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Impacts of EU Sanctions Levied in 2014 on Individual European Countries' Exports to Russia: Winners and Losers

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Abstract

We analyse the effects of sanctions implemented by the European Union against Russia following the latter’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Indirect effects of sanctions on its non-prohibited exports to Russia are examined using a gravity model of trade that includes a time varying sanction index. A per country analysis is also incorporated to increase the granularity of the results. We find that sanctions led to a decrease in exports of non-prohibited products from certain European countries (i.e., the “losers”) while increasing such exports from others (i.e., the “winners”), an outcome that qualifies as an “unintended consequence” of the sanctions.

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Data availability

We thank Manh Hung Do for his support in processing the data. We are also grateful to Professor Nicole B. Simpson and the two anonymous reviewers of our paper for their constructive feedback and valuable suggestions.

Notes

  1. [Crozet and Hinz 2020, p. 12] state that between Dec. 2013 and Dec. 2015 “US$5.4 billion, or 12.7% of Western lost trade, are accrued in embargoed products”. They also state that the EU bears 95% of all lost trade in non-embargoed products. Thus: \(\left(1-0.127\right)*0.95=0.82935=82.9\%\).

  2. Changes in EU exports to Russia are estimated by comparing a pre-sanctions period (May 2005 to Aug. 2014) to the period after the implementation of coercive measures (Sep. 2014 to Dec. 2019). We find a decrease in EU exports to Russia of €111B, in which embargoed products (Appendix A) account for just €16B or only 14% of this decrease. Data from Eurostat, value in euros, extracted on 17.02.20.

  3. Document 10198/1/04 REV 1.

  4. ISO 3166 Alpha-2 code.

  5. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/macroeconomic_and_sectoral/hicp/html/index.en.html

  6. Values of 2007m1 and 2007m4 were missing and have been replaced by marginal lending key interest rate from Malta Central Bank.

  7. Another possibility would have been to adjust the values of the \(\alpha\) parameter provided by [Bali and Rapelanoro 2021], since it can also influence the shape of the index. However, because of the higher number of models that we have to run, multiplying these by a large number of different \(\alpha\) values would have been a tremendous task that could be a full study by itself. As for the \(\beta\) parameter, adjusting it was not an option as its values are calculated with trade and GDP data.

  8. It is also the only one that leads to results statistically significant for \(p<0.001\), while others are passing either \(p<0.05\) or \(p<0.1\).

  9. [Crozet and Hinz 2020] integrate the EU and other western countries that implemented sanctions against Russia.

  10. [Crozet and Hinz 2020, p. 48]: "We find that the global “lost trade” […] amounts to US$3.2 billion per month. […] with European Union member states bearing 76.7% of the overall impact. Interestingly, the bulk of the “lost trade,” 83.1%, is incurred through non-embargoed products, and can hence be considered “collateral damage.”". Thus, \(\left[3.2*0.767*0.831\right]=2.04.\)

  11. Using a yearly average closing price of 1€=1.11US$.

  12. Russia also imposed diplomatic and individual sanctions but such sanctions per se do not have much ability to inflict a large scale economic pressure.

  13. “Re-exports are exports of foreign goods in the same state as previously imported; they are to be included in the country's exports”, United Nations Statistics Division.

  14. Comparison of model 6 to model 10.

  15. Comparison of model 6 to model 14.

  16. F.A. Hayek described the notion of economic order as “a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct” [Hayek 1978, p. 36].

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Funding

This work was supported in part by U.S. Department of Defense Minerva Program Grant No. FA9550-21-1-0156. The funding source is not involved in study design, collection, analysis and interpretation of the data, writing report and decision to submit the article for publication.

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Correspondence to Morad Bali.

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Appendices

Appendices

Due to their excessive length, appendices A, L, M, O, P, and Q, are all available online at https://www.moradbali.com/publications. For more information or requests, feel free to write to morad.bali@irnc.org.

