The series of enlargements of the European Union has led to an increase in the number of member states, population, and the size of the union’s economy. In addition, these enlargements also entailed qualitative changes in the agenda and priorities of the Union, institutions and the decision-making process, and changed the attitude towards the European Union on the part of other international actors. It is no coincidence that Hiski Haukkala noted that “the successive rounds of enlargements have been a factor shaping the EU [Haukkala, 2011, p. 47]. From a similar position, Yuri Borko studied the complex relationship between the processes of expanding and deepening of integration [Borko, 2006].

The decision of the European Union to grant the status of a candidate country to Ukraine means a fundamental change in the logic and goal setting of the enlargement policy and will have a strategic impact on the design of integration processes both within the European Union and on its periphery. This article is devoted to the analysis of two aspects of the ongoing changes: (1) the geopoliticization of the enlargement policy and (2) the development of differentiation processes and the prospect for the emergence of new forms of external differentiated integration (partial membership).

THE EU ENLARGEMENT POLICY: OVERVIEW

Official rhetoric and foreign expert assessments [Smith, 2003; Vachudova, 2005] note that the policy of enlargement, at least until the end of the 2000s, was the most effective instrument of EU foreign policy.

Historically, two goals of the EU enlargement strategy can be traced.

Through enlargement, the European Union tried to fix the trend towards democratic transition in neighboring countries and thereby reduce the risk of “importing” instability. In particular, this logic appears to have underpinned the decision to start eastward enlargement, adopted in the early 1990s. Later, security stabilization became one of the elements in the preparation of the countries of the Western Balkans for EU membership and an important component of the European Neighborhood Policy/Eastern Partnership.

However, since the early 1990s much more important was the strategy of the European Union projecting its norms and values, for which the enlargement policy provided a legitimate and effective toolkit. At the theoretical level, this was interpreted in terms of external Europeanization [Lavenex, 2004; Radaelli, 2003], political conditionality [Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2010], and normative [Manners, 2002] and transformational [Grabbe, 2006] EU power.

From the point of view of the internal evolution of the European Union, the most important consequence of the enlargements of 1995, 2004, and 2007, in our opinion, was the development of elements of differentiated integration in the European Union. In the context of this article, it is especially important that during this period new formats of EU interaction with third countries developed, which can be interpreted as elements of external differentiated integration. Third countries accept the legislation, standards, and regulatory practices of the European Union, but receive neither the right to influence the formation of the acquis communautaire nor the right to participate in EU integration projects.Footnote 1 As a reward for advancing along the path of reform, candidate countries and countries participating in the Eastern Partnership receive bonuses such as preferential trade regimes, visa-free regimes, etc., that is, more advanced forms of external interaction with the EU system, but not admission into the system. Such external differentiated integration is usually interpreted as either a set of different formats for EU interaction with third countries [Piris, 2016; Babynina, 2021; Gstöhl and Phinnemore, 2021] or the concept of concentric circles of external governance [De Neve, 2007; Kaveshnikov, 2011; Lavenex, 2011].

Since the late 2000s, the enlargement policy has stalled both in the geographical sense and in the sense of the transformation of the applicant countries.Footnote 2 Until 2022, it was de facto limited to the region of the Western Balkans.Footnote 3 Three reasons are usually given to explain this: the EU is tired of enlargement, the applicant countries are tired of waiting, and the influence of other actors (China, Russia). Thus, using the example of the Western Balkans, one can see the factors that determine the limits of the effectiveness of the conditionality and the transformational power of the EU [Elbasani, 2013; Kandel’, 2020]. In many respects, the situation in the Eastern Partnership countries appeared similar [Borzel and Langbein, 2013; Bazhan, 2015]. In addition, competition between the integration projects of the Eastern Partnership and the Eurasian Economic Union was growing in Eastern Europe, reflecting the growing geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West [Delcour, 2015; Korosteleva, 2016; Vinokurov et al., 2015].

