Introduction

Research on “populism” and “hybrid regimes”—arguably the most prevalent buzzwords in 21st-century political science—fits seamlessly into two significant streams of comparative politics. The former emphasizes the roles of political actors (i.e., elites and their followers), while the latter argues for the importance of structural conditions over agency. Scholars of populism primarily focus on the inherent dysfunctions of modern democratic politics, notably the deficiencies in its mechanisms of indirect representation.

These deficiencies in representative democracy often prompt populists to remind citizens of the ostensibly lost redemptive face and promises of democracy, as noted by Canovan (1999). Thus, scholars view populism as a permanent shadow of representative democracy (Müller 2016), particularly relevant in the current populist Zeitgeist (Mudde 2004). Conversely, the extensive literature on hybridization emerged with the end of the transition paradigm (Carothers 2002) and the rise of new hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002). These regimes strive to create an uneven playing field between the government and the opposition (Levitsky and Way 2010, 53), aiming to harvest the fruits of electoral legitimacy while minimizing the risks of uncertainty (Schedler 2013, 37).

Although the research fields of populism and political regimes are interconnected, they approach their subjects distinctively: populism examines the level of politics, focusing on the dynamic elements of political systems, whereas regime studies concentrate on the level of polity, emphasizing the structures and institutional dimensions. This study advocates for a synthesis of research on populism with that on regimes in the “grey zone.” Such an approach enables a simultaneous analysis of the static and dynamic aspects of political regimes, offering deep insights into the operations of contemporary autocracies and the dynamics of autocratization. Despite the inherent complexities and challenges in merging these two broad fields of study, which also complicate the analysis of their interdynamics, the potential benefits of employing a comprehensive framework that integrates their strengths are substantial. Echoing Waldner and Lust (2018), this study highlights the potential for shared analytic frameworks that can better guide research projects and foster communication across theoretical boundaries.

It appears, for example, that the success of actors who erode democratic frameworks cannot solely be attributed to distorted political competition. Instead, it often stems from a robust identity-based bond between leaders and followers, even transcending electoral frameworks. A notable problem in explaining the success of the autocratic Orbán regime in Hungary, a quintessential example of contemporary European autocratization (Bozóki and Benedek 2024), is the presumption that voters lack alternative information sources. Although there are clear deficiencies in media pluralism in Hungary (Benedek 2024), research also indicates that Fidesz’s followers exhibit strong emotional-moral attachments (Szabó and Gerő 2020, 123). As a result, Fidesz supporters are more resistant to contrary opinions than might be expected from mere informational segmentation. While explanations at the polity level, primarily through scrutinizing the entire media system, are essential for understanding voter information, the strong emotional and identity-based ties highlight the severe polarization between political camps. In the latter case, the examination of the politics-level relationship between populist leaders and their followers becomes crucial. In this regard, synthesizing approaches that focus on hybrid regimes and populism can also be viewed as an endeavor to meld the “hard” and “soft” elements of political systems.

Polarizing populist leaders ascending to power often operate within, or strive to establish, an uneven playing field—a trend that is becoming increasingly prevalent not only in Europe but also globally (Boese et al. 2022). This study contributes to a deeper understanding of the intricate processes of contemporary autocratization, often described as the “third wave of autocratization” (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). It seeks to reduce the distance between the two research fields through the concepts of populism, autocratization, and electoral autocracy. By doing so, the article introduces the terms “populist autocratization” and the “populist electoral autocracy” (PEA) regime subtype.

In the subsequent sections, I initially focus on the conceptualization of key terms, and the relationship between populism and autocratization through the perspective of autocratic stability. Following the clarification of some methodological and operational considerations, I attempt to demonstrate the applicability of the shared analytical framework by outlining a brief empirical research agenda. The last section will summarize the main findings of the study.

Analytical intension: crossing boundaries in autocratization studies and populism research

The building method

In the realm of concept formation, this study aligns with Giovanni Sartori’s tradition of comparative political science. Sartori’s framework (1970), involving cautious moving up and down on the “ladder of abstraction,” positions high-level categories as universal conceptualizations suitable for capturing many cases with few designated attributes (i.e., maximal extension and minimal intension), while low-level categories represent configurative conceptualizations (i.e., minimal extension and maximal intension). This approach, described by Collier and Mahon (1993, 845) as “classical,” embodies a trade-off between the number of cases examined and the number of properties belonging to each case. This method of concept formation systematically arranges concepts into a hierarchical structure from more abstract to more concrete, ensuring that each category or concept maintains clear boundaries and defining properties that are shared by all members (Mair 2008, 192).

However, Collier and Mahon argue that the proliferation of ambiguous cases challenges the classical approach to concept formation. They propose alternatives based on “radial” or “family resemblance” categories (Collier and Mahon 1993, 846–52). Borrowing from cognitive science, the radial approach posits a central subcategory (root concept) surrounded by secondary categories that display specific combinations of the central elements. Moving further, the notion of “family resemblance,” drawn from linguistic theory, suggests that no single core is shared by each object; thus, they do not conform to Sartori’s classical classification. Collier and Mahon contend that while democracy is best understood through a radial framework, authoritarianism aligns with traditional hierarchical categorization. Under this framework, secondary subcategories like “bureaucratic authoritarianism” or “populist authoritarianism” contribute specific attributes to the primary category, building on its core characteristics without changing its essence.

