American–Chinese contradictions are becoming central to the emerging system of international relations. After the idea of building effective cooperation between the two countries (including the so-called Great Two (G2) in the early 2010s) failed, the parties began to move to strategic competition. A peculiarity is the emphasis on trade, economic, and technological areas.

This development of events requires fundamentally new approaches from the United States, which they have not encountered before. The confrontation with the Soviet Union was predominantly military–political and ideological. At the same time, trade, foreign direct investment, and technological leadership in the civilian sector were a source of income for the United States in the fight against the Soviet Union. Now, these areas are becoming the main ones in the confrontation between the two global leaders.

In modern conditions, these areas also imply the creation of an appropriate transport and telecommunications infrastructure—the basis for intercountry cooperation. In this area, the China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become the largest global initiative, which has set the relevant standards and has turned into a serious lever of political and economic influence.

The United States, considering China as its main strategic competitor, is forced to respond to Chinese projects. However, their capabilities are currently limited. The Biden administration has announced several international infrastructure initiatives in recent years, the prospects for which are still unclear. This article provides a brief comparative analysis of American and Chinese infrastructure projects.

This study was conducted on the basis of a world-system approach, which reflects US–Chinese competition on a global scale. The article consists of three parts. The first part describes the world-systems approach and also examines the position of the PRC in the modern system of international relations through its prism. The second part of the article is devoted to the Chinese BRI initiative, and the third part analyzes the counterinitiatives put forward by the United States.

AMERICAN–CHINESE CONFRONTATION THROUGH THE PRISM OF A WORLD-SYSTEM APPROACH

The competition between China and the United States can be viewed using different paradigms of international relations theory. Neoliberalism sees in it an ideological rivalry between an authoritarian and democratic system; neorealism sees it as a political struggle to establish a new world order; and neo-Marxism sees it as a confrontation between imperialist powers. In this article, the theoretical basis of the analysis is the world-systems approach, which analyzes the infrastructure competition between the United States and China in developing countries.

The “world-system” is a combination of the global economic system and multiple political and cultural systems. The behavior of agents depends on their belonging to one of the levels of the world-system: periphery, semiperiphery, or center. Ownership is defined as the ability to maximize profits through leadership in the possession of technological, financial, political, or military resources. The key property of the world-system is the constant flow of resources from the countries of the periphery to the countries of the semiperiphery and the center [Wallerstein, 2011].

Currently, the United States remains the leader of the world-system and strives to maintain its status [Watkins, 2019]. The problem is that for many years the United States has been struggling with a falling rate of profit [Abdulov et al., 2021], which is due to an increase in capital-intensive production in relation to labor-intensive production and rising labor costs.Footnote 1 To reverse the current trend, the United States is using capital outflows by shifting labor-intensive operations within global value chains (GVCs) to peripheral and semiperipheral countries.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US-promoted policy of neoliberalism took on a global scale, forming a new world order. The structural reforms of the Washington Consensus included the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the reduction of restrictions on foreign direct investment, which made it easier for US companies to acquire domestic assets in peripheral countries and integrate them into GVCs [Watkins, 2019].

The United States gradually abandoned the Westphalian principle of the inviolability of state sovereignty. Independence becomes a “license” that Washington can revoke if the government does not abide by liberal political and economic norms [Watkins, 2019]. In the current paradigm, Beijing was supposed to open access to the national market for American transnational companies (TNCs), as well as to carry out neoliberal reforms of the political system. Depending on how Chinese policy met these requirements, Washington planned to “support, contain, or balance” Beijing.Footnote 2

Not surprisingly, US foreign policy and economic risk assessment documents describe China as a “revisionist power” that seeks to revise the prevailing international conditions. At the same time, Beijing’s actions are aimed at qualitative changes in the configuration of the balance of power and are mainly expressed in trade and economic aspects. This strategy is driven by the long-term goals and strategic plans of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