The EU enlargement policy after 2004‒2007 balanced between the need to define the borders of the “Europe of the European Union” and the fear of undermining the normative power of the EU as a result of abandoning the principle of openness to all European states. It should be recognized that the Western Balkan and Eastern European countries increasingly perceived the practice of enlargement policy as a practice of exclusion, as the construction of a normative and institutional “wall” around the perimeter of the EU [Bélanger and Schimmelfennig, 2021; Scazzieri, 2021]. In academic discourse, the relationship between the removal of barriers (in the broad sense of the word) within the EU (debordering) and the strengthening of barriers at the external border (rebordering) has become legitimate, but not recognized by politicians [Schimmelfennig, 2021].

GEOPOLITICS OF ENLARGEMENT

The strengthening of the geopolitical component in the enlargement policy is inscribed in the general evolution of the EU’s foreign policy. The first results of a conceptual review of the foundations of foreign policy were reflected in the EU Global Strategy of 2016. A new balance between interests and values was established in the formula of “principled pragmatism,” which reflected a shift from the goals of transforming partners (especially neighbors) to a more realistic approach aimed at promoting the resilience of partner countries [Danilov, 2017; Romanova and Pavlova, 2019]. The concept of resilience logically supplemented the concept of the EU’s strategic sovereignty (strategic autonomy), discussions about which have been going on for the past decades. The need to achieve strategic sovereignty has become a key objective of the EU foreign policy and, in general, integration building during the “geopolitical” European Commission of Ursula von der Leyen. The use of “the rhetoric of sovereignty reveals the EU’s desire for the status of a great power … for the geopoliticization of the EU’s external relations” [Romanova, 2021, p. 42]. At the same time, the geopolitical dimension of foreign policy “today is a new basis for intra-European consolidation” [Bolgova, 2020, p. 42].

For many years, foreign policy of the European Union did not take into account the obvious factor that “geopolitics still matters, and the great powers play power politics”; in recent years, the European Union has increasingly faced challenges related to the actions of the three great powers—the United States, China, and Russia [Biscop, 2019, pp. 7, 8, 18]. Such geopolitical concerns were also expressed in relation to the situation in the regions neighboring the European Union: back in 2018, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said, “We must find unity when it comes to the Western Balkans – once and for all. Should we not, our immediate neighbourhood will be shaped by others. [emphasis added by N.K.].”Footnote 4

The concept of resilience allows the European Union to “pragmatically balance interests and principles” [Blockmans, 2017, p. 7], while ensuring strategic sovereignty should provide tools for more effective interaction with the outside world. The goal of EU foreign policy should be to protect European interests, to ensure that Europeans can continue to live the way they have chosen, and not to change the way other people live [Biscop, 2019]. From this point of view, the key interest of the European Union in relation to neighboring countries is to promote their stability and prevent the influx of refugees and economic migrants, the import of terrorism, the import of instability from zones of regional conflicts, etc.

The geopoliticization of foreign policy was reflected in the evaluation of the enlargement policy. The European Commission in the Communication of 2018 declared that potential accession of the countries of the Western Balkans corresponds to “the Union’s very own political, security and economic interest,” that this is a “geostrategic investment,” “an investment in the EU’s security, economic growth and influence and in its ability to protect its citizens.”Footnote 5

Comparative analysis of the Communication of the European Commission of 2018 and the previous document of 2015 shows a change in rhetoric regarding the Western Balkans, from the priority promotion of EU norms to the protection of EU interests in the region [Petrovic and Tzifakis, 2021]. The evolution of the position of the European Commission reflected changes in political rhetoric in the EU countries; in the national discourse on enlargement and the Eastern Partnership, issues of economy and democratization gradually gave way to security concerns [Góra, 2021]. At the same time, “geopoliticization” does not mean the imposition of membership, the key prerequisite for the EU enlargement policy is still the desire of the applicant countries to become members of the European Union and receive all the benefits arising from this.

At the same time, the growing geopolitical discourse on enlargement in the Western Balkans has not led to significant changes in practical policy until recently [Petrovic and Tzifakis, 2021]. In the Eastern Partnership region, the European Union was in principle unable to develop a common position on whether these countries should be included in some common space with the European Union to minimize the threats and risks arising from there.