However, the radial approach not only uses a very complex framework for concepts that is challenging to adapt to real-world situations (Mair 2008, 193), but Møller and Skaaning (2010) argue that it is unsuitable for defining democracy. This is primarily because democracy requires a set of minimal conditions, elements of which may be omitted in radial categorization. Therefore, they advocate a return to Sartori’s hierarchical categorization, which applies Aristotelian logic to determine necessary and sufficient attributes of democracy. Projects like V-Dem also highlight the practical application of this classical method, employing various conceptual combinations while maintaining a core set of minimal democratic attributes (i.e., “electoral democracy”). Thus, precising the definition by adding clarifying attributes can help avoid conceptual stretching (Sartori 2008).

Primary and secondary categorization: regime types and subtypes

By adopting the classical approach to regime classification that aims to separate regime types using a qualitative scale (Anckar and Fredriksson 2019, 86; Sartori 1987), this study defines political regimes through the mechanisms of leadership selection. Drawing on Geddes et al. (2014), the emphasis is not solely on institutional configurations—see Hadenius and Teorell (2007)—but on the entire set of formal and informal rules that “identify the group from which leaders can come and determine who influences leadership choice and policy” (Geddes et al. 2014, 314). Grounded in Dahl’s (1971) tradition, the present article’s framework distinguishes democracies from autocracies (as non-democracies) based on contestation and participation in leadership selection.

This classical perspective underpins the varieties of democracy (V-Dem) project’s definition of electoral democracy (Coppedge et al. 2020), measured by the electoral democracy index (EDI). According to this approach, electoral democracy, explicitly rooted in Dahl’s (1971) concept of polyarchy, includes five key conditions for democratic competition: (i) universal suffrage, (ii) elected officials, (iii) procedurally clean elections, (iv) the freedom of association (encompassing freedom for parties and civil society), and (v) the freedom of the political public sphere (described by Dahl as “freedom of expression” and access to “alternative sources of information”). This framework lends itself to a conceptual distinction, where the first three conditions might be viewed as “formal-procedural,” and the remaining two as “substantial” aspects of democratic competition.

Regarding the substantial conditions, the freedom of association enables citizens to form and engage with independent entities such as political parties and interest groups, crucial for the full exercise of their political rights. The freedom of expression, on the other hand, guarantees individuals the ability to discuss political issues without fear of severe repercussions and to access a variety of independent information sources that are “not under the control of the government or any other single political group attempting to influence public political beliefs and attitudes” (Coppedge et al. 2020, 30–31). These freedoms are foundational in ensuring that elections provide meaningful choices of political authorities, thereby fostering a community of free and equal citizens (Schedler 2013, 83).

Electoral democracy forms the basis for all other high-level principles (liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian) of democracy within V-Dem. Thus, the other types of democracy can be interpreted through classical categorization, where “the differentiating attributes of the secondary categories occur in addition to those of the primary category” (Collier and Mahon 1993, 849). While the primary focus of this study is on autocratization and autocratic regimes, it should be noted that liberal democracy is the other subcategory of democracies within V-Dem’s Regimes of the World index (v2x_regime) typology, alongside electoral democracy. Beyond the basic criteria of electoral democracies, liberal democracies are characterized by a robust implementation of liberal principles, including the rule of law, various civil liberties, and the separation of powers. Nonetheless, electoral democracy remains the foundational reference for democratization and autocratization in this article, encompassing incremental changes that increase or decrease in the fulfillment of its criteria (Maerz et al. 2023).

On the other side of regime types, autocracies are differentiated at a high level of abstraction by the presence or absence of contested elections, distinguishing between electoral autocracies and closed autocracies. This classification mainly aligns with other existing conceptualizations of authoritarian regime types, but there are also concepts that are cross-cutting by the nature of elections. For example, closed autocracies include cases like hereditary (absolute) monarchies, military regimes, and personalist rule (or sultanism), where meaningful multiparty elections do not occur. However, debates among scholars continue regarding whether personalist rule constitutes a distinct regime type (Anckar and Fredriksson 2019, 92–93; Geddes et al. 2014; Linz 2000, 151–55) or not (Brooker 2000, 37; Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 149). Similarly, hegemonic authoritarian regimes seamlessly fit into the overarching category of closed autocracies. Despite conducting regular elections, they effectively operate as one-party states due to overwhelming constraints on the opposition, thus rendering the elections non-competitive (Howard and Roessler 2006, 367).

In contrast, the nature of elections intersects with specific instances of party-based rule (Anckar and Fredriksson 2019; Geddes et al. 2014; Hadenius and Teorell 2007), categorizing some as closed autocracies and others as electoral autocracies, depending on the nature of the election in these cases. In the subtype of party-based rule, in the most extreme cases, only one party is legally permitted. At the other end of the spectrum, there are countries where real opposition parties are allowed to exist and participate in elections, but the dominant party ensures that it secures the majority of parliamentary support (Anckar and Fredriksson 2019, 91–92). While the former exemplifies closed autocracies, the latter are classified as electoral autocracies. Furthermore, oligarchic rule represents a specific case in which, despite apparent multiparty competition, the participation is not inclusive, with only a minority holding voting rights (Anckar and Fredriksson 2019, 93–94). These systems are thus categorized as closed autocracies from the perspective of participation, though they might appear democratic from the aspect of contestation.

Without delving into every nuanced aspect of the literature on hybrid regimes, it is essential at this juncture to address them, as they emerged as the most widespread political system at the start of the 21st century (Howard and Roessler 2006, 365). These regimes, blending democratic procedures with autocratic practices, are mostly viewed as neither fully authoritarian nor completely democratic. Initially interpreted as systems in transition, they were later recognized as rather stable regimes with persisting institutional forms within a “grey zone” (Carothers 2002, 9) or a “foggy zone” (Schedler 2002, 37). However, as Cassani (2014) pointed out, researchers differ significantly in their definitions, viewing hybrid regimes as either diminished types of democracies or authoritarianism, specific intermediate types of regimes, outright instances of authoritarianism, or specific subtypes of autocracy. Furthermore, hybrid regime approaches employ both radial and classical categorizations. Radial categories, like delegative and illiberal democracies, are built on a root concept of democracy—for an overview see Collier and Levitsky (1997)— and designed to expose democratic shortfalls, focusing more on deficits than on existing attributes of democracy (Cassani 2014, 544). Conversely, concepts such as electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2013) and competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010) underscore the distorted nature of competition, defining it as a central “positive” feature of these regimes.

