Abstract
Hard-line Euroscepticism appears to be, nowadays, a persistent phenomenon of the later stages of European integration. However, it is unclear to what extent the joint effects of economic insecurities and growing numbers of immigrants play a role in determining the people’s choice to actually support hard-line Eurosceptic parties with their vote. Building upon the existing body of literature on the economic determinants of voting for anti-European parties, this study brings the analysis further by breaking down the electoral performance of strictly Eurosceptic parties for different types of elections at the regional level, accounting for within-country variations otherwise lost in national-level analysis. We build a dataset including the regionally distributed results of all electoral episodes (regional, national, European) between 2007 and 2016 in Austria, France, Germany, Greece and Italy for a total of 522 elections. Methodologically, the paper adopts panel-level econometrics.
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Notes
Full name: "Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units"(NUTS), single coherent system for the division of regional units within the European Union (Eurostat 2019). We use NUTS 2 in all countries of our panel, with the exception of Germany, where we use NUTS-1 instead.
See also Hix (2019) at the 2019 IdeasLab, Brussels, February 21st 2019.
In other words, it becomes increasingly complicated to distinguish between “left” and “right” Euroscepticism, when—for instance- parties on the right-side of the spectrum adopt increasingly deficit-spending oriented platforms that were once defined as left-wing politics (see for instance the economic platforms of the Front National or the Northern League).
Eurostat does not provide municipality-level macroeconomic statistics.
Estonia joined the Eurozone in 2011 and Latvia (2014) as well as Lithuania (2015) followed a few years later. Moreover, Slovakia (2009) is now member of the Eurozone.
Eurostat has not yet released economic and migration data on the regional level from 2017 onwards.
Since we assume that popular backlash may result both from excessive contributions into the fund, and from excessive conditionality imposed to access the funds, we are interested in the effect associated with the absolute value of this variable.
See “Appendix 3” for a graphical comparison of the interaction effect between migration with income and unemployment.
A small city like Leuven has a population density of about 2000 people per square/km, while a capital city like Brussels has a population density of 7000 people per km2.
We prefer split-sample estimation over interaction effects both for ease of interpretation, and because split samples are equivalent to an interaction effect for the entire set of predictors. “Appendix 7” provides estimates for interaction effects only.
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Acknowledgements
A previous version of this paper was presented at the conference of the ECPR Standing Group on the European Union at the Science Po, Paris in 2018. We would like to thank Daniel Bischoff for his comments on our paper and the Solikris project for the financing of Ann-Kathrin’s participation at the conference. Moreover, we thank our student assistants Hanna Doose and Sven Hegewald for their support. Additional thanks go to the anonymous reviewers for CEP.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Country selection procedure
To identify the countries of interest, two main criteria have been selected: crisis intensity and institutional structure. Since we consider electoral aggregates at regional level, we aim to include in the sample both federal and unitary countries; furthermore, we aim to include both parliamentary and presidential countries. Next, we aim to capture the diverse degrees of the Eurocrisis intensity, including at least a programme country, a non-programme country that was nevertheless severely hit by the crisis, a country that experienced only limited economic setback, and a country that fared well during the crisis. Finally, we also include three additional minor criteria: first, we would like to achieve a good balance between “large” and “small” member states; second, when in doubt, our preference would go to countries which have been active on the southern European border during the heights of the Migration crisis and third we consider founding member states of the European Union as well as nations with a shorter EU history.
Intensity of the Eurocrisis | Institutional structure | ||
|---|---|---|---|
Federal | Unitary | ||
Parliamentary | Presidential | ||
Limitedly hit | DE, AT | NL, LU, MA | |
Partially hit | BE | SL, FI | FR |
Severely hit | IT | ||
Under programme | ES | CY, PT, EL, IE | |
Following the federal criterion, our main selection has been Germany, also considering the key role played during the Eurocrisis. As a second federal country, we chose Austria over Belgium according to the “migration crisis” criterion. Next, France has been selected as it fulfils both the institutional and the crisis-intensity criteria. Similarly, Italy has been chosen—in respect to the Baltic countries—since it has a more complex and diverse regional structure (allowing for more within-country variability); furthermore, it has been on the forefront of the migration crisis. Similarly, Greece was chosen between the other programme countries for its rich regional structure, to maintain a federal-non-federal overall balance, and for its role in the 2015 migration crisis. To generate our databank, we pooled the regionally distributed results of all electoral episodes (regional, national, European).
