INTRODUCTION

Relations between the Republic of India and the United States, if we mean their almost 75-year-long history, can be represented as a rather changeable line. For the most part, especially in the past century, it was sluggish and, according to the definition of the experts of the US Council on Foreign Relations, resembled “estrangement” [1]. There were individual bursts, which were demonstratively multidirectional. For example, in 1962, the United States was on the side of “nonaligned” India in the border war with China but did not support it in 1971 in the Third Indo−Pakistani War. New tensions arose after the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 and the American sanctions announced in this context.

ASCENDING DYNAMICS

However, later this line in their relations slowly but consistently went up. Indeed, in the first decade of this century, the Prime Minister of India and the President of the United States held five summits, while in the previous 50 years there had been only three. In the 2010s, top-level contacts already acquired a distinctly regular character: from 2014 to 2020, N. Modi made six visits to the United States, and twice the head of the White House made official visits to India. In 2020–2021, Modi and President J. Biden held telephone conversations at least three times and participated in joint online events, including the virtual Quad summit in March 2021. Six months later in Washington, on the sidelines of the first in-person meeting of the top leaders of the countries of this group, the first personal negotiations between the current leaders of the United States and India took place, culminating in the signing of another Joint Statement [2].

Formal moments are also a sign of ascending dynamics. Since February 2020, when Biden’s predecessor D. Trump visited the Indian capital, the relations between the two countries began to be called a “comprehensive global strategic partnership” [3]; thus, their official status, previously defined as “partnership for prosperity,” was raised. It is not by chance that after this visit, authoritative analysts of the Foreign Affairs magazine stated that Trump and Modi had managed to rebuild bilateral relations seriously, which have consistently been strengthened [Shivshankar Menon, 2020, p. 132]. In the updated Indo–Pacific Strategy of the United States, adopted on February 11, 2022, Washington calls New Delhi “a steadfast regional ally” [4].

From 2000 to 2019, bilateral trade increased ten times to a record $146 billion. The United States is India’s main export market, the second largest source of direct investment (over $13 billion in the 2020−2021 Indian financial year alone), and one of the main recipients of direct investments from India itself (their accumulated volume is $22 billion) [5].

Such strengthening of ties is explained by a number of circumstances, of both bilateral and external nature, and at the same time relies on mutual interests [Kuzyk and Shaumyan, 2009].

MUTUAL INTERESTS: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS

Bilateral factors are trade and investment, including prospects for cooperation in the energy sector, including nuclear energy. For India, which has only an unofficial nuclear status, interaction with the United States means facilitating access to the markets of nuclear raw materials and technologies, makes it possible to mitigate restrictions from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and generally consolidates India’s position as a nuclear state. The United States, in turn, expects to facilitate its access to the Indian nuclear power plant market, the capacity of which is estimated at $100 billion. India buys from the United States significant volumes of oil (10.7 million tons in 2020; from the Russian Federation, 2.6 million) and LNG (3.3 billion cubic meters in 2020; from the Russian Federation, 0.7 billion) [6].

The interests of the developing bilateral military−technical ties are also of a reciprocal nature, where the value of contracts for the supply of weapons from the United States by 2021 exceeded $20 billion. The Americans receive large incomes, while India diversifies the sources of arms imports, which makes it possible to bargain with other suppliers.

However, equally important for the rapprochement of the two countries are external factors.

Each of the countries fears China in its own way: the United States proceeds from considerations of maintaining its global leadership and openly seeks to make India an ally in the confrontation with China, including by involving it in its own strategy on the Indo–Pacific region, put forward in 2017, with its dominance of military components. India is guided here by more complex considerations due to the long-standing territorial dispute between Delhi and Beijing: the two countries compete for regional influence, primarily in the Indian Ocean basin.

At the level of official contacts, Washington and New Delhi shy away from openly mentioning the “Chinese threat.” Most often, in joint Indian−American political statements, the attitude towards the “Chinese factor” is defined as the intention to promote common interests in the Indo–Pacific region and ensure regional stability and freedom of navigation. Often, especially in the context of the situation in the South China Sea, the parties declare universal calls to respect “the legitimate rights and interests of all nations according to international law” [7], which is perceived as a rather obvious signal to China.

In addition, India highly appreciates the position of the United States in support of its full-fledged membership in the UN Security Council, which has been consistently confirmed, including in joint documents of recent years.

The Russian factor cannot but influence the agenda of the dialogue between Washington and New Delhi. It is not by chance that India recently experienced serious pressure from the United States in connection with the acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system. In April 2022, against the backdrop of the events in Ukraine, Washington warned India “of serious risks” associated with an increase in oil purchases from Russia [8]. Moreover, according to Director of the National Economic Council B. Deese, Washington directly told the Indian leadership that in the case of closer strategic cooperation with Moscow, the consequences would be serious and long term [Juster et al., 2022].