While electoral authoritarianism aligns with the wider category of electoral autocracies, competitive authoritarianism, despite attempts by incumbents to create and maintain an uneven playing field (Levitsky and Way 2010), permits greater electoral uncertainty. In other words, this concept is less definitive in distinguishing itself from electoral democracies and more so from hegemonic regimes (Schedler 2013, 107, 339). Moreover, competitive authoritarian regimes recognize elections as the fundamental, albeit flawed, mechanism for gaining and maintaining political power, adhering to established rules of the game (Howard and Roessler 2006, 368). Nevertheless, although they differ from traditional forms of authoritarian rule, these instances of “authoritarianism with adjectives” are “neither democratic, nor democratizing, nor ambiguous, but plainly authoritarian” (Schedler 2013, 81).

In light of the above, electoral autocracies both integrate and intersect distinct concepts from the literature on authoritarian regimes. Unlike one-party systems, which include regimes with only “satellite parties,” they allow some opposition candidates to participate in elections (Wahman et al. 2013, 27). However, unlike electoral democracies, they do not ensure genuine democratic competition, thereby systematically compromising Dahl’s criteria for polyarchy. Electoral autocracies—“electoral authoritarianism,” as conceptualized by Andreas Schedler— emphasize the manipulated nature of political competition in regimes that conduct real multiparty elections but hollow out their democratic essence (Schedler 2002, 2013). Similarly, V-Dem classifies electoral autocracies based on their adherence to de facto multiparty elections for chief executive and the legislature, requiring that “at least one real opposition party is allowed to contest”, although often under significant constraints (Coppedge et al. 2024, 68). Thus, the mere presence of satellite parties does not guarantee genuine multiparty competition: electoral autocracies require true electoral contests that involve legitimate opposition. The breadth of this secondary regime category’s spectrum can be illustrated with contrasting examples: Russia under Putin in the 2010s, where independent alternatives increasingly diminished, and the Orbán regime in Hungary, where real multiparty electoral competition still persists.

Distinguishing electoral autocracies from electoral democracies is more challenging than separating them from closed autocracies. While electoral democracies are characterized by genuine accountability to the people, ensured through free and fair elections and other institutional prerequisites of Dahl’s polyarchy, electoral autocracies merely simulate competitive elections. Although these elections meet formal democratic criteria, they fundamentally lack substantive democratic qualities such as freedom, fairness, inclusiveness, and the meaningfulness of the elections (Diamond 2002, 28). According to V-Dem, the critical distinction lies in whether elections truly enable free and fair political contestation or merely maintain the semblance of democratic legitimacy (Coppedge et al. 2024, 292). While electoral autocracies may appear to uphold democratic procedures and institutions, they systematically manipulate them to solidify their power and evade genuine accountability. The latter only exists to the extent that citizens’ political preferences and beliefs can be formulated, expressed, and taken into account in decision-making processes under pluralist, free, and fair conditions.

In sum, electoral autocracies present merely the façade of accountability, adhering to the formal-procedural elements of electoral democracies while undermining substantial aspects of contestation. Consequently, their elections and representative institutions, while preserving the formal appearance of democracy, fail to ensure its democratic substance, thereby consolidating power through quasi-democratic means—a central argument in Schedler’s analysis. Although these regimes face some risks from competitive elections, they effectively minimize this uncertainty by systematically manipulating political contestation (Schedler 2013, 54–55). These dynamics stifle the genuine formation and expression of citizens’ political preferences and beliefs, reducing them to “objectified masses” rather than agents capable of independent decision-making (Rak and Bäcker 2022).

The tertiary feature: populism

This picture of a “disciplined mass of indistinct members” (Urbinati 1998, 120) brings us closer to populism, another key term of this study, which gained academic focus concurrently with hybrid regimes in the late 1990s. In populist narratives, people are portrayed as homogeneous and acts merely as passive spectators in contrast to a leader endowed with real agency. These dynamics resemble the ancient Spartan assembly, where Spartans collectively voted by acclamation, approving or disapproving decisions without expressing individual assent or dissent.

In contemporary political science, despite the popularity of perspectives that view populism as a type of political discourse or style, leadership, movement, elite strategy, sociocultural phenomenon, or a mechanism for the formation of collective identities (for an overview, see Kaltwasser et al. 2017), the ideational approach (Mudde 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013; Pappas 2019) is predominant in populism research, especially in Europe. This approach, which serves as the starting point for this study, interprets populism as a thin-centered ideology of “democratic illiberalism.” It posits that populists view society as “ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004, 562).