Appendix 2: Parties
Country | Hard-line Eurosceptic parties | EP group | CHES score |
|---|---|---|---|
Austria | Alliance for the Future of Austria Austrian | NA | 2.7 |
Freedom Party | ENF | 1.9 | |
EU-STOP | NA | – | |
The Reform Conservatives | EFDD | – | |
Germany | Alternative for Germany | ECR and EFDD | 1.6 |
National Democratic Party of Germany | NA | 1.7 | |
The Republicans | NA | – | |
France | France Arise | NA | – |
National Front | ENF | 1.2 | |
Movement for France | EFDD | 1.2 | |
New Anticapitalist Party | NA | – | |
Greece | Golden Down | NA | 1.1 |
Greek Communist Party | NA | 1.1 | |
Independent Greeks | NA | 2.2 | |
Italy | Northern League | UEN and EFDD and ENL | 1.1 |
Five Stars Movement | EFDD | 1.4 | |
Brothers of Italy | ECR | 2.2 | |
Us with Salvini | NA | – | |
Tricolour Flame | NA | – |
Appendix 3: Variables
Name | Description | Source | Level of measurement |
|---|---|---|---|
Dependent variables | |||
Hard-Line Euroscepticism | Cumulative share of votes obtained by parties classified as hard-line Eurosceptic | Authors dataset aggregated from the National Electoral Offices of Austria, France, Germany, Greece and Italy, European Parliament | Regional level |
Independent variables | |||
Type of election | 1 = regional; 2 = European; 3 = national | National statistical offices | Regional level |
Second_order | 1 = European, Regional. 0 = national | National statistical offices | Regional level |
Threshold | Required vote share to enter the parliament | National statistical offices | Regional level |
Unemployment | Total share of population from age 15 to 74 currently signed unemployed | Eurostat | Regional level |
Industrial employment | Number of employees from age 15 to 74 currently working in the industrial sector | Eurostat | Regional level |
Construction employment | Number of employees from age 15 to 74 currently working in the construction sector (thousands) | Eurostat | Regional level |
Manufactory added value | Added value of the manufactory sector | Eurostat | Regional level |
GDP | Gross domestic product at current market price (thousands) | Eurostat | Regional level |
GDP_gap_national | Gap between regional income and national income | Authors elaboration on Eurostat | Regional level |
Income EU share | Per capita GDP as % of EU average | Eurostat | Regional level |
CISS | Composite Index of Systemic Stress | ECB (Hollo et al.) | European level |
Assistance_absolute | Net position towards EU bail out schemes, absolute value | ESM | National level |
Asylum seekers (EU) | Number of asylum applicants in the territory of reference | Eurostat | European level |
Asylum seekers (national) | Number of asylum applicants in the territory of reference | Eurostat | National level |
Migrant population (regional) | Migration population at regional level. Computed using Georgiadou et al. (2018) method, augmented by a linear estimation of the asylum seekers’ distribution between regions. | Eurostat, based on Georgiadou et al. | Regional level |
Population density | Nr of residents per km2 | Eurostat | Regional level |
Appendix 4: Robustness checks by estimator and different dependent variables