THE PERIPHERY WITH CHINESE SPECIFICS

Paradoxically, US neoliberal policy partly contributed to the strengthening of the economic and political power of China, which began to integrate into the world market system as early as the late 1970s. However, the rise of export-oriented “market socialism” that took place in the 1990s occurred precisely on the wave of neoliberal globalization. During this period, the country developed in accordance with the “flying geese” paradigm of the Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu [Taush, 2019]. Like other “catching up” economies, China offered cheap labor to developed countries, but it had unique advantages: a vast domestic market, a developed industry, qualified personnel, a literate population, and a developed state strategic planning system that made it possible to manage loans, organize infrastructure, and control capital flows centrally by redistributing resources across industries and regions. These internal factors qualitatively distinguished the development of China from the “new industrial countries.” Throughout the 1990s, Beijing benefited from these advantages, maintaining state dominance in the economy and raising its status in the world system, including through American investment but without directly challenging Washington’s dominance.

FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE SEMIPERIPHERY

The first successful test of this course was the Asian economic crisis of 1997. However, it also showed that, if Beijing continued to develop an export-oriented development model, attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and invest profits in American securities, then as a result, the country would face the threat of losing control over national assets. For example, the default of South Korea during the Asian crisis in 1997 led to a sharp weakening of state sovereignty in the field of the economy.Footnote 3

Accordingly, the strategy of Beijing in the 2000s changed: the main driver of growth was investment in the national market. The government identified strategic sectors for the development of the economy, creating favorable conditions for the respective companies, “national champions” [Hemphill and White, 2013]. Surplus capital was directed in the form of FDI as part of the Go Global strategy, which was facilitated by joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 [Jenkins, 2019, p. 18]. Since then, China has been importing commodities from semiperipheral and peripheral countries.

The global financial crisis of 2008 strengthened the chosen strategy. Despite the diversification of investments, China still kept a significant part of its savings in US debt securities. Some of them are in the notorious mortgage agencies the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). The disappearance of these funds came as a shock to Beijing, which nevertheless fell into the “dollar trap,” as it could not rely on swap linesFootnote 4 from the Federal Reserve System (FRS).

As a result, the state has become even more active in stimulating the national economy, increasing aggregate supply and demand [Watkins, 2019]. These measures worked, but they led to a further increase in the share of capital-intensive industries and an increase in the cost of labor [Huang and Liugang, 2021]. Falling profitability slowed down GDP growthFootnote 5 and caused the accumulation of excess capacity, especially in the field of infrastructure (electricity and construction sectors), which limited the ability to develop in line with the “world factory.”

FROM THE SEMIPERIPHERY TO THE CENTER

Against the backdrop of a new wave of the global economic crisis that began in 2014, Chinese politicians began to promote the idea of a radical change in the country’s place in the international system of labor division—from a “global factory” to a world technological leader. In the first stage (2015–2025), China should achieve technological sovereignty, and in the second (2020–2035), it should set the standards for innovative production for the whole world.Footnote 6

In 2015, the first stage started, and the industrial development strategy “Made in China 2025” appeared. During the 13th (2016–2020) and 14th (2021–2025) five-year plans, the Chinese economy has been realigning itself to high-tech manufacturing in line with the fourth industrial revolution.Footnote 7

The second stage began in 2020, when the government launched the China Standards 2035 strategy. In accordance with it, China should become the creator of industry 4.0 standards: for example, in the field of industrial automation or environmentally friendly technologies. The state invests in these industries, creating the necessary infrastructure.Footnote 8

In an effort to achieve global leadership in high technology, China is betting on the development of a new infrastructure—“digital, smart, and innovative”—which the CCP leadership announced in 2020. The strategy complements the “Made in China 2025” and “China Standards 2035” programs, and the announced amount of public spending in the 14th “five-year plan” will be approximately $1.4 trillion. The funds will be used to develop 5G networks, artificial intelligence, the Internet of things, intercity high-speed rail, and research institutes. In contrast to infrastructure policy during the 2008 crisis, the government is increasingly working with private investment.Footnote 9

From the point of view of the strategy of global leadership in the field of new standards, this investment policy allows for the formation of a digital environment dominated by Chinese technologies. This aspect is also noted by American analysts, who believe that government subsidies, loans, and digitalization of the One Belt, One Road project contributed to the rapid growth of Huawei and other technology companies [Capri, 2020].