Moscow’s decision to launch a large-scale special military operation on the territory of Ukraine has become a powerful trigger for strengthening the geopolitical component in the EU’s foreign policy. Already on February 24, 2022, the European Council characterized Moscow’s actions as “unprovoked and unjustified military aggression.”Footnote 6 The Versailles Declaration, adopted at the informal meeting of EU leaders on March 10–11, showed a broad consensus that Russia’s actions “constitute a tectonic shift in European history.”Footnote 7 This conflict is certainly a conflict over the formation of the future world order. The position of President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen—“This is a clash between the rule of law and the rule of the gun, between democracies and autocracies, between a rules-based order and a world of naked aggression. How we respond today to what Russia is doing will determine the future of the international system”Footnote 8— reflects the mood of most politicians in the EU countries (and more broadly, Western countries).

For many years, Western countries believed that they would be able to maintain a balance between containment of Russia and constructive practical cooperation. As Dmitrii Danilov rightly notes, they “underestimated Moscow’s readiness to abandon the tactical game … in favor of a strategic choice” (cited by Gromyko et al., 2022, p. 80). Today, the EU countries, and more broadly the countries of the global West, see no medium-term opportunity to return to the balance of the previous decade.

The extremely sharp reaction to Russia’s actions is provoked, among other things, by the fact that Ukraine is perceived by Europeans as a member of the family, and “aggression against Ukraine,” as an attack on “one of us.” These views are now characteristic of the public opinion of the EU countries and the majority of the political elite.

The current conflict has forced European countries to rethink their security strategy radically. Currently, European countries are increasing their defense budgets and are implementing a wide range of long-term and short-term practical military-political measures at the national and community levels. Adopted on March 21, 2022, the EU Strategic CompassFootnote 9 “reflected a significant and long-term shift in the position of the European Union towards Russia, the opposition to which has now become the most important task of the CSDP” [Aleshin, 2022]. Cooperation between the European Union and NATO and coordination of actions in the G7 format have intensified.

Precisely because Ukraine is now perceived as part of the “European family,” the European Union and member states are implementing a wide range of measures to support Kyiv, including the first ever supply of lethal weapons in the history of the European Union. It is no coincidence that, speaking about the supply of weapons, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell noted, “Another taboo has fallen… Yes, we are doing it. Because this war requires our engagement to support the Ukrainian army.”Footnote 10 Assessing the threat as a strategic one, the Europeans are ready to pay a big price. As Ursula von der Leyen put it in September 2022: “Many of us have taken democracy for granted for far too long…. Today we all see that we must fight for our democracy every single day.”Footnote 11

The change in attitude towards Ukraine made possible a substantive discussion of the country’s application for EU membership. For some time, there has been an intense discussion in the European Union about Ukraine’s compliance with the membership criteria and the need to comply with the procedure, as well as potential risks. However, in the end, the political approach prevailed over the technocratic one.

Noteworthy is the speed with which the European Commission prepared a conclusion on the possibility of granting Ukraine the status of a candidate country. Ukraine received questionnaires on April 8 (on compliance with political and economic criteria) and on April 13 (on the degree of adaptation to the acquis), submitted its answers on April 17 and May 9, and already on June 17, the European Commission issued a positive conclusion.Footnote 12

An extraordinary and symbolic event was the visit to Kyiv on June 16, 2022, of the German Chancellor, the President of France, and the Prime Minister of Italy, during which they supported the proposal to grant Ukraine the status of a candidate country. After that, a few skeptical EU countries had to accept the inevitable, and a positive decision was a foregone conclusion.

The European Council on June 23–24 officially granted Ukraine the status of a candidate country. The discourse justifying this decision is mainly of geopolitical nature. President of the European Council Charles Michel said after the summit, “This is a historic moment, which allows us to sketch the contours of the European Union…. We are sending a very strong message: it is at once a message of unity and a signal of geopolitical determination [emphasis added N.K.].”Footnote 13 Josep Borrell noted that this is a signal not only to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, but it is a signal that “should echo loudly beyond our borders as a manifestation of our strength and unity and support to these three countries, and especially to the one that is being aggressed by Russia.”Footnote 14 Thus, the previously hidden geopolitical dimension of the enlargement process is now becoming more pronounced.

