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Bottom-Up Approaches and Decentralized Extension Structures for Improving Access to and Quality of Extension Services and Technology Adoption: Multi-level Analysis from Malawi

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Abstract

This paper looks at village agriculture committees, model villages, and stakeholder panels at various levels as participatory and decentralized structures for improving demand articulation and accountability in agricultural extension service provision in Malawi. It uses various datasets including nationally representative household and community surveys, a survey of service providers, a survey of representatives from the various structures, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews. It employs various estimation methods including matching techniques, matching plus regression adjustments, and an instrumental variables approach. Results show diverse experiences and functionality of these structures. Contrary to earlier reports, most of these structures are active, except for district stakeholder panels (DSPs), of which only about a quarter are active. Similarly, most of them provide a platform for discussion and feedback on service providers and the quality of their advice, except for DSPs. However, most structures were given poor ratings in terms of their responsiveness to the concerns and issues raised. Household participation in village development or agriculture committees is strongly associated with better household outcome indicators. These village committees, if they are active and responsive to farmers’ expressed concerns and needs, can contribute to better community-level outcomes. Results show that these village-level structures matter and that strengthening them is key to addressing their long-term functionality. On the other hand, a model village concept that focuses on an integrated approach to solving communities’ challenges is not associated with improved community outcome indicators; therefore, its implementation should be reviewed and improved to contribute to development outcomes.

Résumé

Ce document examine les comités agricoles de village, les villages modèles, et les panels de parties prenantes, à divers niveaux en tant que structures participatives et décentralisées pour améliorer l'articulation de la demande et la responsabilité dans la fourniture de services de vulgarisation agricole au Malawi. Il utilise divers ensembles de données, y compris des enquêtes ménagères et communautaires représentatives au niveau national, une enquête sur les prestataires de services, une enquête sur les représentants des diverses structures, des groups de discussion, des discussion et des entretiens avec des informateurs clés. Il emploie diverses méthodes d'estimation, y compris des techniques de correspondance, des ajustements de régression plus correspondence, et une approche par variables instrumentales.

Les résultats montrent que les structures partecipatives offrent des expériences et fonctionnalités differentes. Contrairement aux rapports précédents, la plupart de ces structures sont actives, à l'exception des panels de parties prenantes de district (DSP), dont seulement environ un quart sont actifs. De même, la plupart des structures fournissent une plateforme de discussion et de feedback sur les prestataires de services et la qualité de leurs conseils, à l'exception des DSP. Cependant, la plupart des structures ont reçu de mauvaises évaluations en termes de leur réactivité aux préoccupations et aux problèmes soulevés. La participation des ménages aux comités de développement de village ou d'agriculture est fortement associée à de meilleurs indicateurs de résultats des ménages. Les comités de village, s'ils sont actifs et réactifs aux préoccupations et aux besoins exprimés par les agriculteurs, peuvent contribuer à de meilleurs résultats au niveau de la communauté. Les résultats montrent que ces structures au niveau du village sont importantes et que leur renforcement est essentiel pour assurer leur fonctionnalité à long terme. D'autre part, un concept de village modèle qui se concentre sur une approche intégrée pour résoudre les défis des communautés n'est pas associé à des indicateurs de résultats communautaires améliorés; par conséquent, sa mise en œuvre devrait être revue et améliorée afin de contribuer aux résultats de développement.

Resumen

Este documento examina los comités de agricultura de los pueblos, los pueblos modelo, y los paneles de grupos de interés de varios niveles, como estructuras participativas y descentralizadas para mejorar la articulación de la demanda y la rendición de cuentas en la prestación de servicios de extensión agrícola en Malawi. El estudio utiliza varios conjuntos de datos, incluyendo encuestas a hogares y comunidades representativas a nivel nacional, una encuesta a proveedores de servicios, una encuesta a representantes de las diversas estructuras, discusiones de grupos focales, y entrevistas a informantes clave. Emplea varios métodos de estimación, incluyendo técnicas de emparejamiento, ajustes de regresión más emparejamiento, y un enfoque de variables instrumentales.

Los resultados muestran que las varias estructuras partecipativas ofrecen diferentes experiencias y funcionalidades. Contrariamente a informes anteriores, la mayoría de estas estructuras están activas, excepto los paneles de interesados a nivel de distrito (DSPs), entre los cuales solo alrededor de un cuarto están activos. De manera similar, la mayoría de las estructuras proporcionan una plataforma para la discusión y retroalimentación sobre los proveedores de servicios y la calidad de sus consejos, excepto los DSPs. Sin embargo, a la mayoría de las estructuras se les dio una mala calificación en términos de su capacidad de respuesta a las preocupaciones y problemas planteados. La participación de los hogares en los comités de desarrollo o agricultura de los pueblos está fuertemente asociada con mejores indicadores de resultados de los hogares. Estos comités de pueblos, si están activos y responden a las preocupaciones y necesidades expresadas por los agricultores, pueden contribuir a mejores resultados a nivel de la comunidad. Los resultados muestran que estas estructuras a nivel de pueblo important, y que fortalecerlas es clave para abordar su funcionalidad a largo plazo. Por otro lado, un concepto de pueblo modelo centrado en un enfoque integrado para resolver los desafíos de las comunidades no está asociado con mejores indicadores de resultados de la comunidad; por lo tanto, su implementación debería ser revisada y mejorada para contribuir a los resultados del desarrollo.