However, rather than merely focusing on the struggle between the established elite and populist challengers—viewing populism almost synonymously with mere elite criticism—, this study suggests examining populism through the lens of anti-pluralism. It argues that populism should be understood as an inherently anti-pluralist interpretation of democracy and political representation. Thus, rather than defining populism as per se democratic and emphasizing the "paradoxical" (or "constitutive") tension between the democratic-populist and the liberal-constitutional pillars of (liberal) democracy (Mény and Surel 2002, 15; Taggart 2004), this study identifies populism as a manifestation of anti-pluralism, which stands in opposition to inherently pluralist (electoral) democracy. Instead of advocating for the simple, unfettered power of the popular will, this study interprets democracy as a “selective polyarchy” that combines popular sovereignty with limited majority rule (Sartori 1987, 167). This approach emphasizes pluralism through free and fair political contestation—extending beyond merely clean and multiparty elections—reflecting Dahl’s notion of “pluralist democracy.” This nuanced view challenges the simplistic equating of populism with “democratic illiberalism,” arguing that such a conflation is an oxymoron within the context of electoral democracy, as the latter inherently demands pluralism as a fundamental principle. Although many argue for the beneficial or diverse impact of populism on democracy—for an overview, see Vittori (2022)—this study does not pursue the argument along those lines. Instead, employing a more rigorous definition, it seeks to align the concept of populism with literature on regimes in the “grey zone.”

Before delving into a concise conceptualization of populism, it is crucial to clarify why this study prefers “populism” to “anti-pluralism” when linking it to the literature on hybrid regimes. While Medzihorsky and Lindberg (2024) compellingly argue that anti-pluralism—rather than populism or extreme ideologies—can reveal “would-be autocratizers” before they assume office, their approach focuses on predicting future autocratic tendencies by examining anti-pluralist parties, rather than examining the characteristic strategies of autocrats in power. Furthermore, they apply a mainstream definition of populism centred on merely anti-elitism and people-centric rhetoric, which they acknowledge is not inherently pluralistic or antidemocratic (Pappas 2019). Thus, Medzihorsky and Lindberg’s approach results from their minimalist interpretation of populism, which generally fails to seriously consider the antagonistic nature of populism. Unlike agonistic conflicts, which are compatible with pluralism and democracy (Mouffe 2013), antagonistic conflicts are fundamentally at odds with these principles, as they lack the reciprocal minimal recognition required (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Linz 1978). Schedler (2023) similarly argues in his recent review of the polarization literature. According to him, we should distinguish ordinary political conflicts from extraordinary ones that lead to the collapse of basic democratic trust, proposing the latter as a primary marker of political polarization.

Following this logic, the present study proposes a robust interpretation of populism that seriously considers its exclusionary, delegitimizing, and anti-pluralist nature, viewing it as a specific subtype within the broader category of anti-pluralism—one that is distinctly leader-driven and cloaked in democratic rhetoric. Unlike general anti-pluralism, which may not necessarily involve appeals to the will of the people or elections (such as hereditary or military rule), populism explicitly invokes the will of the people. Therefore, it can be characterized by the features associated with anti-pluralism in the V-Dem project, namely low commitment to democratic processes, demonization of political opponents, encouragement of political violence, and disrespect for fundamental minority rights, as identified in the V-Dem project. More specifically, in line with interpretations that consider it an anti-pluralist threat to democracy (Abts and Rummens 2007; Müller 2016; Urbinati 1998), populism is defined here as an autocratic interpretation of democracy and political representation that embodies three core attributes: (1) people-centrism, (2) anti-elitism, and (3) a Manichaean outlook, all culminating in a moralizing and extremely exclusionary representative logic. This definition is not only more robust than the V-Dem’s minimalist approach, which requires only the first two elements for its Populism Index, but also somewhat more comprehensive than those that recognize the anti-pluralist consequences of Manichaean politics yet measure them at a relatively low level (Bene and Boda 2023; Castanho Silva et al. 2019).

People-centrism refers here to the absolutization of the will of the homogeneous people and the desire for the enforcement of their transparent will as the ultimate political goal (Canovan 1999; Mudde 2004; Laclau 2005). This is often articulated through militant rhetoric about establishing “real democracy.” Inherently, this perspective rejects pluralism and constraints on popular sovereignty by promoting a fictional, unified concept of the people, which denies the legitimacy of dissent and diversity (Lefort 1988). It is important to emphasize that representing the unity of the people through symbols such as heads of state or national emblems, and other integrative institutions, is not anti-pluralist in itself. It is crucial to distinguish this from the mere symbolic representation of national unity, which in itself is not antithetical to democratic principles. Unlike these symbols, the populist notion of the people suppresses the pluralistic value of diversity, which is completely crowded out by its praise for unity.

Anti-elitism is not only a phenomenon observed within domestic political arenas; it also manifests in the perceived underdog status of populists on the international stage. The elite is portrayed as a minority group of corrupt forces that have subverted the political system for their own gain (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 502). These elites, who dominate realms such as politics, the economy, culture, media, and the judiciary (Rooduijn 2014, 577), are seen as exploiting the people to augment their own power, necessitating a liberation from their control. Populism is fundamentally concerned with unmasking and identifying these adversaries, as defining such an enemy crucially shapes the populist construction of the “people” (Hawkins 2009, 1044).

A Manichaean outlook frames politics as a kind of moral cosmology or worldview and an antagonistic struggle between forces of good and evil (Hawkins 2009), generating deep societal divisions through narratives of perpetual crisis and extreme political polarization. At the core of this polarized politics lies an existential crisis of the political community, which serves as a morally unquestionable justification for the populist leader’s claim to power. This crisis allows the leader to proclaim to speak in the name of the people and to identify its enemies. The “good” forces are considered the morally superior common people, while their enemies are cast as morally inferior—comprising past, present, or foreign elites, their allies, and even other political communities. These adversaries are portrayed as posing a fundamental threat to the integrity of the “true” people.