It is symptomatic that Georgia has not received candidate status, although, according to expert assessments (see the third part), its compliance with EU standards of political and economic governance is at least no lower than that of Moldova and Ukraine. Apparently, the European Union decided to provide support to those countries that are faced with current military-political risks.

Stating the fact of strategic confrontation and division of Europe, Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly spoke about the economic, financial, and technological aggression of the West, “I am talking about aggression, there is no other way to call it.”Footnote 15 Western leaders interpret this confrontation as a conflict between democracy and autocracy. For them, as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz noted, “the question arises of where the dividing line between a free Europe and a neo-imperialist autocracy will henceforth be drawn.”Footnote 16 The whole range of measures to support Ukraine and put pressure on Russia is an attempt to answer this question. A reviewed policy of enlargement is also a means to demarcate this border between the two parts of Europe; Ursula von der Leyen, delivering annual State of the Union speech in the European Parliament on September 14, 2022, said, “I want the people of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia to know: You are part of our family, your future is in our Union, and our Union is not complete without you!”Footnote 17

THE CONCEPT OF PARTIAL MEMBERSHIP AS A NEW TREND IN EXTERNAL DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION

In the first part of this article, it was noted that one of the consequences of the enlargement policy was an increase in the elements of differentiation within the European Union, as well as the development of external differentiated integration. At the same time, within the framework of external differentiated integration, candidate countries and applicant countries receive more advanced forms of external interaction with the European Union, but until the moment of entry they do not receive admission “inside” the political, socioeconomic, and regulatory space of the European Union.

The fundamental readiness to reconsider this logic is declared in the new approach to enlargement, which the European Commission unveiled in 2020.Footnote 18 One of the key elements of the new approach, the principle of “positive and negative conditionality,” implies predetermined incentives that candidate countries can receive based on the progress of reforms at each stage of the pre-accession process. At the same time, it is possible to deprive a candidate country of previously granted incentives in the event of “any stagnation or serious backsliding in the reform process.” What is especially important in the context of this article is that one of the forms of incentive could be “closer integration” of candidate countries with the European Union and their “phasing-in to individual EU policies, the EU market and EU programmes.”Footnote 19

Until recently, the idea of partial membership had not received significant practical implementation. However, there remains a political consensus in the EU in support of this idea. In particular, the European Council in June 2022 noted the need to “to further advance the gradual integration” between the European Union and the candidate countries “in a reversible and merit-based manner.”Footnote 20

In this context, we should mention the ideas of the European Political Community (French President Emmanuel MacronFootnote 21) and the European Geopolitical Community (President of the European Council Charles MichelFootnote 22). These ideas are very vague; in most general form they proposed to create an institutionalized format of relations between the European Union and neighboring countries, including political dialogue and closer cooperation in the field of energy, transport, investment, and people movement. Such a format could theoretically become, by analogy with the European Economic Area, a way to involve candidate countries partially in the economic and regulatory space of the European Union and provide mechanisms for taking their voice into account in the decision-making process. However, other formats for organizing partial membership are also possible, which, if put into practice, will lead to the emergence of new forms of differentiation within the European Union due to the partial admission of candidate countries “inside” the EU space in terms of both economic activity and participation in decision-making.

In parallel, since 2021, various forms of partial membership have been discussed at the expert level in relation to the countries of the Western Balkans [Scazzieri, 2021; Emerson et al., 2021]. This expert discussion intensified in the spring of 2022 in the context of active combat operations on the territory of Ukraine [Emerson et al., 2022; Scazzieri, 2022; Chopin et al., 2022].

All these expert papers propose the participation of candidate countries in individual EU integration projects and policies, various forms of their participation in the activities of EU institutions, primarily the Council of Ministers and its working bodies (in the status of observers or with the right to participate in discussions but without the right to vote), and their access to funding from the EU budget in accordance with the general rules of the EU sectoral policies but in a smaller amount (for example, in the amount of 50–75% of the amounts due to full EU members).

