestic industries and provides fuel and lubricants for military equipment. It became a priority target of sanctions along with the financial sector. In March 2022, Russian oil was removed from the quotations of international exchanges. After the United States and then the United KingdomFootnote 24 refused to purchase Russian oil and gas, other European countries gradually but steadily began to phase out their imports of Russian energy resources. Within the sixth package of EU sanctions,Footnote 25 the member-states of the organization, as it has already been mentioned above, agreed to impose an embargo on transporting the Russian oil by tankers from December 5, and on oil products from February 5, 2023.Footnote 26 In order to limit Russian oil revenues, the G7 countries decided to set a fixed oil price cap. This step was then enshrined in the eighth EU sanctions package, which also prohibited ships from carrying oil if sold at a price higher than the fixed one. Insurance companies were instructed not to provide services to such vessels. Turkey, in turn, announced that it would not allow tankers to pass through the Bosporus Strait without proper insurance (though later agreed that the Russian insurance would do).

Europe sharply reduced its imports of the Russian gas. At the same time, Moscow put forward a requirement to pay for it in rubles, which presumably was supposed to make transactions safe for Russia. Thus, the funds received by Russia for gas could not be frozen in the accounts of European or U.S. banks. The proposed scheme prescribed the counterparty to open a ruble account in the Russian Gazprombank, which would convert the payments it received into rubles. Russia managed to agree upon the plan with many European countries, and switched to settlements in national currencies with China and India. However, the gas flow through the Nord Stream stopped completely in October 2022 after the explosions on the pipeline branches. European countries were replacing gas imports from Russia with supplies from Norway and the Netherlands, Israel and Egypt, Qatar and Algeria, and Azerbaijan and AustraliaFootnote 27 (from where the UK received its first LNG shipment in six years). EU countries were also conducting talks on gas purchases with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.Footnote 28 At the same time, Russia did not have enough tankers and oil pipelines to divert all of its oil supplies eastwards. The construction of new ones, according to experts,Footnote 29 could take more than ten years. According to the World Energy Agency’s estimates, Russia would need at least ten yearsFootnote 30 to redirect fully its gas supplies towards Asia, and about five years if things would be managed well and huge investments would be acquired.

An embargo on Russian coal exports to the EU also took effect on August 10, and the UK decided to refuse from Russian coal by the end of 2022. EU companies were prohibited from providing insurance services to Russian companies when supplying coal all around the globe. Because of the sanctions, Rosatom, which had hundreds of contracts in different countries, lost some of its clients. First the EU and then the U.S. raised the issue of banning uranium imports from Russia (Castillo-Peters and von Hippel, 2022), which supplies a fifth of all nuclear fuel consumed in the Old World.

Russia’s metallurgy was significantly affected by both sectoral and personal sanctions. The United States imposed blocking sanctions against Severstal and its owner, and against the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works and its affiliated enterprises (the company’s assets were frozen and the head of the board of directors was put on the sanctions list), as well as personal sanctions against the chairman of the board of directors of Pipe Metallurgical Company. In March 2022, the European Union announced a ban on imports of rolled steel, rebar, steel sheets, and welded and seamless pipes from Russia, the decision which President Putin called “unfair competition.”

According to Andrey Leonov, Vice President of the Russian Steel Association, which includes major domestic steel companies, the production of steel and steel alloys in the country fell by 20–50% in June 2022 due to sanctions.Footnote 31 Blast furnaces and roll trains were halting their manufacturing processes, and the output of metal products was going down. At the same time, Russia stopped receiving from abroad metallurgical products, on which many of its industries depended. In particular, Australia banned its exports to Russia of alumina and aluminum ore, which are used in the production of aluminum. This metal is essential for the domestic defense industry and mechanical engineering, and is a key Russian export item. Two years before that, Russia began developing the largest Udokan copper deposit. Yet Yale University researchers wrote in their report that “leading copper consuming countries, namely China, are already sourcing new copper supplies from African and Central Asian partners without even considering Russia as a potential source of new copper production” (Sonnenfeld, Sokolowski, Wyrebkowski, and Kasprowicz, 2022, 36).