The outcome of these characteristics is a quasi-democratic yet deeply moralizing and extremely exclusionary representative logic that asserts that populist leaders are the sole legitimate representatives of the morally superior people. This acclamative concept of representation extends beyond traditional electoral procedures, with the populist leader embodying and expressing the unified will of a homogeneous people, transcending specific group interests. This embodies the core attributes of V-Dem’s Anti-Pluralism Index—low commitment to democratic processes, denying the legitimacy of dissenting opponents, toleration of the use of political violence, and curtailing the minority rights—which in populism manifest through Manichaean discourses depicting the moral struggle between the pure people and the conspiring elite.

The result is a direct and unmediated relationship between the populists and the people, based on an unquestionable faith in and devotion to the leader. These dynamics grant populists an extraordinary level of freedom and arbitrary power to determine and articulate the people’s will, effectively making it impossible to hold the leader accountable. This phenomenon can be viewed as a form of inverse representation, where the typical democratic roles of accountability and representation are inverted. Invoking Hanna Pitkin’s seminal work on political representation, the ideal of representation in populism can be likened to the fascist theory of representation, which is characterized by a radical leader (Führer) principle. This endows the leader with a “blank cheque” authorization, a full transfer of political rights, epitomizing an extreme form of “symbolic representation.” In this asymmetric relationship, which relies on emotional and charismatic political identification, the people are subordinated to the populist leader’s authority. Pitkin notes, “the leader creates the unity of wills among his followers out of his own inner resources,” aligning them to himself and moulding them to suit his aims and interests (Pitkin 1967, 108). Although populists do not completely transcend the law as fascists might in their quest to unify the masses, they employ a similar “authoritarian mode” of symbolic representation, which “uses elections and the media as devices for keeping the popular acceptance always alive” (Urbinati 2019, 135).

Towards synthesis: populist autocratization and populist electoral autocracy (PEA)

Rather than fully connecting the two outlined research areas, the primary objective of this study is to advocate for the benefits of a complex approach while identifying potential connections between key concepts. The main argument suggests that while populism does not provide a regime-level explanation on its own (Urbinati 2019), its appropriate application could enhance the explanatory power of studies on contemporary autocratization and autocracies. This connection is further supported by the expanding body of literature on the interplay between populism and hybrid regimes (Balderacchi 2018; Castaldo 2018; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Robinson and Milne 2017), as well as on the relationship between political polarization and democratization/autocratization (Boese et al. 2022; Casal and Rama 2021; Somer et al. 2021). Moreover, even if not specifically in the terms defined above, concepts such as “populist authoritarianism” (Tang 2016) and “authoritarian populism” (Bugarič 2019; Norris and Inglehart 2019) have gained popularity. Nonetheless, the latter concept is less compatible with the approach outlined in this study, which perceives democracy as an inherently pluralist regime type and populism as an inherently anti-pluralist interpretation of democracy and representation. Consequently, unlike approaches that might imagine both authoritarian and democratic manifestations or impacts of populism (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 2017; Urbinati 2019, 134), if we seriously consider the anti-pluralist nature of populism and the pluralist value of democracy, then “democratic populism” emerges as an oxymoron.

Conversely, insights from the literature on the relationship between populism and hybrid regimes provide a solid foundation for further research. Notably, scholars often view populism as a catalyst for hybridization. For instance, Levitsky and Loxton’s examination of 14 elected presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2010 highlights how populism has acted as a major catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in the Andes (Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Elected populists, as personalistic outsiders, utilized their electoral mandates to dismantle the existing elite and institutions of horizontal accountability (controlled by the old elites), leading to the formation of competitive authoritarian regimes in nearly all examined cases. On the other hand, a reverse relationship can also be observed. Robinson and Milne argue that “hybrid regimes can emerge from populism or develop populism to explain and justify their democratic shortcomings” (Robinson and Milne 2017, 412). Thus, populism can both trigger and follow hybridization mechanisms. An illustrative case of the former is Turkey, where Erdoğan’s initial defensive populism in the mid-2000s—aimed at surviving threats from judiciary and military tutelary institutions—paved the way for competitive authoritarian tendencies after securing a clearer electoral mandate through typical populist strategies (Castaldo 2018). Conversely, deliberately developed and state-promoted “official populism” has served as an effective regime stabilization tool in Putin’s autocracy, particularly since 2011–2012 electoral cycle (Robinson and Milne 2017; Busygina 2019).

Following these researchers, this study advocates for a complex analytical approach, leveraging the concepts of autocratization, electoral autocracies, and populism as previously defined. To briefly summarize, autocratization refers to the process where either the formal (suffrage, elected officials, and clean elections) or substantive (freedom of association and political public sphere) criteria of electoral democracy are significantly diminished. Electoral autocracies are regimes that ostensibly adhere to the formal criteria of democratic contestation but manipulate its substantial conditions, thereby undermining the pluralistic value inherent in electoral democracy. Finally, populism is defined here as an autocratic interpretation of democracy and political representation characterized by people-centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichaean outlook. These concepts serve as cornerstones for our understanding of populist autocratization and the populist electoral autocracy (PEA). Consequently, populist autocratization denotes processes where violations of democratic criteria are driven by populist actors. This encompasses autocratization within democracies, autocratic transitions, and consolidation within autocracies. Finally, PEA refers to a regime subtype within electoral autocracies where substantive aspects of political competition are undermined by populists, although formal-procedural criteria of democracy are largely maintained. The brief summary of the PEA is presented in Table 1.