With all this, it is no secret that US−Indian ties are having a rebound effect on New Delhi’s relations with Beijing and Moscow. Against the backdrop of Washington’s increased pressure on China and Russia in recent years, the United States is rather concerned about the growth of these ties. In this respect, the dialogue between Washington and New Delhi has long been perceived by many experts as part of a much more complex quadrangular structure—the United States−India−China−Russia.

PROSPECTS: THE CHINESE AND RUSSIAN FACTORS

What are the prospects for US relations with India in this context from the point of view of not only the bilateral agenda but, above all, the international one?

One can foresee that the general trends of recent years will continue in bilateral dialogue. The parties will cooperate in the areas in which their interests mentioned above, including the “Chinese factor,” are similar. However, limitations and zones of divergence, which are especially characteristic of New Delhi’s approaches, will also remain. While interested in developing a strategic dialogue with the United States, India is clearly striving to preserve its traditional “strategic autonomy,” which it reinforces by diversifying its global and regional policies as much as possible. Note that, in recent years, New Delhi has seemed to be striving increasingly to expand such autonomy to the economic sphere, emphasizing its own strengths [Subramanian and Felman, 2022, pp. 144, 145]. Let us also bear in mind the frictions directly in the bilateral agenda, which sometimes, for example, in trade, turn into open squabbles. As Foreign Affairs observers have recently recalled, in 2019 the United States denied duty-free access to India’s products to the American market, which it provides to developing countries; this move was motivated by the fact that India had not given the United States equal access to its market [9]. The issue has been discussed since then, but to no avail thus far. In addition, India is on the US list of countries where, according to the United States, human rights violations take place. In particular, Secretary of State A. Blinken spoke about this at the press conference on April 11, 2022, and the quick answer to him was the statement of the head of Indian diplomacy, who recalled that India has its own idea of human rights [10].

There is no doubt that the degree of rapprochement between India and the United States, especially from New Delhi, will largely depend on the situation in China−India relations.

After resolution of the acute phase of the border conflict in the spring−summer 2020, on the one hand, tensions between Beijing and New Delhi remain, while on the other hand, negotiations continue on a further settlement (the 14th and 15th rounds of meetings were held in January−March at the level of commanders of the border corps of the two countries), and there are fairly stable mutual signals that the parties have not excluded the resumption of full-scale cooperation. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted at a press conference following the recent March session of the NPC, “… sustainable development, peace, and harmony between the two countries would serve as a guarantee of peace and prosperity on the planet…. May there always be a partnership of mutual benefit between us instead of rivalry” [11]. This seems to have enjoyed a moderate but positive response in India. Two weeks later, Wang Yi held talks in New Delhi with his Indian counterpart, who, assessing the meeting, noted the great significance of the bilateral ties and India’s interest in stable and predictable relations with China [12]. One way or another, trade between the two countries in 2021 reached a record level in the history of their relations—$125.5 billion, having increased by 43% over the year [13].

This means that India is unlikely to show a greater inclination than before to cross anti-Chinese “red lines” in dialogue with Washington—both in bilateral dialogue with the United States and in the Quad, where, according to official New Delhi, India is emphasizing the economic agenda [14].

As for the mutual influence of the Indian−American dialogue and Russian−Indian relations, a certain balance should be expected here too. However, it is clear that the Ukrainian events in the spring of 2022 inserted new challenges into the situation in the United States−Russia−India triangle. Assessing the possible scenarios here, one should keep in mind the position of clear neutrality regarding Ukraine, which was immediately taken by India, just as in 2014, distancing itself from anti-Russian sanctions [15].

Indicatively, along with the diplomatic formulations of official New Delhi about its interest in relations with all countries, about the task of achieving peace as soon as possible, many in Indian media, including the blogosphere, clearly spoke for Russia as a proven, long-term, and reliable friend of India, which had supported it more than once [16]. On the contrary, doubts were expressed about the allied strength of the United States, which, using the example of Hussein, had more than once betrayed those whom it called friends. Attention was also drawn to the mercenary nature of the US attitude to India: the United States, unlike Russia, is moving away, for example, from the transfer of defense technologies and seeking to put India in a dependent position.

President V.V. Putin’s visit to India in December 2021, including the holding of the first 2 + 2 Dialogue between the Foreign and Defense Ministers of India and Russia in New Delhi on December 6, 2021, was a success. Important issues in bilateral relations, including in the context of the new realities caused by the Ukrainian events and sanctions policy of the United States, were discussed during the negotiations, which were held in the Indian capital in late March−early April 2022 by Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov. They discussed ways to switch to the “ruble−rupee” scheme in bilateral trade operations, including settlements for India’s significantly increasing imports of Russian oil in 2022 and the already realized exports of a number of Indian goods to the Russian Federation. Other topics were also touched upon, connected with the possibilities of removing traditionally strong bilateral relations from the pressure of Western sanctions. For the same purposes, India, shortly after the start of the Ukrainian crisis, created a government interdepartmental group to study the impact of anti-Russian sanctions on the Indian economy and find solutions, including through mutual settlements in national currencies, with orientation to the Chinese yuan as the base exchange rate equivalent [18].