ONE BELT, ONE ROAD

The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) integration project was launched in 2014 as a result of the merger of the land Belt and Road and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road [Jenkins, 2019, p. 341]. It is aimed at creating a global production infrastructure dominated by Chinese goods, finance, and technology and is a set of relevant investment programs. By 2021, 145 countries had become participants in the project and had gained the opportunity to export products to the largest market on favorable terms, receive financing, and use advanced technologies, which became especially important considering the slowdown in global GDP growth after the 2008 crisis.

Latin America and the Caribbean countries (LACC) began joining the project in 2018, with 21 countries out of 33 joining in four years [Albright, 2022]. Since the BRI brings together trade, finance, investment, and infrastructure projects within a single space, it provides China with a strategic advantage in the region in terms of commodity and food security. China’s success is confirmed by American experts, noting, for example, the predominance of Chinese companies in the territory of the free economic zone in the Panama Canal.Footnote 10 In addition, as a result of its investment policy, China is gaining control over technology, which gives it the ability to control strategic infrastructure in Venezuela, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Costa Rica.Footnote 11 The development of closer economic integration allows China to enlist the support of elites in the region, regardless of their political orientation. For example, Beijing’s position on Taiwan as of 2022 is shared by 25 of 33 Latin American states, including left, right, and centrist regimes.Footnote 12

In Central Asia, the development of the OBOR involves the creation of several land transport corridors, two of which, northern and central, run through the territory of regional states. Like Latin America, Central Asia exports raw materials to China. Kazakhstan supplies metals and oil; Uzbekistan, cotton fiber; and Kyrgyzstan, scrap metal and livestock products. In connection with this trend, most investment projects in the region are tied to “hard” infrastructure: these are gas and oil pipelines, as well as transport hubs. Over the past 30 years, the volume of trade flows between regions has increased 100 times.Footnote 13

Since the BRI was originally supposed to link China with Europe, the next region on the route after Central Asia was the Middle East. Already in 2016, Beijing became the largest investor in this region as well,Footnote 14 although back in 2009 it accounted for less than 1% of direct investment. As in Central Asia, the strategic area for Chinese investment here is the fuel and energy sector and industry, as well as transport infrastructure.

Beijing’s Middle East Strategy was published in 2016.Footnote 15 Cooperation with the countries of the region is formed according to the “1 + 2 + 3” formula, which is based on the energy sector (1). Its development is accompanied by the modernization of infrastructure and an increase in trade and financial investments (2), which should subsequently ensure close cooperation in three (3) high-tech areas—nuclear energy, space exploration, and renewable energy sources [Lin, 2017]. China is balancing between the two leading players in the region—Iran and Saudi Arabia. Beijing agreed with Riyadh to coordinate the OBOR with the Vision 2030 program and concluded a package of deals worth $65 billion, while supporting Iran’s candidacy for membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Tehran was also granted a $10 billion loan for infrastructure development.

If the agreements with the Gulf countries relate to cooperation in the field of energy and technology, then projects in the Maghreb and Mashriq regions are predominantly infrastructural. The development of port areas through Chinese investment is taking place in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. Together with the construction of ports in the nearby territories, special economic zones are being created, where Chinese production is located on preferential terms.

Back in 2008, the China–Egypt TEDA Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation zone (TEDA Suez) was founded. The PRC is also participating in the construction of a new administrative cluster in the eastern part of Cairo, infrastructure projects near the Suez Canal, and railways and a container port on the Mediterranean coast. Another port is planned to be built in Algiers. The first Algerian deep-water port of El Hamdania in the eastern part of the country will be able to compete with the Moroccan port of Tangier Med. According to some statements, in exchange for construction and investment, China will receive the right to manage the hub for 25 years.Footnote 16

China is also actively increasing its presence in Africa. Thus, as of 2022, 49 countries of the continent are already participating in the BRI. Several projects are expected in the areas of infrastructure and the development of mobile communications, telecommunications, and fisheries. In addition, there are separate programs for the construction of an oil terminal in Mombasa, as well as the production of vaccines in Casablanca. The PRC is likely to seek BRI integration with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), allowing duty-free trade in Chinese goods, as well as taking center stage in logistics, technology, and standards [Deutsch, 2022].