Along with the financial, energy, and metallurgical sectors, the sanctions were especially hard on the aviation and automotive industries, rail transport, machine building, high tech production, IT, and the industries that used imported parts and foreign technologies in their work, which became much less available. Half of the automotive business in Russia depended on European supplies, and the decline in production in this sector amounted to more than 90%.Footnote 32

Major international transport companies suspended their activities in Russia. Container transport enterprises left the country. Already in April 2022, the fifth package of European sanctions imposed a complete ban on Russian and Belarusian trucking operators on the EU member states’ roads. This measure halted road transport to and from Europe (exemptions were made for the transportation of agricultural goods and products, humanitarian aid, and petroleum products). Finland closed rail traffic across its border. The Russian Railways Joint Stock Company found itself under sanctions, which included a ban on obtaining financing. Siemens terminated supply and maintenance contracts for Sapsan and Lastochka trains.Footnote 33 The Finnish railway company VR Group wrote off all of its Allegro trains (and spare parts for them), which provided freight shipments between Helsinki and St. Petersburg. Although Talgo, the Spanish manufacturer of Strizh trains (operated by the Russian Railways) did not announce sanctions, it stopped providing its maintenance services. Sanctions against the Russian Railways also affected subway cars, trams, and electric trains.

On its part, on October 10, Russia banned cargo transportation by vehicles of “unfriendly countries” for the period till the end of the year,Footnote 34 and consequently extended the prohibition till June 30, 2023.

European countries, including Great Britain and Norway, closed their skies to Russian aviation back in late February, followed by a similar decision by the United States and Canada.Footnote 35 Leading American companies Boeing and Airbus refused to service the Russian airlines. The EU banned the sales of aircraft, components, and equipment to Russia,Footnote 36 and stopped servicing and leasing Russian planes. The domestic fleet, which used to consist of foreign-made aircraft by almost 80%,Footnote 37 could no longer receive spare parts after the sanctions were introduced. Sanctions were also imposed on the deliveries of avionics. Roscosmos proposed to the Ministry of Transport and to the Federal Air Transport Agency to transfer the Russian aircraft fleet to the navigation using the locally produced and operated system GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System) instead of GPS.Footnote 38 Yet, due to the lack of access to foreign equipment and components, there were also problems with ensuring the proper functioning of the Russian GLONASS satellite constellation.

The U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions against Russia’s leading shipbuilding companies. European ports were closed to the Russian ships and the vessels that had changed their flag from Russian to another after February 24. The transportation of crude oil or petroleum products from third countries were exempt from Western bans if they were only loaded and exported from Russia or if they were passing through its port in transit, given that the cargo itself did not belong to a Russian owner.

First, the EU and the UK, and then the U.S. took restrictive measures against the Russian State Transport Leasing Company, which leases air, water, and rail transport, as well as against its subsidiaries.Footnote 39

The U.S., EU, UK, and Japan also imposed sanctions against the Russian defense industry, banning deliveries of military equipment and dual–use goods. Those Western companies that had still continued to sell ammunition and components for military hardware and equipment to Russia after 2014, terminated their trade relations with local enterprises. One of the first packages of U.S. sanctions included measures against eight deputy defense ministers, heads of several Russian defense enterprises, and several dozen companies that develop engineering products for the Russian defense industry: Vektor research institute, Mikron, Sertal, and Sernia Engineering, whose activities were related to military programs. Blocking sanctions were imposed on 22 enterprises of the Russian defense industry. On November 16, the United States imposed new restrictions on 42 individuals and companies associated with the Russian defense industry. Washington also banned deliveries to Russia of semiconductors and high tech electronic components, including electronics for fighter jets and missiles, which had been successfully imported to this country before. As part of its fifth sanctions package, the EU announced an embargo on exports of high tech goods totaling €10 billion,Footnote 40 as well as weapons. Then the seventh package banned the sale of dual–use products to Russia. Cooperation in space exploration was also being curtailed.

The task set by the Russian leadership to replace components and high tech equipment supplies by local production and through imports from other countries entailed significant difficulties. At the same time, the impact from some sanctions was expected not to become fully apparent immediately, but in the fourth quarter of the year, in the next six months, and then during another several years.Footnote 41 Experts of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation expressed their opinion that the compensatory deployment process of domestic production—the so-called forced “reverse industrialization”—would continue for several years. They predicted that it would take place through import substitution investment projects “on the basis of the development of less advanced technologies,”Footnote 42 and would be accompanied with an inevitable production decline.

IMPLICATIONS OF ANTI-RUSSIAN SANCTIONS FOR EUROPE, THE U.S., AND OTHER COUNTRIES

Meanwhile, Western sanctions have caused considerable damage to the European market and the global economy as a whole. Germany, the largest EU economy, came to the verge of recession. Leading experts pointed out that the inflation in the euro-zone reached a record high of 10.7% in October 2022. Due to a sharp rise in fuel and food prices, in the Baltic countries this index exceeded 22%.Footnote 43