Appendix B: European country code and their attributed numbers

Code

Name

Attributed number (i)

Code

Name

Attributed number (i)

AT

Austria

1

HU

Hungary

15

BE

Belgium

2

IE

Ireland

16

BG

Bulgaria

3

IT

Italy

17

CY

Cyprus

4

LT

Lithuania

18

CZ

The Czech Republic

5

LU

Luxembourg

19

DE

Germany

6

LV

Latvia

20

DK

Denmark

7

MT

Malta

21

EE

Estonia

8

NL

Netherlands

22

ES

Spain

9

PO

Poland

23

FI

Finland

10

PT

Portugal

24

FR

France

11

RO

Romania

25

GB

The United Kingdom

12

SE

Sweden

26

GR

Greece

13

SI

Slovenia

27

HR

Croatia

14

SK

Slovakia

28

Appendix C: Data sources

Variable

Details

\({\text{XRU}}_{t,i}\)

Countries’ Exports to Russia—Eurostat; extracted on 03.06.20; last update 15.05.20; total exports net of arms and ammunition (SITC 891); value in euros; EU trade since 1988 by SITC [DS-018995]. Products targeted by the Russian embargo were also removed from this database.

\({\text{LP}}_{t,i}\) 1

Labour Productivity[1] (per hours worked)—European Central Bank; total economy; all activities; index; chain linked volume (rebased); non-transformed data; neither seasonally adjusted nor calendar adjusted data; average of observations through period (A).

\({\text{PPI}}_{t,i}\)

Producer Prices in Industry—Eurostat; extracted on 04.06.20; last update 03.06.20; total—quarterly data; total output price index—in national currency; industry (except construction, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities); unadjusted data (i.e. neither seasonally adjusted nor calendar adjusted data); index, 2015=100, [sts_inpp_q].

\({\text{REER}}_{t,i}\)

Real Effective Exchange Rate—Eurostat; extracted on 04.06.20; last update 03.06.20; deflator: consumer price index—42 trading partners—industrial countries; Index, 2010=100; [ert_eff_ic_q].

\({\text{ER}}_{t,i}\)

Country’s Currency Exchange Rate Against the Russian rouble—European Central Bank; ECB reference exchange rate; average of observations through period (A).

\({\text{GDP}}_{t,r}\)

Russia’s GDP—Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; gross domestic product by expenditure in constant prices: total gross domestic product for the Russian Federation [NAEXKP01RUQ652S], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

\({\text{HICP}}_{t,i}\)

Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices—Eurostat; extracted on 04.06.20; last update 29.05.20; index, 2015=100; neither seasonally adjusted nor calendar adjusted data; all items; monthly data [ei_cphi_m].

\({\text{ML}}_{t,i}\)

ECB Marginal lending facility—European Central Bank; euro area (changing composition); key interest rate; date of changes (raw data); level; euro; average of observations through period; per cent per annum.

\({\text{S}}_{t}\)

Sanction Index (European Sanctions)—Bali and Rapelanoro (2021).

\({\text{distance}}_{ij}\)

Distance between capitals of European countries and Russia; extracted from the CEPII Mayer and Zignago (2011).

[1] Regarding \({\text{ LP}}_{t,i}\), data for Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom were not available as detailed here. Thus, it was necessary to use instead:

  • Greece: Labour Productivity (per hours worked)—Greece—world (all entities, including reference area, including io), total economy, services, index, chain linked volume (rebased), non-transformed data, neither seasonally adjusted nor calendar adjusted data, ECB.

  • Luxembourg: Labour Productivity (per persons)—Luxembourg—world (all entities, including reference area, including io), total economy, total—all activities, index, chain linked volume (rebased), non-transformed data, neither seasonally adjusted nor calendar adjusted data, ECB.

  • The United Kingdom: Labour Productivity (per hours worked)—United Kingdom—world (all entities, including reference area, including io), total economy, services, index, chain linked volume (rebased), non-transformed data, neither seasonally adjusted nor calendar adjusted data, ECB.