Table 1 The concept of populist electoral autocracy (PEA)
Full size table

Furthermore, the interplay between the polity and politics-level elements of PEAs reveals complex dynamics of autocratic stabilization. The compatibility of the anti-pluralist logic of populism with autocratization enhances the stability within these regimes. For instance, the “friend versus enemy” logic of populism not only solidifies political divisions but can also justify repressive measures against perceived regime threats. Additionally, the exclusionary representation employed by populists deters political resistance, enhancing co-optation. Furthermore, populism also strengthens the regime’s charismatic type of legitimacy, which extends beyond the mere formal-procedural framework of democracy and makes it easier to shape political perceptions through an emotional-charismatic connection with the leaders (Benedek 2021, 216–18). Thus, by reinforcing the three “pillars of autocratic stability” (Gerschewski 2013), populism may significantly contribute to the adaptability and resilience of autocracies, making the study of populism particularly valuable for scholars investigating the mechanisms of autocratic stability (Cassani and Tomini 2019; Gerschewski 2013).

Regarding the interplay between populism and autocratic structures in PEAs, populism grants pseudo-democratic legitimacy and moral justification for autocratic governance, while autocratic institutions support these populist narratives through manipulation strategies that subvert meaningful political contestation. As a result, populist electoral autocrats transform democratic arenas into “arenas of acclamation” (Schedler 2013, 91), which, devoid of genuine accountability, stray from the essence of popular sovereignty. Echoing Sartori’s insights, “free elections with unfree opinions express nothing. We say that the people must be sovereign. An empty sovereign who has nothing to say, without opinions of his own, is a mere ratifier, a sovereign of nothing” (Sartori 1987, 87). This stark reality unfolds most clearly perhaps in the political public sphere, where populist electoral autocrats can effectively mobilize and spread misinformation about their adversaries, exploiting the toxic levels of polarization driven by the antagonistic political logic. This environment makes the political community susceptible to identity-driven negative campaigns (Graham and Svolik 2020).

By crafting “populist myths” (Casullo 2020) through employing polarization mechanisms, populism strategically fosters specific sociopolitical divisions that benefit autocrats, thereby bolstering their emotional-charismatic and electoral support. This symbiotic relationship between toxic polarization and autocratization is evident in global contexts, as shown by V-Dem data (Boese et al. 2022). Central to the divisive narratives of populist electoral autocrats is the portrayal of an existential crisis, framed as a—never-ending—heroic struggle between virtuous heroes and malevolent domestic and foreign villains, who threaten the unity and identity of the pure people. Within this anti-pluralist interpretation of democracy and representation, individuals are either loyal followers of the sole true leader or part of a morally inferior enemy of the people. However, when political adversaries are cast as illegitimate enemies, radical steps to neutralize them become justified, leading to the breakdown of the basic democratic trust (Schedler 2023), appealing to both autocrats and populists. Thus, populism and electoral autocracy share a common goal: to rule in the name of the people, but without their genuine control. Populism not only serves as an attractive interpretation of democracy and political representation for hybrid regimes, but also supports their efforts to preserve an autocratic essence behind a democratic façade. Consequently, populism may serve as a bridge linking the semblance of democracy with autocratic substance, thus strengthening the resilience and stability of autocratic regimes.

Empirical extension

Following the conceptualization of populist autocratization and populist electoral autocracy (PEA), this study aims to outline the applicability of its analytical framework, including the formulation of an empirical research agenda. However, firstly, to effectively extend this approach into empirical research settings, a few methodological and operational considerations must first be addressed.

Methodological and operational considerations

The key question is determining whether the criteria for populist autocratization and PEAs are met in empirical realities. The dimensions of concepts like democracy are often treated as ideal types, providing benchmarks against which real-world instances can be measured. However, classifying these instances involves inherent uncertainties and a risk of subjective interpretation, though this does not necessarily lead to bias if this “boundary problem” is handled in a transparent and consistent manner. 

In the specific case of electoral democracies versus (populist) electoral autocracies, a crucial issue is defining the point at which political competition transitions from being free and fair to systematically distorted. While theoretical boundaries between regime types might appear clear, they are “essentially contested” in practice, due to their multidimensional and value-laden nature. This complicates their empirical application, leading to persistent scholarly debates about the qualitative distinctions between democratic and authoritarian practices. Furthermore, since “public simulation defines the very nature of electoral authoritarian regimes”, EAs are “normatively ambiguous by design, not by accident,” and put our judgement to the test (Schedler 2013, 102). Election observers, democracy institutes, and political scientists grapple with the structural ambiguities of manipulated elections, using ever more sophisticated approaches. However, no  amount of methodological refinement can fully resolve the inherently contested nature of regime classification (Schedler 2013, 105). Thus, while striving for objectivity, researchers must navigate between the fallacies of relativism, which sets too low standards, and perfectionism, which aims unreachably high.

To find the middle ground in understanding (populist) electoral autocracies, we must focus on the severe and systematic manipulation of democratic and representative institutions that bolster autocratic stability. This implies not merely assessing the presence of competitive features within regimes but evaluating how these features are exploited to undermine democratic norms. In short, the task is to distinguish between democratic and autocratic elections by evaluating whether political competition is genuinely free and fair or if it is distorted by incumbents using state resources to skew conditions in their favour, often rendering them nearly irremovable. Moreover, the possibility of successfully achieving the latter (i.e. removing the autocrat through elections) is revealed only retrospectively, further complicating "real-time assessments." In (populist) electoral autocracies, the systematic manipulation results in elections that are inclusive in appearance but lack genuine pluralism, competitiveness, and openness. Although these are procedurally competitive multiparty elections, these regimes are not democratic at all (Diamond 2002, 27–29; Schedler 2013, 79–81). Strategically, these elections operate on two levels: while political actors ostensibly abide by established quasi-democratic rules, they simultaneously engage in contests over these very rules (Schedler 2013, 14).