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Fig. 1

Source Modified from Malawi, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development (2006). Straight lines reflect reporting lines from the DAESS platforms to the MoLGRDs and oversight from MoLGRD to DAESS platforms. For instance, the ASPs report to the area development committees on agricultural development at the area level and on the functioning of the ASPs; while ADC provides the oversight to the ASP. A similar structure applies to the other levels (village, district). On the other hand, the short-dashed lines connect MoAIWD with the DAESS platforms in terms of facilitating the existence of these platforms, being part of them (for example, the district agriculture development officer chairs the DAECC), and building their capacity so that these platforms perform their key functions. MoAIWD is also an advocate for the role of MaFAAS at the national level. The DAES is part of MoAIWD, together with the other technical departments concerning fisheries, livestock, crop development, land resources, and agricultural development. The DAESS structure encompasses all of these technical departments, and so the heads of the agricultural technical departments are represented on the DSPs and DAECCs. Larger-dash lines represent coordination across the ministries and DAESS platform

Fig. 2

Source Map from MASDAP (2016); raw data from International Food Policy Research Institute interviews, December 2016 to March 2017. All districts were covered in the household and community surveys. Those shaded in dark gray are the 15 focus districts of the census of service providers; those with dots are the locations of the focus group discussions; and those marked as Feed the Future districts have detailed information from a census of area stakeholder panels, district stakeholder panels, and the District Agricultural Extension Services System

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Notes

  1. The DACs work with the district councils to, for example, make recommendations on extension service policy, support local agricultural institutions and development, assist in resource acquisition, and encourage community participation.

  2. Dasgupta and Beard (2007), for instance, analyzed the World Bank’s Urban Poverty Projects in Indonesia and highlighted the importance of elite and nonelite participation through democratic self-governance processes in order to obtain the expected goals. Other studies have also underscored the need for committed local government officials as well as traditional and religious leaders for the success of participatory platforms (for example, Sanyang et al. 2016).

  3. In this respect, Resnick and Birner (2010) studied participatory mechanisms that enabled farmers to provide input into key policy aspects in Senegal, yet the authors showed that this participation did not translate into implemented policies, due mostly to conflicting group interests and political alliances. In Burkina Faso, the lack of financial resources hinders the implementation of discussed policies.

  4. For these surveys, Mzimba district was divided into north and south, and Lilongwe into east and west.

  5. For example, if the majority of the respondents within the panel reported that the platform had bylaws, then that platform was considered to have bylaws.

  6. We focus here on crop productivity and exclude that of livestock.

  7. Research implemented by IFPRI (for example, Hoddinott and Yohannes 2002) has confirmed that a more diversified diet is associated with improvement in nutritional parameters, including birth weight, child anthropometric status, improved hemoglobin concentrations, caloric and protein adequacy, percentage of protein from animal sources (high-quality protein), and per capita consumption (a proxy for household income). Studies validating dietary diversity against nutrient adequacy in developing countries have confirmed a positive relationship and a consistently positive association between dietary diversity and child growth (Ruel 2002; Arimond and Ruel 2002; Working Group on Infant and Young Child Feeding Indicators 2006; Smale, Moursi, and Birol 2015).

  8. Note that active platforms are those that use bylaws, have short-term plans, meet at least yearly, report back to members when meeting with other panels/committees, share reports at least annually, and have record-keeping processes.

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Funding

This study was funded by the Government of Flanders, through the Flanders-Malawi Country Strategy Paper for International Cooperation, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), through the Strengthening Agricultural and Nutrition (SANE) Activity.

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Appendix 1

Appendix 1

See Tables 9, 10, 11, 12.

Table 9 Reduction of bias from the matching techniques
Table 10 Descriptive statistics of the outcome indicators and control variables at community level (N = 299)
Table 11 Descriptive statistics of the outcome indicators and treatment and control variables at household level (N = 3001)
Table 12 Results of the likelihood of respondents’ participation in village committees
Fig. 3
figure 3

Source International Food Policy Research Institute household and community surveys (2016). Results using Stata software. VAC village agriculture committee, VDC village development committee

Results of the propensity score matching.

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Ragasa, C., Alvarez-Mingote, C. & McNamara, P. Bottom-Up Approaches and Decentralized Extension Structures for Improving Access to and Quality of Extension Services and Technology Adoption: Multi-level Analysis from Malawi. Eur J Dev Res (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-024-00627-y

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