European countries have been actively looking for ways to replace Russian hydrocarbon fuel supplies, but it is clear that the engaged resources are not enough to fully meet the demand. Since the imports of oil and petroleum products from Russia have been terminated, the populations of the EU countries have been deprived of inexpensive fuels. The European Council decided to curb gas consumption by 15% throughout the winter of 2022.Footnote 44 European businesses using either oil itself or diesel, vacuum gasoil, etc., have been affected. The German government has had to allocate $200 billion to help consumers and businesses that are struggling to survive in the face of high energy prices.Footnote 45 According to economists, the policy of renouncing the use of Russian gas will cost the industrialized European countries the GDP growth, which will go down from 3.2% in 2022 to 0.6% in 2023, while the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will face the growth shrinkage by 3% of GDP, as well as inflation increase which will affect the whole continent.Footnote 46 The gas shortage has also impacted the chemical industry of EU countries and other sectors where gas is used as an ingridient in the production process: mechanical engineering, metallurgy, glass manufacturing, construction industry, and nitrogen fertilizers production. The international economy structure has been changing, as sanctions along with COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns have led to a breakdown in the trade chains and interconnections of the global economic system. “The risk of inflation, and even economic recession, stagflation, now hangs over the world economy. European countries have begun to question whether they have been fooled by the U.S.,” Footnote 47 noted Wang Yiwei, Director of the Institute of International Affairs at the Renmin University of China.

The alleged deliberate attempt by Washington to weaken Europe’s economic position deserves a separate study. However, it is clear that the United States by selling liquefied natural gas stands to gain. In addition, due to rising energy prices, such energy–intensive enterprises as plants producing fertilizers, zinc, copper, aluminum, etc., have begun to move over from Europe to the United States. The Inflation Reduction Act passed in Washington in August 2022 provided further incentives, through energy benefits and tax cuts, for foreign businesses to “relocate” to the U.S. market.Footnote 48

As a result of the EU’s own sanctions and Russia’s retaliatory measures, European airlines had to re-route and cancel flights. Already in mid-summer, the European Union was forced to lift the ban on deliveries to Russia of a number of aviation industry components, technologies and services, as it was stated, “to the extent necessary to ensure the functioning of the International Civil Aviation Organization.”Footnote 49

Economic problems also affected politics. It is no coincidence that, as the Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban pointed out, political crisis hit in 2022 four European countries one after another: Great Britain, Bulgaria, Estonia, and Italy.Footnote 50 Then national governments changed in Sweden and Denmark.

However, in many aspects, the United States felt the consequences of the sanctions regime as well. While Biden himself spoke of “Putin’s inflation,” “Putin’s tax,” and “Putin’s price increases” Footnote 51 (inflation in the United States by the end of the year reached a record 8% in recent decades), in the United States it was him and the Democratic Party administration that were blamed for the economic failures and for what was interpreted as inability to stop the armed conflict in the center of Europe–the same criticism the country’s leadership received a year earlier for the blotched withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan (Bubnova, 2022).

Particular attention in the West focused on the problem associated with secondary sanctions, which were supposed to cut off bypasses and prevent Russia from obtaining goods, components, and technology through various kinds of “gray” schemes or by means of “alternative” imports. Data provided in the Peterson Institute report (Chorzempa, 2022, p. 1) showed that imports to Russia from countries not participating in the sanctions imposed on Russia directly because of the operation in Ukraine fell by almost 40% in its first four months. These figures confirmed that respective countries, too, were wary of crossing the Western line to avoid falling under sanctions. In late September 2022, the American Treasury Department announced that the United States would push more aggressively for secondary measures.Footnote 52 However, later the Deputy Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Climate and Energy Economics Catherine Wolfram announced that the United States would not use secondary sanctions against foreign buyers of Russian oil who would pay above its fixed price.Footnote 53

The eighth EU sanctions package, adopted in early October, for the first time specifically envisaged the introduction of secondary sanctions. Many experts noted the declarative nature of the European Parliament’s decision of November 23 to recognize Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism,Footnote 54 but it not only created a new precedent in relation to Russia, but also simplified the imposition of secondary sanctions, as well as formally opened way to legitimizing the confiscation of the frozen Russian assets.

Meanwhile, many countries were in no hurry to support or join Western sanctions because they perceived the actions of the United States and its partners as aimed at maintaining their post-colonial hegemony and, based on their own economic and political interests, sought not to spoil relations with Russia. Companies from China, Turkey, India, and some other countries that did not want to impose sanctions were replacing the Western importers of Russian goods and/or counted on increasing their share of the largely vacated Russian market.