Ultimately, the empirical assessment of the nature of political competition and the populist characteristics of a regime involves qualitative judgements, such as case studies or comparative analysis, and may also utilize semi-qualitative or quantitative data from democracy or populism indices, as well as other relevant data sources. However, indices primarily also rely on qualitative surveys conducted among political scientists. To explore the empirical instances of electoral autocracies and populism, an effective systematic approach proposed by Cassani and Tomini (2019, 6–7) is comparative area studies (CAS). This methodology seamlessly integrates deep contextual insights with comparative analysis, allowing for intra-regional studies within a single region, inter-regional studies across different regions, and cross-regional studies that span multiple areas. For a nuanced understanding of the multi-modal nature of post-Cold War autocratization, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and case studies may also be useful, facilitating case-based, macroqualitative evaluations (Cassani and Tomini 2019, 67–69).

On the other hand, considering semi-qualitative or quantitative data, a plethora of options are available. Given the conceptual framework outlined in this study, the V-Dem project emerges as particularly suited for our needs. For static regime classification, the choice of V-Dem’s Regimes of the World (RoW) index (v2x_regime) is almost self-evident. This index distinguishes among closed autocracy, electoral autocracy, electoral democracy, and liberal democracy by considering both the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) and liberal principles. In addition, using the electoral democracy index (EDI, v2x_polyarchy) to measure the criteria of polyarchy is a logical approach to studying democratization and its reverse process, autocratization.

However, the robust approach to populism outlined in this article is not perfectly captured by existing indices. The V-Dem project’s V-Party dataset defines populism narrowly through its Populism Index, focusing solely on anti-elitism and people-centrism, without considering the aspect of Manichaean politics. A possible alternative solution could involve adopting certain indicators from V-Dem’s Anti-pluralism Index, such as the demonization of political opponents (v2paopresp) or the violation of minority rights (v2paminor). Alternatively, Hawkins et al. (2022), relying on Hawkins’ approach (2009), define populism as a Manichean vision of politics, which positions the will of the people on the good side, opposed by a conspiring elite that subverts this will (Hawkins 2009, 1043–46). The database includes speeches, primarily from 2000 to 2022. Furthermore, the PopuList Dataset, building on Mudde’s classic definition (Rooduijn et al. 2023), incorporates a Manichean worldview through the struggle between two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite.” The PopuList 3.0 covers elections from 1998 up to the end of 2022 and also includes ideological classifications of parties. Finally, it is possible to employ methodologies and data collected by Castanho Silva et al. (2019) and those who build on this approach, such as Bene and Boda (2023). They have distinguished populism through dimensions of people-centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichean outlook, similar to the approach used in this study. However, the actual items regarding Manichean outlook used by them, especially by Bene and Boda, are somewhat minimalistic (“You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics” and “The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed”). Perhaps, Castanho et al.’s (2019, 153) third specific suggestion (now a reverse item) for measurement (“The people I disagree with politically are not evil”) or other potential solutions, could more strongly express the deeply moral and dualistic nature of the Manichean worldview, which leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language by populists (Hawkins 2009, 1063).

A brief research agenda for potential case studies

In this final section, the study outlines several potential empirical applications for the concepts of populist autocratization and PEAs. Firstly, it is crucial to distinguish between populist autocratization and electoral autocracies and their non-populist counterparts, which typically manifest as various forms of technocratic-bureaucratic autocracy. Rather than using the term “technocratic populism”—an output-oriented subtype of populism that directly connects voters to leaders through perceived expertise (Guasti and Buštíková 2020)—these non-populist regimes may be classified as technocratic hybrid regimes, characterized by a bureaucratic-elitist approach.

The classic and most repressive forms of these regimes were initially described by O’Donnell in the context of Latin America as bureaucratic authoritarianism—a type of military rule dominated by individuals who rose to prominence through bureaucratic careers and whose decision-making styles were predominantly technocratic (O’Donnell 1973). In the contemporary era, however, technocratic hybrid regimes typically manifest as electoral autocracies that rely on modernization narratives and output legitimacy within the context of real multiparty competition, in contrast to O’Donnell’s concept of closed autocracies.

Examples of such technocratic hybrid regimes in the post-Cold War era include Singapore’s elitist-technocratic regime (Morgenbesser 2017), Vladimir Putin’s Russia before the emergence of “official populism” during the 2011–2012 electoral cycle (Robinson and Milne 2017), Nursultan Nazarbayev’s “traditional authoritarian” Kazakhstan between 1991 and 2019 (Busygina 2019), or Ben Ali’s “techno-bureaucratic” Tunisia between 1987 and 2011 (Erdle 2020). While all these regimes maintain a façade of electoral legitimacy (i.e., substantively subverted but real multiparty contestation), they essentially rely on technocratic-bureaucratic sources of legitimacy, distinct from the highly polarized and people-centred populist regimes.

Turning our focus back to the concepts of populist autocratization and PEAs, contemporary examples are easily identifiable. Notable instances within European democracies include the Kaczyński twins in Poland from the mid-2000s and Silvio Berlusconi’s governments in Italy (1994–1995, 2001–2006, and 2008–2011). Globally, Donald Trump’s presidency in the United States from 2017 to 2021 stands out. Poland, perhaps the most striking example, has experienced a significant level of populist autocratization since Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice Party came to power in 2015 (Stanley and Cześnik 2019). On the other hand, the rise of populists such as Berlusconi (Fabbrini 2013) and Trump (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018) highlights an increasingly polarized political landscape that fosters highly personalized politics rather than indicating a clear shift from liberal to electoral democracies, as occurred in Poland. However, a potential return of Trump in 2024 could further exemplify populist autocratization in the United States.