Paradoxically, Ukraine, as well as Moldova and Georgia, have shown at least comparable success to the countries of the Western Balkans in implementing the reforms envisaged by the process of rapprochement with the European Union. Based on the results of annual monitoring, the European Commission noted that Ukraine has ensured a high degree of harmonization of national legislation with EU law: in 2020, the country implemented 54% of the acquis; in 2021 this figure increased to 63%; and in 2022, to 70%.Footnote 23

In 2021, experts from one of the leading European think tanks, the Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), compared the extent to which the countries of the Western Balkans and the three countries of the Eastern Partnership (Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia) have progressed in implementing the reforms provided for by agreements with the EU [Emerson et al., 2021]. Such a comparison is fundamentally possible, since the detailed action plans provided for in the Association Agreements are largely similar to the commitments of candidate countries in the process of accession negotiations. The CEPS experts used the methodology that the European Commission uses in evaluating the progress of the candidate countries and assessed their readiness for accession for each of the negotiating chapters in points from 0 (not at all ready) to 3 (good readiness). As a result, they concluded that, from a technical point of view, the readiness of Georgia for EU membership in 2020 (1.93 points), Ukraine (1.81), and Moldova (1.71) was higher than that of potential candidates—Kosovo (1.35) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1.55)—and is comparable to the readiness of Albania (1.73), which has the status of a candidate country.

In the 2010s political and geopolitical considerations determined an extremely restrained approach to the prospects for the accession of the countries of the Eastern Partnership to the European Union. Potential risks gave reason to underestimate the progress of these countries along the path of reforms recommended by the European Union. In the spring of 2022, when all these risks materialized on an unexpected scale, the geopolitical logic of the European Union began to work in favor of Kyiv, as shown in the second part of this article.

By the results of assessment of Ukraine’s application for accession, the European Commission concluded that the country has a “vital democracy,” and the economy demonstrates “strong macroeconomic record” and a “noteworthy resilience... after February 2022.”Footnote 24 At the same time, the European Commission, recommending to grant Ukraine a candidate status, noted that the country needs to carry out serious reforms in the future in the field of justice, the fight against corruption and money laundering, media regulation, and legislation on national minorities.Footnote 25

Given the presence of political will on the part of Brussels and the member states, the high degree of regulatory compatibility and the existing assessments of the implementation of the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, it can be assumed that the European Union, in the logic of partial membership, can offer Ukraine a fairly wide range of forms of partial membership.

In terms of political cooperation, informal participation in individual European Council summits and some meetings of sectoral Council of Ministers is possible (this practice already took place in the spring and summer of 2022). On a practical level, one can predict the participation in the activities of some working bodies of the Council of Ministers (committees, working groups) when they discuss issues directly related to interaction between the European Union and Ukraine. In the medium term, the permanent participation of Ukrainian representatives as observers in the activities of the working bodies of the Council of Ministers in those sectoral areas of EU policy to which Ukraine can be connected is not ruled out. It is quite easy to involve Ukraine in the work of some EU agencies, for example, the European Committee for Standardization.

In terms of economic integration, Ukraine’s admission to the EU Single Market in terms of free movement of goods is very likely. Technically, this is possible, since even in previous years the European Commission noted the great progress of Ukraine in the field of standardization and technical regulation. It is symptomatic that in June 2022 the European Union suspended (for a period of one year) the import duties in trade with Ukraine.

Even today, there are no significant technical obstacles to involve Ukraine in a number of EU sectoral policies. First of all, these are energy (in the context of membership in the Energy Community and participation in the Energy Connectivity in Central and Southeastern Europe initiative, Ukraine has ensured a high degree of regulatory compatibility with the European Union), transport (in the context of the implementation of the Association Agreement, Ukraine generally corresponds to the level of regulatory compatibility with the European Union, achieved by the countries of the Western Balkans within the framework of the Transport Community), and telecommunications (plans have already been announced to include Ukraine in the EU free roaming space).