  • Belgium: Labour Productivity (per persons)—Belgium—world (all entities, including reference area, including io), total economy, total—all activities, index, chain linked volume (rebased), non-transformed data, neither seasonally adjusted nor calendar adjusted data, ECB.

[2] Regarding \({\text{PPI}}_{t,i}\), data are not available for Ireland and Portugal between 2003 and 2004. Consequently, there are missing 16 observations (8 quarters for each country).

Appendix D: Impact of EU countries’ sanctions on export to Russia: the raw sanction values

 

Export of European countries to Russia

 

Model (1.1)

Model (1.2)

Model (1.3)

Model (1.4)

European sanctions index

−0.000

0.000

−0.000

0.000

 

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

GDP of the RF (ln)

1.861***

1.635***

1.435***

1.456***

 

(0.227)

(0.267)

(0.241)

(0.229)

GDP of the EU countries (ln)

0.873***

0.873***

0.893***

0.892***

 

(0.072)

(0.075)

(0.085)

(0.083)

Distance between capitals (ln)

−2.003***

−1.993***

−1.922***

−1.917***

 

(0.294)

(0.293)

(0.292)

(0.285)

Real effective exchange rate

−0.011

 

−0.000

 
 

(0.012)

 

(0.012)

 

Harmonised index of consumer prices

0.007

0.006

  
 

(0.007)

(0.006)

  

Marginal lending key interest rate

−0.072*

−0.046

−0.080**

−0.069*

 

(0.037)

(0.036)

(0.040)

(0.041)

Labour productivity

0.013***

0.009**

0.011**

0.010**

 

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.005)

Exchange rate against the Russian rouble

 

0.019***

 

0.014

  

(0.006)

 

(0.021)

Producer prices in industry

  

0.010

0.002

   

(0.009)

(0.016)

Sanction time (Dummy)

0.250***

0.071

0.199***

0.129

 

(0.085)

(0.068)

(0.066)

(0.096)

_cons

−0.233

0.185

2.908

2.081

 

(2.685)

(3.181)

(2.658)

(2.829)

Number of observations

1904

1904

1888

1888

R-squared

0.889

0.889

0.873

0.878

  1. Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses; ln: natural logarithm; In model (1.3) and (1.4), 16 observations are excluded due to the missing data in producer prices in industry (the total observations decrease from 1904 to 1888); ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, p<0.1

Appendix E: Impact of EU countries’ sanctions on export to Russia: the lagged sanction values

 

Export of European countries to Russia

 

Model (2.1)

Model (2.2)

Model (2.3)

Model (2.4)

European sanctions index

−0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

 

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

GDP of the RF (ln)

1.848***

1.642***

1.434***

1.461***

 

(0.225)

(0.263)

(0.234)

(0.230)

GDP of the EU countries (ln)

0.873***

0.873***

0.893***

0.892***

 

(0.072)

(0.075)

(0.085)

(0.083)

Distance between capitals (ln)

−2.003***

−1.993***

−1.922***

−1.917***

 

(0.294)

(0.293)

(0.292)

(0.285)

Real effective exchange rate

−0.012

 

−0.000

 
 

(0.012)

 

(0.012)

 

Harmonised index of consumer prices

0.007

0.006

  
 

(0.007)

(0.006)

  

Marginal lending key interest rate

−0.071*

−0.046

−0.080**

−0.069*

 

(0.037)

(0.036)

(0.040)

(0.040)

Labour productivity

0.013***

0.009**

0.011**

0.010**

 

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.005)

Exchange rate against the Russian rouble

 

0.019***

 

0.014

  

(0.006)

 

(0.021)

Producer prices in industry

  

0.010

0.002

   

(0.009)

(0.016)

Sanction time (Dummy)

0.241***

0.075

0.193***

0.128

 

(0.083)

(0.066)

(0.063)

(0.090)

_cons

−0.063

0.100

2.912

2.013

 

(2.662)

(3.127)

(2.651)

(2.831)