Baseline (model a5) | Baseline, left-wing Euroscepticism (including M5S) | Fractional logit with country fixed effects (omitted). Odd ratios reported | Hard-line Euroscepticism, RE estimator* | Pooled regression (country fixed effects)** | Pooled regression (region fixed effects)*** | Multilevel mixed effects (2 levels: region and country) | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Unemployment | 0.360 | 0.167 | 0.020 | 0.118 | 0.074 | 0.359 | 0.132 | |
(0.116)*** | (0.041)*** | (0.009)** | (0.092) | (0.123) | (0.125)*** | (0.105) | ||
Composite Index of Systemic Stress | − 19.209 | 0.324 | − 1.541 | − 23.427 | − 20.303 | − 19.178 | − 20.618 | |
(3.162)*** | − 1.084 | (0.248)*** | (2.885)*** | (3.161)*** | (3.443)*** | (3.397)*** | ||
Financial assistance | 0.087 | − 0.316 | 0.016 | 0.162 | 0.299 | 0.089 | 0.255 | |
(0.112) | (0.060)*** | (0.013) | (0.131) | (0.147)** | (0.122) | (0.181) | ||
Regional migrant population | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.002 | − 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.026 | 0.001 | |
(0.010)*** | (0.009)*** | (0.001)*** | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.010)** | (0.001) | ||
Threshold | 0.930 | 0.559 | 0.006 | 1.116 | 0.862 | 0.925 | 0.854 | |
(0.330)*** | (0.232)** | (0.031) | (0.286)*** | (0.316)*** | (0.356)** | (0.417)** | ||
Second order (dummy) | 2.244 | − 0.536 | 0.144 | 2.598 | 2.552 | 2.243 | 2.502 | |
(0.798)*** | (0.275)* | (0.060)** | (0.755)*** | (0.780)*** | (0.868)** | (0.777)*** | ||
Population density | − 0.005 | 0.013 | − 0.002 | − 0.001 | ||||
(0.019) | (0.009) | (0.001)** | (0.002) | |||||
_cons | 14.404 | |||||||
(3.625)*** | ||||||||
Country | _cons | 1.785 | ||||||
(0.330)*** | ||||||||
Region | _cons | 1.064 | ||||||
(0.185)*** | ||||||||
_cons | 5.701 | − 6.172 | − 1.410 | 15.854 | 21.237 | 14.125 | 2.060 | |
− 5.797 | − 4.620 | (0.254)*** | (1.528)*** | (1.666)*** | (1.572)*** | (0.034)*** | ||
R 2 | 0.36 | 0.19 | 0.47 | 0.61 | ||||
N | 521 | 374 | 521 | 521 | 521 | 521 | 521 |
Appendix 5: Standardized coefficients for Table 1
a1 income | a1 unemployment | a1 financial | a2 income | a2 industrial | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Income EU share | − 1.99 | ||||
Threshold | − 0.07 | − 0.07 | 0.07 | − 0.06 | 0.06 |
Second_order | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.07 |
Population density | 0.03 | 0.64 | 0.17 | − 0.18 | 0.98 |
Unemployment | 0.56 | 0.18 | 0.56 | 0.53 | |
CISS (financial trend) | − 0.35 | ||||
Financial assistance | 0.05 | ||||
National income disparity | − 1.24 | ||||
Industrial employment | 0.31 |
a5 asylum (national) | a6 migration (regional) | a7 | a8 trends | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Unemployment | 0.58 | 0.52 | 0.21 | 0.18 | |
Threshold | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.09 | |
Second_order | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.07 | |
Population density | 0.15 | − 0.37 | − 0.27 | − 0.90 | |
CISS (financial trend) | − 0.32 | − 0.24 | |||
Financial assistance | 0.03 | ||||
National income disparity | − 0.10 | ||||
Asylum seekers (national) | 0.32 | ||||
Migrant population (regional) | 2.28 | 1.10 | 1.20 | ||
EU asylum seekers (migration trend) | 0.18 | ||||
Appendix 6: Interaction effects
b1a—Income*regional migration | b1b—Unemployment*regional migration | b2a—Income*national migration | b2b—Unemployment*national migration | b3a—Regional migration*population density | b3b—National migration*population density | b4a—Income *population density | b4b—Unemployment*population density | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Income (% of EU average) | − 0.534 | − 0.613 | − 0.538 | − 0.528 | − 0.657 | |||
