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Hydrohegemony in the context of Shatt al-Arab River: from coercion to consent

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Abstract

The Shatt al-Arab River (SAR) is a transboundary river between Iraq and Iran. The bulk of it has traditionally been under Iraqi jurisdiction, yet Iran has always held significant influence. This paper applies the framework of hydro-hegemony to distinguish between two different hegemonic configurations operated over SAR. In the first period, Iran exercised coercive tactics, prompting Iraq to sign the Algeria Accord in 1975. However, after four years, the eight-year war between the two states revoked this institutional order, paving the way for a new era. During this period, which began dominantly after 2003, Iran exerted soft power. The Iranian Islamic regime manipulated ties with Iraqi elites to influence the course of Iraqi policy. Nonetheless, by helping Iraqis defeat ISIS and curbing the Kurdish issues following their referendum to separate from Iraq in 2017, Iran ensured the majority of Iraqis' willing acquiescence. Consequently, it contained SAR on its own terms.

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Notes

  1. The lesser and great Tunb and Abu Musa islands are strategically critical security for the Hormuz strait, which passes through it about 40% of the world's oil. Iran occupied the islands after the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf.

  2. The agreement was signed under British authority on 4th July 1937, between Iran and Iraq (Zargar 2011).

  3. At the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meeting in Algeria, the Algerian President Houari Boumediene brokered a meeting between the Vice President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein (President later), and the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Riza Pahlavi.

  4. Iran's support for the PUK extended to the Kurdish civil war of the 1990s, whereas Turkey backed the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

  5. Article 3 of the Algeria Accord states the two parties form “the Permanent Joint Technical Commission”. The PJTC met only once before the war in 1980.

  6. He is considered a former leader of the Islamic Dawa Party when he went to Iran at the behest of the party's founder, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, in 1979. He became the latter's agent and his special representative to Imam Khomeini. The Dawa Party behold to Shahroudi a reference (Marja'), though he was assigned many of the highest Iran positions.

  7. He was assigned a Minister of Foreign Affairs within the Haider al-Abadi government.

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Correspondence to Luay Hussien AlDalooi.

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AlDalooi, L.H. Hydrohegemony in the context of Shatt al-Arab River: from coercion to consent. Int Polit 60, 310–329 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-022-00398-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-022-00398-5

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