Thus, through the BRI, China is creating the infrastructure to include peripheral countries in its own GVCs, which will bring Beijing closer to achieving the strategic goal of technological leadership and a place at the center of the world-system.

US INITIATIVES

As it develops and spans a growing number of countries in the LAAC, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa, the BRI presents an increasing challenge to US interests in the areas of trade, finance, technology, and standards. As was mentioned above, this process creates the threat of a gradual “squeezing out” of American companies from peripheral and semiperipheral countries through the use of specific nonmarket mechanisms. As a result, the old American model of economic leadership is also becoming obsolete and there is a need to reconsider practices, rebuild existing ones, and create new institutions.

In previous decades, neoliberal globalization was driven by the creation of free trade areas (FTAs), which provided a complex mechanism for the exchange of goods, services, and investments, which, coupled with deregulation policies, allowed American companies to dominate the markets of peripheral countries. At the same time, recent similar projects—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—have not been successful for the United States. The crisis of the world-system led to a decrease in the effectiveness of market integration mechanisms and the predominance of mechanisms of economic nationalism and protectionism.

In 2016, negotiations with the European Union under the TTIP were terminated. In this case, the preparation of the agreement was initially accompanied by a number of contradictions related to differences in standards, requirements for product quality, protection of manufacturers and jobs, and problems of mutual access to public procurement.

In 2017, the Trump administration on the very first day of its work announced its withdrawal from the TPP agreement signed a year earlier. Instead, in 2019, the remaining eleven countries signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP), which basically repeated the previous version but without US participation.

The rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership did not meet with serious objections in the United States, including from Trump’s opponents. The reasons for this were similar to the withdrawal from the TTIP—the desire to protect the national market from the threat of rising unemployment and lower wages in the United States caused by the influx of cheap goods from other FTA partner countries.Footnote 17 In addition, a protectionist policy that is incompatible with the principles of an FTA can also be seen as a consequence of a decrease in the profitability of the backbone companies of the central countries.

At the same time, the strategy of concluding bilateral trade agreements, which D. Trump and the Republican Party adhered to, turned out to be no less complicated. In addition, against the background of the US withdrawal from regional projects, a new free trade area was created—the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—in which China also participates. It also included the ASEAN countries, Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.

These factors led the United States to prepare an alternative base for the reintegration of its allies in the new conditions. The most important task here is the development of new norms and standards, which in the future can be applied to create a kind of American-centric global system. It should not include the PRC or other countries traditionally identified as threats to national security—North Korea, Iran, and Russia.Footnote 18 One of the most important tasks in this area is to create an alternative to the Chinese BRI.

As part of this goal, the first step was the launch of the Blue Dot Network (BDN) program in 2019 with Australia and Japan. Its task is to create framework norms, standards, and principles for the development of international infrastructure projects, which it will also evaluate and certify.Footnote 19 As conceived by the developers, this step will help attract investments and partners, as well as ensure the further development and effective functioning of the projects being created. This program is carried out in cooperation and with the technical support of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).Footnote 20 For several years of operation, the BDN funding amounted to $60 billion and was provided by the US International Development Finance Corporation, created in the same year.

Two years later, the Biden administration attempted to continue the Blue Dot Network line through the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative,Footnote 21 aimed at developing countries. It was announced at the G7 summit in 2021. It was assumed that the main tasks of the B3W would be energy security and the development of green and digital technologies, as well as healthcare. In fact, the United States invited other countries of the center to take part in creating an infrastructure to strengthen their positions in the joint management of GVCs based on innovative technologies. The initiative was supposed to be provided through private investment with the support of the governments of the G7 countries. Its name was consonant with the large-scale Build Back Better plan to upgrade the American transportation infrastructure, which Congress never approved.

Further and apparently in an effort to get away from the association with the unaccepted bill, B3W was replaced by the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). Its creation was announced at the G7 summit in 2022. Like the B3W, the partnership will focus on developing countries—mainly in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Its tasks are reduced to the creation of infrastructure, the development of “green technologies,” the promotion of norms and standards in the areas of the digital economy, entrepreneurship, healthcare, climate, and gender equality.