Number of observations

1904

1904

1888

1888

R-squared

0.889

0.889

0.873

0.878

  1. Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses; ln: natural logarithm; In model (2.3) and (2.4), 16 observations are excluded due to the missing data in producer prices in industry (the total observations decrease from 1904 to 1888); ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, p<0.1

Appendix F: Impact of EU countries’ sanctions on export to Russia: the logarithm of the raw values

 

Export of European countries to Russia

 

Model (3.1)

Model (3.2)

Model (3.3)

Model (3.4)

European sanctions index

−0.007

0.005

−0.000

0.003

 

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.007)

(0.006)

GDP of the RF (ln)

1.860***

1.631***

1.433***

1.452***

 

(0.227)

(0.268)

(0.247)

(0.233)

GDP of the EU countries (ln)

0.873***

0.873***

0.893***

0.892***

 

(0.072)

(0.075)

(0.085)

(0.083)

Distance between capitals (ln)

−2.003***

−1.993***

−1.922***

−1.916***

 

(0.294)

(0.293)

(0.292)

(0.285)

Real effective exchange rate

−0.011

 

−0.000

 
 

(0.012)

 

(0.012)

 

Harmonised index of consumer prices

0.007

0.006

  
 

(0.007)

(0.006)

  

Marginal lending key interest rate

−0.072*

−0.045

−0.080**

−0.068*

 

(0.037)

(0.037)

(0.040)

(0.041)

Labour productivity

0.013***

0.009**

0.011**

0.010**

 

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.005)

Exchange rate against the Russian rouble

 

0.019***

 

0.014

  

(0.006)

 

(0.021)

Producer prices in industry

  

0.010

0.002

   

(0.010)

(0.016)

Sanction time (Dummy)

0.309***

0.022

0.198

0.101

 

(0.095)

(0.099)

(0.122)

(0.139)

_cons

−0.260

0.239

2.928

2.124

 

(2.682)

(3.201)

(2.695)

(2.874)

Number of observations

1904

1904

1888

1888

R-squared

0.889

0.890

0.873

0.878

  1. Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses; ln: natural logarithm; In model (3.3) and (3.4), 16 observations are excluded due to the missing data in producer prices in industry (the total observations decrease from 1904 to 1888); ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, p<0.1

Appendix G: Impact of EU countries’ sanctions on export to Russia: the logarithm of the lagged values

 

Export of European countries to Russia

 

Model (4.1)

Model (4.2)

Model (4.3)

Model (4.4)

European sanctions index

0.005

0.010***

0.011**

0.012***

 

(0.006)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.002)

GDP of the RF (ln)

1.877***

1.689***

1.488***

1.515***

 

(0.212)

(0.255)

(0.226)

(0.231)

GDP of the EU countries (ln)

0.873***

0.873***

0.893***

0.892***

 

(0.072)

(0.075)

(0.085)

(0.083)

Distance between capitals (ln)

−2.003***

−1.992***

−1.922***

−1.917***

 

(0.294)

(0.293)

(0.292)

(0.285)

Real effective exchange rate

−0.011

 

0.000

 
 

(0.012)

 

(0.013)

 

Harmonised index of consumer prices

0.007

0.006

  
 

(0.007)

(0.006)

  

Marginal lending key interest rate

−0.072*

−0.046

−0.080**

−0.069*

 

(0.038)

(0.036)

(0.040)

(0.040)

Labour productivity

0.013***

0.009**

0.011**

0.010**

 

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.005)

Exchange rate against the Russian rouble

 

0.019***

 

0.014

  

(0.006)

 

(0.021)

Producer prices in industry

  

0.010

0.002

   

(0.009)

(0.016)

Sanction time (Dummy)

0.204***

0.007

0.114

0.048

 

(0.053)

(0.064)

(0.077)

(0.091)

_cons

−0.454

−0.448

2.236

1.371

 

(2.604)

(3.024)

(2.647)

(2.809)

Number of observations

1904

1904

1888

1888

R-squared

0.888

0.890

0.873

0.878

  1. Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses; ln: natural logarithm; In model (4.3) and (4.4), 16 observations are excluded due to the missing data in producer prices in industry (the total observations decrease from 1904 to 1888); ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, p<0.1