Numerous instances exist where countries teetered on the brink of democracy due to populist autocratization, or even transformed into PEAs. Noteworthy examples include Vladimír Mečiar in Slovakia during the 1990s (Deegan-Krause 2013), Boyko Borisov in Bulgaria from 2009 to 2021 (Bankov 2020), and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil from 2019 to 2022 (Daly 2020). Despite the distinctly populist and autocratic leadership styles of these leaders, these low-quality but relatively stable electoral democracies have managed to avoid transitioning into autocratic regimes.

In contrast, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary serves as a textbook example of extremely intensive populist autocratization culminating in an autocratic transition in the mid-2010s (Bozóki and Benedek 2024). Utilizing populism initially as a catalyst for undermining the pre-2010 liberal democracy, Hungary has rapidly evolved into a PEA, particularly following the 2015 refugee crisis. This pattern, marked by anti-migrant populist rhetoric and attacks on civil society and media pluralism (Benedek 2024), echoes in other cases such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela between 1998 and the mid-2000s (Kestler and Latouche 2022), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey since the early 2000s (Castaldo 2018; Esen and Gumuscu 2016), and Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia since the mid-2010s (Spasojević 2020). These leaders have similarly established systems characterized by distorted electoral competition and centralized, personalistic governance.

Finally, the role of populist autocratization in transitions between closed and electoral autocracies could also be significant. An intriguing question arises concerning whether the populist characteristics helped or hindered the (failed) attempts at autocratic regime transitions from PEAs to closed autocracies in the cases of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia during the late 1990s (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Levitsky and Way 2010) or Hugo Chávez in Venezuela from the mid-2000s until 2013 (Kestler and Latouche 2022).

Conclusion

This article aimed to reduce the distance between the research fields on populism and regimes in the “grey zone” by connecting them through the concepts of populist autocratization and the populist electoral autocracy (PEA) regime subtype. By merging the strengths of these approaches, this study enabled a comprehensive analysis of both the static and dynamic aspects of political regimes. This approach provides deeper insights into the functioning of contemporary autocracies and the dynamics of autocratization, while enhancing communication across theoretical boundaries.

To briefly summarize the key concepts of this approach: autocratization is a general process by which formal (suffrage, elected officials, and clean elections) or substantive (freedom of association and political public sphere) criteria of electoral democracy are significantly diminished. Electoral autocracies adhere to formal criteria of democratic contestation but manipulate their substantial conditions, undermining the pluralism essential to genuine democracy. Additionally, the study has proposed a refined concept of populism, viewed as an inherently anti-pluralist interpretation of democracy and representation. Characterized by people-centrism, anti-elitism, and a Manichaean outlook, populism may be instrumental for regime stabilization, especially in contexts where autocrats, while holding multiparty elections, systematically hollow out the democratic and competitive spirit in order to maintain a façade of democratic legitimacy. These concepts  have served as cornerstones for our understanding of populist autocratization and PEAs. The first concept denotes processes where violations of democratic criteria are driven by populists, encompassing autocratization within democracies, autocratic transitions, and consolidation within autocracies. PEA refers to a regime subtype within electoral autocracies where substantive aspects of political competition are undermined by populists, although formal-procedural criteria of democracy are largely maintained.

Synthesizing the anti-pluralist logic of populism with autocratization—integrating the “hard” and “soft” elements of political systems—significantly enhances the stability of PEAs. Consequently, a joint analytical approach provides valuable insights for scholars studying the dynamics of autocratic stability. Populism provides a pseudo-democratic legitimacy and moral justification for autocratic governance, thereby reinforcing autocratic resilience by exploiting and deepening sociopolitical divisions. The strategic use of polarization mechanisms not only fosters emotional-charismatic bonds between leaders and followers but also allows populist electoral autocrats to effectively shape their followers’ political perceptions. By portraying political adversaries as illegitimate threats, populism creates an environment where radical measures to neutralize opposition are perceived as justified, eroding basic democratic trust. This facilitates autocratic governance in the name of the people, albeit without their genuine control. Consequently, populism may serve as a bridge that links the semblance of democracy with autocratic substance, thereby enhancing the resilience and stability of these regimes.

Finally, this study has not only addressed conceptualization but also explored methodological and operational aspects, as well as the issue of empirical applications through potential case studies. Regarding semi-qualitative or quantitative data, the V-Dem project is well-suited for the conceptual framework in the case of regime classification and democratization/autocratization. On the other hand, although existing indices do not perfectly capture the robust approach to populism, the study outlined potential solutions to this discrepancy. Beyond these quantitative approaches, the article also suggested potential case studies within a brief research agenda. To define its terms more precisely, the study differentiates between populist autocratization and electoral autocracies and their non-populist equivalents, which may fall under the category of technocratic hybrid regimes characterized by a bureaucratic-elitist approach. In contrast to both classical and contemporary technocratic-bureaucratic electoral autocracies, populist autocratization and PEAs are associated with highly polarized and people-centred politics.

Noteworthy examples of populist autocratization within democracies include the Kaczyński twins in Poland, Silvio Berlusconi’s governments in Italy, and Donald Trump’s presidency in the United States. Moreover, several cases illustrate countries teetering on the brink of democracy due to populist autocratization or even transforming into PEAs. Examples of the former include Vladimír Mečiar in Slovakia, Boyko Borisov in Bulgaria, and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. On the other hand, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary is a quintessential example of the rise of the PEA, alongside other cases such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, and Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia. Additionally, the role of populist autocratization in transitions between closed and electoral autocracies was also considered in this study. Hopefully, these methodological and operational considerations, as well as the proposed research agenda, have demonstrated the empirical applicability of the analytical framework, laying a solid foundation for future research beyond this introductory exploration.