It is expected that the United States will be able to attract about $200 billion to the project, initially from the federal budget (grants, state funds, and organizations) and later through private investment. In total, together with the contribution of other G7 members, PGII funding should amount to about $600 billion by 2027.Footnote 22 However, by mid-2022, the amount of funds allocated was about $3 billion, and counterparties in the recipient countries were not fully identified. It is stated that both governments and private companies will be among them.

For comparison, according to Morgan Stanley, China’s costs for the development of the BRI, which primarily implies the construction of transport infrastructure (hard infrastructure), may amount to about $1.2–$1.4 trillion by 2027.Footnote 23 By that time, creating a similar and redundant system will not be possible, and such a strategy is unlikely to make sense in the long term. As a result, the United States is faced with the task of finding alternative ways to fend off the actions of the PRC. In this situation, the emphasis on the digital economy seems to be an effective response, since it is expected that the attention of developed countries will be focused around it [Shirov, 2022, p. 17]. The development of the relevant infrastructure can proceed at a relatively fast pace. In addition, this process will be accompanied by individual programs to improve the living standards of the populations of developing countries and to create an appropriate “soft infrastructure.” However, there are also a number of difficulties.

As was noted above, it is expected that the main costs will fall on the private sector, but for private investors the problem of return on investment is even more acute than for government investors. Since the activities of PGII will focus on developing countries, and in particular Africa, the most important issue is sovereign risks that hinder investment. The United States will have to tackle the challenge of institutional reforms in developing countries to improve the business and investment climate.

To solve these problems, the United States plans to involve the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which operates in close relationship with the State Department. It has many years of experience working with governments and the private sector in developing countries, including in promoting standards. The state-owned Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which provides direct financial support to developing countries in the form of grants, will also take part in the project. Its annual budget is about $900 million, which is approved by Congress. The task of both organizations is likely to be to work with local governments and the private sector, to provide an enabling environment, and to attract local and foreign investors [Savoy, 2022].

Within the framework of the same task, the initiatives put forward (at least at the initial stages) are supposed to be carried out with the participation of American companies from the fields of energy, construction, and transport. In addition, government agencies—USAID, MCC, and several others—traditionally make most of their purchases from US suppliers. This feature, among other things, is due to the “Buy American” law,Footnote 24 on the implementation of which budgetary departments are required to report. Thus, the PGII development strategy at its initial stage is close to the PRC approaches. A significant part of BRI projects is paid from the Chinese budget, and Chinese contractors are involved in the work. However, unlike China, the US federal government cannot afford a similar cost of infrastructure development in foreign countries ($1.2 trillion over ten years). There are also costs to the tactics of attracting private investment in the PGII. It does not allow reallocation of funds between projects if necessary, and furthermore, it links the amount of incoming funds to the success of democratization and the development of local political and financial institutions.

The projects announced under the PGII can be divided into three groups: digital economy, energy, and social sphere. The first includes one of the flagship projects of the entire initiative—the laying of a telecommunications cable SEA-ME-WS 6 between Southeast Asia (Singapore), North Africa (Egypt), and Western Europe (France), which will cost $600 million.

Another project is the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership (DCCP). Its objectives are to stimulate economically sustainable and reliable private sector investments, promote regulatory reforms, and encourage the implementation of modern methods for ensuring cybersecurity and data privacy.Footnote 25 The latter task also includes the creation of a 5G network infrastructure, which can be seen as a countermeasure to the promotion of Chinese services in this area. The DCCP also includes a Digital Investment Program for ISPs and financial technology companies operating in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Among its tasks is support (including investment) for high-risk projects that are at the initial stages of development.

In energy and green technologies, the PGII will develop the USAID-supported Power Africa program launched in 2013, the installation of solar panels in Angola (about $2 billion), the energy security project in Southeast Asia, and also the development and construction of a modular reactor in Romania.