Appendix H: Impact of EU countries’ sanctions on export to Russia: the first difference of raw sanction values

 

Export of European countries to Russia

 

Model (5.1)

Model (5.2)

Model (5.3)

Model (5.4)

European sanctions index

(first difference of sanction values)

−0.000

0.000

−0.000*

−0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

GDP of the RF (ln)

1.865***

1.639***

1.459***

1.474***

 

(0.212)

(0.260)

(0.243)

(0.236)

GDP of the EU countries (ln)

0.873***

0.873***

0.893***

0.892***

 

(0.072)

(0.075)

(0.085)

(0.083)

Distance between capitals (ln)

−2.003***

−1.993***

−1.922***

−1.917***

 

(0.294)

(0.293)

(0.292)

(0.285)

Real effective exchange rate

−0.011

 

−0.000

 
 

(0.012)

 

(0.012)

 

Harmonised index of consumer prices

0.007

0.006

  
 

(0.007)

(0.006)

  

Marginal lending key interest rate

−0.072*

−0.046

−0.081**

−0.069*

 

(0.038)

(0.036)

(0.040)

(0.041)

Labour productivity

0.013***

0.009**

0.011**

0.010**

 

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.005)

Exchange rate against the Russian rouble

 

0.019***

 

0.014

  

(0.006)

 

(0.020)

Producer prices in industry

  

0.010

0.002

   

(0.009)

(0.016)

Sanction time (Dummy)

0.240**

0.079

0.207***

0.140

 

(0.097)

(0.069)

(0.063)

(0.092)

_cons

−0.302

0.148

2.600

1.864

 

(2.572)

(3.079)

(2.720)

(2.905)

Number of observations

1904

1904

1888

1888

R-squared

0.888

0.890

0.873

0.878

  1. Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses; ln: natural logarithm; In model (5.3) and (5.4), 16 observations are excluded due to the missing data in producer prices in industry (the total observations decrease from 1904 to 1888); ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, p<0.1

Appendix I: Variance inflation factor (VIF) values for the estimation models with the logarithms of the raw values and lagged sanction values

 

The case of logarithm of the raw values

The case of logarithm of the lagged values

 

Model (3.1)

Model (3.2)

Model (3.3)

Model (3.4)

Model (4.1)

Model (4.2)

Model (4.3)

Model (4.4)

European sanctions index

10.51

10.73

10.62

10.69

8.42

8.37

8.38

8.35

GDP of the RF (ln)

3.78

4.15

4.37

4.37

4.11

4.48

4.71

4.71

GDP of the EU countries (ln)

1.17

1.14

1.16

1.15

1.17

1.14

1.16

1.15

Distance between capitals (ln)

1.27

1.25

1.13

1.12

1.27

1.25

1.13

1.12

Real effective exchange rate

1.29

 

1.13

 

1.30

 

1.13

 

Harmonised index of consumer prices

1.84

1.59

  

1.84

1.59

  

Marginal lending key interest rate

1.56

2.17

1.89

2.14

1.56

2.15

1.87

2.11

Labour productivity

1.60

1.73

1.70

1.74

1.57

1.71

1.68

1.72

Exchange rate against the Russian rouble

 

3.44

 

7.10

 

3.37

 

7.05

Producer prices in industry

  

2.03

4.18

  

2.01

4.17

Sanction time (Dummy)

14.53

17.05

15.90

16.95

9.00

10.29

9.67

10.24

Mean VIF

4.17

4.80

4.44

5.49

3.36

3.82

3.53

4.51

Appendix J: Variance inflation factor (VIF) values for the estimation models with the first difference of sanction values and the first difference of the logarithms of sanction values

 

The first difference of sanction values

The first difference of the logarithms of sanction values

 

Model (1)

Model (2)

Model (3)

Model (4)

Model (1)

Model (2)

Model (3)

Model (4)