Note, however, that almost simultaneously with the Russian Foreign Minister, the Indian Prime Minister received British Foreign Minister L. Truss, and three weeks before that, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar had had a personal meeting in Melbourne with Blinken. In the interval between these events, Deputy Secretary of State V. Nuland visited the Indian capital and, as part of the next round of regular US−Indian consultations at the level of deputy foreign ministers, insisted on the increased need for cooperation between the two major democracies and on India’s refusal to import Russian weapons [19]. Recall that, since the beginning of the year, the Indian Prime Minister has held telephone or online negotiations with almost all the leaders of the leading Western countries (Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Australia, Canada, France), as well as Poland and Ukraine, and took part in the online Quad summit on March 3, 2022 [20]. On March 31, Indian Deputy Foreign Minister Harsh Shringla received US Deputy National Security Adviser Daleep Singh to discuss Ukraine and developments in the Indo–Pacific region [21].

At the same time, despite the tightened agenda of negotiations with Washington, influential Indian experts stated that tension in relations between the United States and India had increased. Allegedly, this was caused by “Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s reluctance to criticize Putin, which has complicated a budding security partnership between the democracies in countering China’s influence.” Citing the April 6 speech of the Indian Foreign Minister to his parliamentarians as the basis for such an assessment, commentators in The Times of India emphasized that, for India, Russia is an “important partner in a variety of areas”; based on this, it is “assessing the implications” of the Ukrainian events and “deciding what is best for our national interests” [24].

RUSSIA−INDIA−CHINA DIALOGUE FORMAT

In other words, India’s parallel dialogue with Moscow and with the United States and other Western countries, including Quad members, can be considered one of the most likely scenarios for the near future. It seems much less likely that New Delhi’s policy of “autonomy and equidistance” will abruptly change to a formal union with Washington, the possibility of which was recently analyzed by some researchers [Brahma Chellaney, 2020].

In fact, this was again indicated by the results of the regular online meeting of Biden and Modi on April 11, 2022, and the subsequent face-to-face talks between the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs (2 + 2 format), when the parties continued the dialogue on security and other areas of cooperation, but the Indian leaders again refrained from criticizing Russia in the Ukrainian context and avoided any commitment to reduce cooperation with the Russian Federation [25]. For similar reasons, and despite the current difficulties in Sino−Indian relations, the Russia−India−China (RIC) dialogue format remains relevant. This format was not too much affected by the Ukrainian events, which was facilitated by the fact that both India and China assessed it from similar, neutral, positions, refraining from criticizing and condemning Russia and fencing off anti-Russian sanctions. The RIC continues to be considered important in Moscow and Beijing. New Delhi shows no intention of leaving it either.

Recall that on November 21, 2021, the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, China, and India held a regular annual event—trilateral negotiations (held since 2002; the last two years, in an online format), culminating in the adoption of a joint communiqué [26]. The need to promote trilateral cooperation further was once again recorded in the Joint Russian Statement following the December (2021) visit of the President of the Russian Federation to India [27]. The same approach was confirmed during the above-mentioned talks of Lavrov in New Delhi in the spring of 2022. Let us note that, having arrived in the Indian capital from Beijing, where he had previously met with Minister Wang Yi, the head of Russian diplomacy, among other things, referred to a positive opinion about the prospects of the RIC, again expressed by the Chinese side [28].

India, let us repeat, quite routinely combines RIC-like formats with its participation in similar Western-oriented dialogue configurations (for example, in the US−India−Japan trio). Therefore, the likelihood of India curtailing its participation in the unification of the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization seems even lower than in the case of the RIC.

India today can once again use the benefits of the beneficiary, when, in connection with the events in Ukraine, its international position is important to both Russia and the West. The above-mentioned abundance of visits to the Indian capital by leaders of various countries is good evidence of this.

As some observers reasonably emphasize, the United States, not wanting to lose the “Indian resource” in its confrontation with China, refrains from quarreling with India because of its special position on Ukraine [29].

However, India’s position is important for Russia as well. It was the opinion of India, according to the same experts, that was taken into account, for example, in the communiqué following the second Quad summit, which “failed to condemn Russia” [30].

Such a situation objectively promotes the interests of the Russian Federation, which means that in any case it requires a flexible and carefully adjusted policy of Russia in the Indian−American−Russian triangle.

At the same time, one should keep in mind the high degree of dynamics of the international landscape associated with the new Ukrainian crisis. Its consequences can make important adjustments to forecast scenarios.