(0.079)*** | (0.080)*** | (0.123)*** | (0.128)*** | (0.079)*** | ||||
Regional migrant population, 1000 s | 0.091 | 0.043 | 0.059 | 0.052 | 0.053 | |||
(0.026)*** | (0.012)*** | (0.012)*** | (0.012)*** | (0.011)*** | ||||
Income *regional migration | − 0.000 | |||||||
(0.000)** | ||||||||
Threshold | − 0.062 | − 0.200 | 1.456 | 0.705 | − 0.067 | 1.363 | 0.060 | 0.057 |
(0.313) | (0.313) | (0.497)*** | (0.452) | (0.319) | (0.551)** | (0.327) | (0.317) | |
Second order (dummy) | 2.103 | 1.920 | 2.144 | 1.665 | 2.102 | 2.144 | 2.188 | 2.041 |
(0.792)*** | (0.846)** | (0.824)** | (0.909)* | (0.813)** | (0.846)** | (0.793)*** | (0.850)** | |
Regional Population density | − 0.019 | − 0.012 | − 0.002 | − 0.008 | 0.020 | 0.018 | − 0.030 | 0.001 |
(0.012) | (0.009) | (0.016) | (0.009) | (0.032) | (0.016) | (0.010)*** | (0.010) | |
Unemployment | 0.776 | 0.659 | 0.145 | 0.257 | 0.938 | |||
(0.125)*** | (0.109)*** | (0.188) | (0.186) | (0.132)*** | ||||
Unemployment*regional migrant population | 0.001 | |||||||
(0.001)* | ||||||||
National asylum applicants, 1000 s | 0.234 | − 0.034 | 0.121 | |||||
(0.030)*** | (0.029) | (0.017)*** | ||||||
Income*national migration | − 0.001 | |||||||
(0.000)*** | ||||||||
Unemployment*national migration | 0.018 | |||||||
(0.004)*** | ||||||||
Regional migrant population*population density | − 0.000 | |||||||
(0.000) | ||||||||
National migration*population density | − 0.000 | |||||||
(0.000)*** | ||||||||
Income*population density | 0.000 | |||||||
(0.000)* | ||||||||
Unemployment*population density | − 0.000 | |||||||
(0.000) | ||||||||
_cons | 57.344 | − 5.541 | 65.775 | 1.450 | 46.528 | 49.360 | 63.771 | − 11.511 |
(10.520)*** | − 3.553 | (10.812)*** | − 3.736 | (16.660)*** | (16.615)*** | (8.209)*** | (3.929)*** | |
R 2 | 0.28 | 0.24 | 0.32 | 0.30 | 0.28 | 0.31 | 0.28 | 0.24 |
N | 522 | 521 | 522 | 521 | 521 | 521 | 522 | 521 |
Appendix 7: Interaction effects by election type
National election (base level) | Omitted |
|---|---|
European election | − 8.750 |
(1.123)*** | |
Regional election | − 6.295 |
(2.532)** | |
Unemployment | 0.682 |
(0.098)*** | |
Regional migrant population, 1000 s | 0.039 |
(0.011)*** | |
National asylum applicants, 1000 s | − 0.019 |
(0.021) | |
European election * unemployment | 0.379 |
(0.055)*** | |
Regional election * unemployment | 0.482 |
(0.158)*** | |
Regional election * regional migrant population | 0.002 |
(0.002) | |
European election * national asylum seekers | 0.196 |
(0.029)*** | |
Regional election * national asylum seekers | 0.074 |
(0.030)** | |
Threshold | 4.383 |
(0.914)*** | |
Population_density | − 0.015 |
(0.009)* | |
European election * regional migrant population | − 0.002 |
(0.001) | |
_cons | − 17.978 |
(4.734)*** | |
R 2 | 0.36 |
N | 521 |
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Nicoli, F., Reinl, AK. A tale of two crises? A regional-level investigation of the joint effect of economic performance and migration on the voting for European disintegration. Comp Eur Polit 18, 384–419 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00190-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00190-5