European sanctions index

1.09

1.10

1.09

1.10

1.63

1.72

1.69

1.72

GDP of the RF (ln)

4.06

4.50

4.71

4.72

5.61

6.66

6.95

7.06

GDP of the EU countries (ln)

1.17

1.14

1.16

1.15

1.17

1.14

1.16

1.15

Distance between capitals (ln)

1.27

1.25

1.13

1.12

1.27

1.25

1.13

1.12

Real effective exchange rate

1.30

 

1.13

 

1.31

 

1.13

 

Harmonised index of consumer prices

1.84

1.59

  

1.86

1.60

  

Marginal lending key interest rate

1.56

2.15

1.87

2.12

1.56

2.22

1.91

2.18

Labour productivity

1.58

1.71

1.68

1.72

1.73

1.78

1.78

1.79

Exchange rate against the Russian rouble

 

3.39

 

7.09

 

3.60

 

7.21

Producer prices in industry

  

2.01

4.18

  

2.10

4.18

Sanction time (Dummy)

4.62

5.91

5.30

5.90

6.54

8.73

7.75

8.69

Mean VIF

2.05

2.53

2.23

3.23

2.52

3.19

2.84

3.90

Appendix K: Additional models

Different Options Explored to Cast the Sanction Index

We tried different options to select which form of the sanction index we will use: (i) raw values (i.e. untransformed) ; (ii) lagged values (t–1); (iii) logarithms of raw values; (iv) logarithms of lagged values (t–1); (v) the first difference of raw values; (vi) first difference of the logarithm of the sanction index. Forms (i-v) are not used in our analysis as they either lead to statistically insignificant results (Appendixes D-H) or suffer from multicollinearity (Appendixes I and J). Given that form (vi) is the only one that does not suffer from multicollinearity, we use it for the remainder of our analysis. Additionally, form (vi) is highly relevant for this analysis as there is often a delay in the coming into force of sanctions.

Models with Different Variable Combinations

In set (7), \({\text{HICP}}_{t,i}\) and \({\text{ER}}_{t,i}\) are removed, in set (8), \({\text{REER}}_{t,i}\) and \({\text{PPI}}_{t,i}\) are excluded, in set (9), \({\text{PPI}}_{t,i}\) and \({\text{ER}}_{t,i}\) are removed, and in set (10), \({\text{REER}}_{t,i}\) and \({\text{HICP}}_{t,i}\) are removed.

$$\begin{aligned} {\text{XRU}}_{t,i} = & \alpha_{c1} + \beta_{c1} {\text{FD}}(\ln \_S_{t} ) + \gamma_{c1} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,r} + \delta_{c1} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,i} + \theta_{c1} \ln \_{\text{dist}}_{r,i} \\ + & \;\vartheta_{c1} {\text{REER}}_{t,i} + \lambda_{c1} {\text{PPI}}_{t,i} + \varsigma_{c1} {\text{ML}}_{t,i} + \phi_{c1} {\text{LP}}_{t,i} + \psi_{c1} {\text{time}}_{t} + \varepsilon_{t,r,i}^{c1} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(7)
$$\begin{aligned} {\text{XRU}}_{t,i} = & \alpha_{b1} + \beta_{b1} S_{t} + \gamma_{b1} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,r} + \delta_{b1} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,i} + \theta_{b1} \ln \_{\text{dist}}_{r,i} \\ & \; + \rho_{b1} {\text{HICP}}_{t,i} + \varphi_{b1} {\text{ER}}_{t,i} + \varsigma_{b1} {\text{ML}}_{t,i} + \phi_{b1} {\text{LP}}_{t,i} + \psi_{b1} {\text{time}}_{t} + \varepsilon_{t,r,i}^{b1} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(8)
$$\begin{aligned} {\text{XRU}}_{t,i} = & \alpha_{a1} + \beta_{a1} S_{t} + \gamma_{a1} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,r} + \delta_{a1} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,i} + \theta_{a1} \ln \_{\text{dist}}_{r,i} \\ & \; + \vartheta_{a1} {\text{REER}}_{t,i} + \rho_{a1} {\text{HICP}}_{t,i} + \varsigma_{a1} {\text{ML}}_{t,i} + \phi_{a1} {\text{LP}}_{t,i} + \psi_{a1} {\text{time}}_{t} + \varepsilon_{t,r,i}^{a1} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(9)
$$\begin{aligned} {\text{XRU}}_{t,i} = & \alpha_{d1} + \beta_{d1} S_{t} + \gamma_{d1} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,r} + \delta_{d1} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,i} + \theta_{d1} \ln \_{\text{dist}}_{r,i} \\ & \; + \varphi_{d1} {\text{ER}}_{t,i} + \lambda_{d1} {\text{PPI}}_{t,i} + \varsigma_{d1} {\text{ML}}_{t,i} + \phi_{d1} {\text{LP}}_{t,i} + \psi_{d1} {\text{time}}_{t} + \varepsilon_{t,r,i}^{d1} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(10)

