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Multilevel determinants of MNC corruption risk

Journal of International Business Policy (2021)Cite this article

A Correction to this article was published on 30 August 2021

This article has been updated

Abstract

We explore the multi-level determinants of firm-level corruption risk among multinational corporations (MNCs) in both developed and developing market economies in a comparative context. We argue that institutional and regulatory environments affect MNCs’ anti-corruption performance. We employ a comprehensive measure of MNC corruption risk and find evidence for the influence of country-level institutional and regulatory effects, while firm-level financial characteristics also influence anti-corruption performance. Furthermore, the effects of institutional and regulatory environments differ between developed and developing markets. In general, our framework and results highlight the utility of strong legal and regulatory environments, particularly in developing markets, to combat MNC corruption risk.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    Juliane Markscheffel

  2. School of Public Policy, University College London, London, UK

    Michael Plouffe

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  1. Juliane Markscheffel
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  2. Michael Plouffe
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Correspondence to Michael Plouffe.

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Accepted by Luis Dau, Area Editor, 28 May 2021. This article has been with the authors for two revisions.

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Markscheffel, J., Plouffe, M. Multilevel determinants of MNC corruption risk. J Int Bus Policy (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s42214-021-00116-7

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Keywords

  • corruption
  • institutional environment
  • multinational corporations (MNCs) and enterprises (MNEs)
  • multilevel analysis