Despite China’s ambivalence toward the Russian special military operation, Beijing officials opposed the “increasingly outrageous sanctions,”Footnote 55 although they did not explicitly express a desire to help Russia. China remained cautious, using the situation to its advantage, yet seeking to avoid being subjected to secondary sanctions. Nevertheless, if in 2021 the main trading partner of Russia was the European Union, which accounted for 36% of her import–export transactions,Footnote 56 by the summer of 2022, its share decreased and it was China that came out on top. As of the end of 2022, the volume of Russian–Chinese trade was estimated at $190 billion.Footnote 57 At the same time, it was clear that the sanctions were also meant to be a demonstration to China, which remains the main competitor of the United States. As noted by the Indian political scientist, Professor at the New Delhi–based Center for Policy Analysis Brahma Chellaney,Footnote 58 drawing on the Russian experience, China and other countries received the opportunity to explore parallel ways of economic ties and financial settlements. In this regard, one of the consequences of the sanctions was the impetus toward the transition of the global financial system from its reliance on dollars and payments in dollars and euros to a more diversified system—involving national currencies and the stronger presence of Chinese and other non-Western payment systems in financial markets.

Apparently, Washington and the West on the whole also miscalculated when assessing their ability to influence Moscow. The sanctions had no effect on the military–political decisions of the Russian authorities. Quite a few researchers (Mulder, 2022) pointed out that such restrictions usually do not achieve their desired political results. The author of this article also warned of a similar effect in Russia back in 2015 (Bubnova, 2015, 85–88) in the wake of Western sanctions packages following the joining of Crimea to Russia. Just as Russia’s special military operation helped to unify the West, so the total, indiscriminate sanctions annoyed a large part of the Russian population, provoked a rise in anti-Western sentiments, and contributed to the local public support for confronting the West. Meanwhile, in the opinion of many experts, the sanctions hurt mostly the categories of the Russian population that were oriented toward cooperation with Europe and the United States and openness to the world. On November 10, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that it revoked the Russia’s market economy status.Footnote 59 This decision not only carried reputational losses, but also served to the United States an opportunity to extensively apply higher duties vis-a-vis Russia without regard to the WTO requirements to ensure free trade. On November 14, member states at the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly for a resolution to create an international mechanism to ensure reparation payments to Ukraine from Russia. A detailed analysis of this decision is beyond the scope of this paper, yet the very fact that the document was supported by 94 states that make up the majority of the world (China, together with Russia, and 12 other countries voted against it) is certainly noteworthy.

* * *

As Russia’s special military operation continued, Western leaders were speaking less frequently about the possibility of lifting certain sanctions in exchange for concessions from Russia (although a number of German politicians, before the Nord Stream explosions, had expressed an opinion that the terms of resolution in Ukraine should include the resumption of Russian gas supplies). Some sanctions were indeed revised and lifted, yet these cases occurred under the pressure of circumstances. This happened as a result of court decisions, when restrictions proved inefficient (they did not prevent the inflow of funds to finance Russian military production), or in a situation of excessive collateral damage for those who had adopted them or for third countries.

Questions arise as to whether Western countries’ societies will continue to support measures against Russia at the expense of their own vital interests in a worsened economic situation. According to the U.S. news portal Axios, the American public’s interest regarding the events in Ukraine, which increased dramatically in February 2022, was declining, with ups and downs, thereafter. Already by the end of spring 2022, the number of interactions related to the news on Ukraine among foreign-language Internet users dropped 22 times.Footnote 60 According to a poll by the European Council on Foreign Relations (conducted in June among residents of European countries), only Polish respondents among the listed options chose “justice” rather than an end to the conflict. Just 25% of the population across the continent thought it was more important to “punish Russia.”Footnote 61

When the U.S. Congress demanded in August 2022 that the State Department declare Russia a state sponsor of terrorism, critics of the initiative noted that most of the restrictions (export bans on military goods, dual–use goods, and technology) implied by such a measure had already been imposed on Russia. Although the White House’s team, along with the Justice Department’s Task Force KleptoCapture and the Yermak–McFaul International Expert Group, have continued to come up with their suggestions for new personal, financial, and energy sanctions,Footnote 62 many politicians in Western states believe that their countries are running out of economic resources and that the entire arsenal of possible restrictions has already been engaged. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell said just a month after the start of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine that the EU was already on the verge of expending new measures, and repeated it once again a year later. However, quantitatively, the lists of export controls and blocking sanctions continue to expand and may increase further. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian noted in turn that in order to resolve the conflict in Ukraine, the first thing that needs to be done is to discontinue sanctions.Footnote 63 Meanwhile, it is known that in the United States, the procedure for lifting restrictions involves internal political struggle and a complex bureaucratic process. It is especially difficult to remove sanctions that are enshrined in laws. These include both executive orders passed under the Obama administration after the joining of Crimea to Russia and acts introduced in 2021 and 2022, such as the decision approved by both houses of Congress to refuse to buy the Russian oil and gas. Even if the parties successfully overcome the relevant political problems, it usually takes many years before it becomes possible to lift sanctions.