Sensitivity Tests

Models that use (\(S_{t}^{a}\)) instead of (\(S_{t}\)):

$$\begin{aligned} {\text{XRU}}_{t,i} = & \alpha_{c3} + \beta_{c3} {\text{FD}}(\ln \_S_{t}^{a} ) + \gamma_{c3} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,r} + \delta_{c3} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,i} + \theta_{c3} \ln \_{\text{dist}}_{r,i} \\ & \; + \vartheta_{c3} {\text{REER}}_{t,i} + \lambda_{c3} {\text{PPI}}_{t,i} + \varsigma_{c3} {\text{ML}}_{t,i} + \phi_{c3} {\text{LP}}_{t,i} + \psi_{c3} {\text{time}}_{t} + \varepsilon_{t,r,i}^{c3} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(11)
$$\begin{aligned} {\text{XRU}}_{t,i} = & \alpha_{b3} + \beta_{b3} {\text{FD}}(\ln \_S_{t}^{a} ) + \gamma_{b3} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,r} + \delta_{b3} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,i} + \theta_{b3} \ln \_{\text{dist}}_{r,i} \\ & \; + \rho_{b3} {\text{HICP}}_{t,i} + \varphi_{b3} {\text{ER}}_{t,i} + \varsigma_{b3} {\text{ML}}_{t,i} + \phi_{b3} {\text{LP}}_{t,i} + \psi_{b3} {\text{time}}_{t} + \varepsilon_{t,r,i}^{b3} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(12)
$$\begin{aligned} {\text{XRU}}_{t,i} = & \alpha_{a3} + \beta_{a3} {\text{FD}}(\ln \_S_{t}^{a} ) + \gamma_{a3} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,r} + \delta_{a3} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,i} + \theta_{a3} \ln \_{\text{dist}}_{r,i} \\ & \; + \vartheta_{a3} {\text{REER}}_{t,i} + \rho_{a3} {\text{HICP}}_{t,i} + \varsigma_{a3} {\text{ML}}_{t,i} + \phi_{a3} {\text{LP}}_{t,i} + \psi_{a3} {\text{time}}_{t} + \varepsilon_{t,r,i}^{a3} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(13)
$$\begin{aligned} {\text{XRU}}_{t,i} = & \alpha_{d3} + \beta_{d3} {\text{FD}}(\ln \_S_{t}^{a} ) + \gamma_{d3} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,r} + \delta_{d3} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,i} + \theta_{d3} \ln \_{\text{dist}}_{r,i} \\ & \; + \varphi_{d3} {\text{ER}}_{t,i} + \lambda_{d3} {\text{PPI}}_{t,i} + \varsigma_{d3} {\text{ML}}_{t,i} + \phi_{d3} {\text{LP}}_{t,i} + \psi_{d3} {\text{time}}_{t} + \varepsilon_{t,r,i}^{d3} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(14)

