Abstract
What have been the consequences of NATO enlargement for European security? To the vindication of its critics, the consequences appear disastrous. Insecurity pervades Europe while NATO is in crisis with a Russia justifiably aggrieved by broken promises and the overreach of liberal hegemony. This insecurity is especially troubling because NATO’s newer commitments are indefensible. In this essay, I evaluate these criticisms of NATO enlargement and advance three claims. First, intentionally or not, NATO enlargement has fulfilled a reasonable need to hedge against Russian resurgence. Critics of NATO enlargement themselves conceded that Russia could become revisionist once it reconstitutes itself. Second, NATO enlargement still allows for mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia. It has not been responsible for Russia’s internal political development and aggressive foreign policy choices. Finally, NATO enlargement does not necessitate expensive deterrence measures to secure its most vulnerable members. NATO enlargement thus has hugely benefited European security.
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Notes
On counterfactual analysis and NATO enlargement, see Marten (2018).
To be fair, Mearsheimer (1993, 57) cautioned that ‘extending NATO’s security umbrella into the heart [sic] of the Old Soviet Union is unwise’ given that ‘[i]t is sure to enrage the Russians and cause them to act belligerently.’ But NATO members never offered to do this for Ukraine in 2013 and 2014. They still have not as of early 2020.
Tellingly, Masha Gessen’s (2017, 198–199, 280) recent book about how Putin restored authoritarian rule in Russia mentions NATO only six times and exclusively in the context of the 1999 Kosovo bombing campaign. No mention of NATO appears in more academic texts on Russian authoritarianism (see, e.g., Gel’man 2015).
As Götz (2017) demonstrates, every model of Russian behavior—whether it emphasizes individual decision-makers, domestic politics, ideas and identities, or geopolitics—has empirical shortcomings. Indeed, though many opponents of NATO enlargement are self-described realists, constructivists have also offered critiques. See, for example, Tsygankov (2018).
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank James Goldgeier and Joshua Shifrinson for involving me in this special issue as well as the important feedback they provided on previous versions of this article. I also thank William James, participants in the Pardee School of Global Studies’ workshop, Mauro Gilli, Andrea Gilli, and the anonymous reviewers at International Politics for their helpful comments. All errors are my own.
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Lanoszka, A. Thank goodness for NATO enlargement. Int Polit 57, 451–470 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00234-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00234-8