Consolidated democracy advantage: political instability and sovereign spreads in the EU

  • Josip GlaurdićEmail author
  • Christophe Lesschaeve
  • Maruška Vizek
Original Article


We expose the way the market evaluates internal political risk and instability in democratic polities by analysing the determinants of sovereign spreads of EU member states over the course of the past two decades. Our analysis builds on the “democratic advantage” argument which suggests democracies enjoy preferential treatment on the international market of sovereign debt because of their better ability to make credible commitments. We suggest that, when it comes to the market’s evaluation of internal political instability and risk in democratic polities, there actually exists a “consolidated democracy advantage”. In times of political instability, older and more consolidated democracies pay less of a premium on their debt than their younger and less consolidated counterparts. In other words, the market indeed views the commitment of consolidated democracies with long track records of democratic competition and survival as something qualitatively different than the commitment of new democracies with short track records.


Sovereign debt European Union Democratic consolidation Democratic advantage Political instability 



This work was supported by the Croatian Science Foundation (HZZ) under the project 1356: “Economic, statistical and political aspects of sovereign bond markets”.

Supplementary material

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Supplementary material 1 (DOCX 22 kb)


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Limited 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Josip Glaurdić
    • 1
    Email author
  • Christophe Lesschaeve
    • 1
  • Maruška Vizek
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute of Political ScienceUniversité du LuxembourgEsch-sur-AlzetteLuxembourg
  2. 2.Institute of EconomicsZagrebCroatia

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