Models that use (\(S_{t}^{b}\)) instead of (\(S_{t}\)):

$$\begin{aligned} {\text{XRU}}_{t,i} = & \alpha_{c4} + \beta_{c4} {\text{FD}}(\ln \_S_{t}^{b} ) + \gamma_{c4} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,r} + \delta_{c4} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,i} + \theta_{c4} \ln \_{\text{dist}}_{r,i} \\ & \; + \vartheta_{c4} {\text{REER}}_{t,i} + \lambda_{c4} {\text{PPI}}_{t,i} + \varsigma_{c4} {\text{ML}}_{t,i} + \phi_{c4} {\text{LP}}_{t,i} + \psi_{c4} {\text{time}}_{t} + \varepsilon_{t,r,i}^{c4} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(15)
$$\begin{aligned} {\text{XRU}}_{t,i} = & \alpha_{b4} + \beta_{b4} {\text{FD}}(\ln \_S_{t}^{b} ) + \gamma_{b4} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,r} + \delta_{b4} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,i} + \theta_{b4} \ln \_{\text{dist}}_{r,i} \\ & + \rho_{b4} {\text{HICP}}_{t,i} + \varphi_{b4} {\text{ER}}_{t,i} + \varsigma_{b4} {\text{ML}}_{t,i} + \phi_{b4} {\text{LP}}_{t,i} + \psi_{b4} {\text{time}}_{t} + \varepsilon_{t,r,i}^{b4} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(16)
$$\begin{aligned} {\text{XRU}}_{t,i} = & \alpha_{a4} + \beta_{a4} {\text{FD}}(\ln \_S_{t}^{b} ) + \gamma_{a4} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,r} + \delta_{a4} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,i} + \theta_{a4} \ln \_{\text{dist}}_{r,i} \\ & \; + \vartheta_{a4} {\text{REER}}_{t,i} + \rho_{a4} {\text{HICP}}_{t,i} + \varsigma_{a4} {\text{ML}}_{t,i} + \phi_{a4} {\text{LP}}_{t,i} + \psi_{a4} {\text{time}}_{t} + \varepsilon_{t,r,i}^{a4} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(17)
$$\begin{aligned} {\text{XRU}}_{t,i} = & \alpha_{d4} + \beta_{d4} {\text{FD}}(\ln \_S_{t}^{b} ) + \gamma_{d4} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,r} + \delta_{d4} \ln \_{\text{GDP}}_{t,i} + \theta_{d4} \ln \_{\text{dist}}_{r,i} \\ & \; + \varphi_{d4} {\text{ER}}_{t,i} + \lambda_{d4} {\text{PPI}}_{t,i} + \varsigma_{d4} {\text{ML}}_{t,i} + \phi_{d4} {\text{LP}}_{t,i} + \psi_{d4} {\text{time}}_{t} + \varepsilon_{t,r,i}^{d4} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(18)

Appendix N: Values of alpha and KHI

\(\alpha\)

\(o_{k,i}\)

Description

0

0

Absence of sanctions

1

100

Sanction against an individual

10

50

Official announcement of sanctions

100

1

Sanction against a company

1,000

5

Sanction against an economic sector

3,000

15

Embargo

Because of their size, values of \(\chi_{k,i,u}\) cannot be displayed as they are relative to the implementation date of each sanction (68 sanctions in total). We thus provide the value of \(o_{k,i}\) as it defines the slope of \({\upchi }_{{{\text{k}},{\text{i}},{\text{u}}}}\). As stated in Bali and Rapelanoro (2021, p. 29): “The lower \(o_{k,i}\) is, the more horizontal the slope will be, and the less the time factor will negatively impact the sanction’s ability to apply economic pressure […] In other words, \(o_{k,i}\) is allowing us to calibrate the time factor intensity and behaviour.” The complete data base is available upon request at morad.bali@irnc.org.

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Bali, M., Nguyen, T.T. & Pratson, L.F. Impacts of EU Sanctions Levied in 2014 on Individual European Countries' Exports to Russia: Winners and Losers. Eastern Econ J 50, 154–194 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41302-024-00266-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41302-024-00266-5

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