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Prospects for Limiting Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

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Abstract

The continuation of the treaty process of interaction between Russia and the United States in the reduction and control of nuclear weapons largely depends on the ability of the parties to find ways to include nonstrategic (operational–tactical) nuclear weapons (NSNWs) into this process. The positions of the parties on this issue differ significantly. The United States, according to the statements of its officials, would like to reach an agreement that includes full-scale measures of transparency and control over all nuclear warheads, including NSNW warheads. The Russian side perceives this approach as unacceptable for itself. The current difference in the views of the parties on this issue makes the prospect of reaching the next agreement, after the expiration of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms in 2026, rather vague. This paper is devoted to an overview of the state of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Russia and the United States and the current directives; in addition, the Russian–American experience in the control of nuclear warheads is considered. Possible solutions are proposed to ensure progress towards reaching a new agreement on the limitation and control of nuclear weapons.

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Notes

  1. The yield of nuclear weapons is measured in kilotons or megatons; one kiloton corresponds to the energy released during the explosion of 1000 tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT); 1 kiloton (kt) TNT = 4.184 × 1012 J.

  2. A plutonium pit is a component of a nuclear warhead, consisting of parts made of weapons-grade plutonium and designed to initiate a thermonuclear reaction using the energy released during an explosion due to a chain reaction of plutonium fission.

  3. Bombs of this type were withdrawn from the US active arsenal in 2016.

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  1. Primakov National Research Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

    A. S. Diakov

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Translated by B. Alekseev

Anatolii Stepanovich Diakov, Cand. Sci. (Phys.–Math.), is a Leading Researcher at the Primakov IMEMO RAS.

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Diakov, A.S. Prospects for Limiting Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. Her. Russ. Acad. Sci. 92, 151–160 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1019331622010026

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