In addition, the PGII envisages several social projects aimed at improving living standards in developing countries. Among them are the construction of clinics in Côte d’Ivoire, the launch of vaccine production in Senegal, support for the World Bank’s project to ensure the care of children in developing countries, food safety and the development of the agricultural complex in India, and support for small and medium-sized businesses in southern Africa. In total, by mid-2022, ten programs were announced in various regions of the world with a total funding of about $3 billion.Footnote 26

In addition to the PGII, the United States has stepped up its policy of creating regional interstate formats of economic cooperation with similar goals. Thus, at the end of May 2022, as part of the Asian tour of J. Biden, the creation of the Indo–Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) was announced.Footnote 27 It was signed by Australia, Brunei, Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan. The IPEF implies the development of new standards of international trade, including within the digital economy; improving the reliability of supply chains and logistical efficiency; providing reliable access to raw materials, minerals, and semiconductors; development of clean energy and green technologies; and resolution of taxation problems and anticorruption measures.

In June 2022, at the Summit of the Americas in Miami, a regional project similar to the IPEF (and close to the PGII) was announced—the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP).Footnote 28 Its main areas are strengthening the economies of Latin America, developing regional infrastructure, improving the reliability of supply chains, introducing green energy, simplifying customs procedures, raising labor standards, settling migration, education, and health problems, and the economic empowerment of women.

At the moment, both regional projects can be characterized as informal, in which there are no specific requirements for participants. This nature of the projects is determined not only by ongoing interstate consultations on the development of action programs but also by the political situation in the United States. The presence of specific requirements and conditions obliging Washington to fulfill them may adversely affect some of the US political elites, primarily from the Republican Party. Thus, attracting private investment and creating the appropriate conditions may be the only effective approach for Washington. However, this option also has serious drawbacks. Successful management of sovereign risks cannot be guaranteed, and it also limits private capital inflows. As a consequence, the PGII may face uneven and slow development in a number of areas.

However, it is important to note that the IPEF and PAEP may be an attempt to prepare the political environment for more effective promotion of the Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership initiative. Speaking about the strategic advantages that the United States can receive from the development of the PGII and related regional initiatives, one can note the opportunity to influence the infrastructure and tools used by agents in the digital economy. Access to its facilities, tools, and services can be regulated much more easily and quickly than transport corridors. Under such conditions, the United States may be able to restrict access to certain resources for individual user countries, depending on its national interests. Furthermore, on the contrary, the ability to use the created infrastructure may imply the fulfillment of a number of specified conditions. Among current examples is the disconnection of Russian users from a number of services distributed on the Internet, ranging from entertainment media platforms to professional software.

Thus, the spread of the infrastructure that powers the digital economy can be faster and less expensive. In addition, its creation can give the United States a serious tool for economic and political influence on other countries. Such “leadership by subscription” will allow the United States to regulate and limit the interaction of third countries with the PRC, depending on the situation.

***

Comparative analysis of American and Chinese infrastructure projects shows significant differences between the parties in terms of planning, implementation, and initial capabilities. With a high degree of probability, the United States will not implement programs to create transport infrastructure, seeking to duplicate existing or emerging Chinese projects.

At the same time, in the context of the fourth industrial revolution and the development of the digital economy, emphasis will be placed on the digital infrastructure. Differences in approaches to the creation of such projects come down to the principles of their financing, management, and the number of partners involved. If the PRC acts unilaterally, the United States plans to cooperate actively with the G7 countries. In addition, American partners are expected to raise significantly more funds than the United States.

The US infrastructure strategy is reactionary and aimed at curbing Chinese initiatives. The reason is that Washington has become a hostage to the mechanisms of neoliberal globalization, which are becoming less effective in the current unfavorable conditions. At the same time, attempts by the United States to create projects like China’s are facing objective difficulties. One of them is Beijing’s qualitatively different strategic planning system, which enables it to implement more effectively multiyear comprehensive strategies for socioeconomic development, including in the field of global infrastructure.

It can be assumed that, in the event of negative dynamics in the development of American projects, the United States will face the real threat of losing its status as the leader of the world-system, which will lead to intensification of the struggle for markets and resources of the periphery and will also cause a comprehensive destabilization of international relations. If this option is developed, it is possible to predict a high probability of the militarization of the US–Chinese rivalry in various regions of the world, since militarily the United States remains much more powerful. This hypothesis is confirmed by the aggravation of a number of conflicts with indirect American participation: in Ukraine, Serbia, and Taiwan.