In the medium term, it is possible to involve Ukraine in such integration projects as the Digital Single Market and the Banking Union.

In the medium or long term, one can not exclude the spread of the activities of the EU structural funds to Ukraine, provided that the funds allocated to it are limited. Such a limitation is theoretically possible in the form of a limit on allocated funds (a share of GDP) or in other forms.

Of course, various formats of partial membership will be offered not only to Ukraine but also to Moldova, Georgia, and the countries of the Western Balkans. These forms of participation of candidate countries in the EU activities will be positioned not as an alternative (as, for example, was originally conceived in the Eastern Partnership program) but as transitional steps on the way to full membership.

Forms of political participation by candidate countries may be implemented in the near future. Gradual inclusion of candidate countries in particular EU sectoral policies can be carried out taking into account their economic dynamics, as well as political and regulatory reforms required in the context of accession negotiations. As for Ukraine, most economic forms of partial membership can be implemented only after the cessation of active combat operations on the territory of the country. The speed and degree of involvement in sectoral policies will inevitably be linked to the restoration of the economic potential of Ukraine and later to the continuation of sectoral reforms. Most likely, the European Union, when deciding whether to involve Ukraine in individual sectoral policies, will assess progress in areas such as the quality of public administration, the reform of law enforcement agencies, and the fight against corruption as a framework condition.

The European Union is not ready to give Ukraine a “fast track” of accession, but has already given it a “quick start” and is very likely to be ready to give it and other applicant countries some form of partial membership.

At the moment, it is not clear how soon and under what conditions the armed conflict on the territory of Ukraine will be resolved. This uncertainty makes it extremely difficult to develop any timetable for Ukraine’s progress towards EU accession and theoretically possible partial membership formats. In the long term, the question of principle is to what extent the European Union will be ready to provide Ukraine with advanced forms of partial membership in the context of long-term actual and potential security risks. Obviously, the European Union itself is not capable of providing the necessary security guarantees. With such guarantees in place and a steady freezing of the conflict, the European Union will most likely not perceive Ukraine’s unresolved territorial disputes as an insurmountable obstacle to advanced partial membership, and in the long term, full membership of Ukraine. In the context of the current confrontation between the European Union and Russia, refusal of membership due to territorial disputes is unacceptable for European politicians, since it would mean that “the enlargement procedures be taken hostage by Russia” [Emerson et al, 2022, p. 7]. Even if scenarios of conflict resolution are favorable for Ukraine, Ukraine’s accession to the European Union as a full-fledged member is possible only after the restoration of a significant part of the lost economic potential and the implementation of complex reforms, which can hardly be expected earlier than 10–15 years.

CONCLUSIONS

In the second half of the 2010s, the process of conceptual rethinking of the EU enlargement policy, its goals, tools, and forms of interaction with the applicant countries was gradually going on. This was partly due to the stalling of the enlargement process, partly due to changes in the regional and global systems of international relations. The Russian–Ukrainian conflict of 2022 and the related decision by Ukraine to send a formal application for EU membership gave a powerful impetus to the transformation of enlargement policy.

The logic of projecting norms and values and transformation of partner countries that dominated earlier in the European Union faded into the background, giving way to the geopolitical logic of ensuring the security of the countries of the “European family.” The large-scale special military operation initiated by Moscow on the territory of Ukraine led to the formation of a strategic division in Europe. The EU enlargement policy is becoming one of the tools by which Western countries are trying to demarcate the emerging border between the two parts of Europe and to protect the “European family” (including non-EU members) from the influence of external actors whose vision of the future and justice fundamentally contradicts the basic “European” values.

The decision of the European Union to grant Ukraine (as well as Moldova) candidate status can intensify the practical implementation of the concept of partial membership of candidate countries outlined in recent years. If the trend of gradual involvement of the candidate countries in the activities of the European Union develops in accordance with the assumptions formulated, this will provide an incentive for the development of new formats for the EU’s interaction with these countries and will contribute to the accelerated development of elements of external differentiated integration.