Large-scale agricultural development schemes are not new in Kenya. From the mid-1950s, the colonial government sets up the Perkerra, Hola and Mwea-Tebere irrigation schemes on ‘native reserves’. After independence, the Ministry of Agriculture took over the management of these projects, and in 1966, the National Irrigation Board (NIB)Footnote 25 was established with the mandate to develop, improve and manage national irrigation schemes in Kenya (Ngigi 2002). NIB spearheaded the development of Ahero, Bunyala, West Kano and Bura irrigation schemes between the mid-1970s and early 1980s.
Closely related to these projects is the million-acre idea, which is traceable to the early 1960s when focus shifted to the re-Africanization project dubbed the ‘million-acre settlement scheme’. It targeted lands that the colony had previously set aside for European settlement (Bradshaw 1990; Chambers 1969; Kanyinga 2009; Leo 1981). The million-acre scheme aimed at land redistribution and conferment of tenure rights on indigenous communities for settlement and agricultural development, while the large irrigation schemes were a response to food security challenges and the management of risks associated with unpredictable rainfall patterns. Irrigation and settlement schemes are driven by the politics of aspiration, because their purpose goes beyond addressing the underlying challenges. Essentially, they are central to the realization of the independence dream and are, thus, designed to win the support of the masses and to draw potential international development aid. The big promises justified external financing of such projects. For example, between 1977 and 1986, the World Bank financed the Bura Irrigation Project to the tune of USD 40 million.
To what extent have these centralized projects lived up to expectations? About six decades on, most public irrigation schemes in Kenya perform way below average (Muema et al. 2018). Ngigi (2002) notes that ‘the intended benefit of improving the living standards, to say the least, has not been realised’ and that some, like Bura, are no longer functional. Moreover, some irrigation schemes and large-scale agricultural investments are linked to human rights abuses especially through land dispossession (Otieno 2016). However, central to the failure of these schemes is the complexity of management and control as exemplified by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003). Bradshaw (1990) blames this on challenges around ownership, management, uneven resource distribution, water allocation and scarcity, which contribute to underdevelopment.
In 2010, as part of Vision 2030 and in line with UN goals,Footnote 26 Kenya embarked on a renewed push for the return of mega irrigation projects. Arguably, these visions and imaginations of the future are essentially anchored in global discourses and existential threats, which helps to give them currency and a strong bargaining position in the state decision-making apparatus. Despite the proven failure of the schemes already discussed, the idea of megaprojects was presented afresh, with renewed fascination and new aspirations that captured the imagination of the masses, as well as that of development partners, capitalizing on their link to the country’s development blueprints within the internationally favoured devolved governance structures.
Nine large-scale schemes were identified, three of which became flagship irrigation projects: the Galana-Kulalu Food Security Project (GKFSP), Mwea Irrigation Development Project and Bura Irrigation Rehabilitation Project. The GKFSP is more recent than the others, having been launched in 2014 with completion planned for 2017. The project was one of the key campaign promises that the Jubilee administration made in its manifesto. The idea was to make Kenya a food-secure nation through the one-million-acre land irrigation initiative (Leshore and Minja 2019). Below, we will describe the nature of the project and the conditions under which this massive agricultural investment collapsed.
The project was planned to be implemented in three phases: a Model Farm of 10,000 acres, to be developed into a Pilot Farm covering 100,000 acres, and finally the larger GKFSP with 1.75 million acres (NIB 2015). As located in one of Kenya’s poorest, semi-arid counties, the proposed million-acre irrigation scheme promised to secure the country against hunger, increase agricultural exports and transform a previously ‘underutilized’ landscape through large-scale production of maize, sugarcane, vegetables and fruits, and through market-oriented livestock production for both local and international markets. Water from the Galana River was meant to irrigate hundreds of thousands of acres of farmland located primarily within the controversial Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC)Footnote 27 land at Kulalu ranch. Such a massive project required big financing and technical expertise that exceeded the country’s capacity. Through NIB, the Kenyan government engaged Israel’s leading agricultural consulting firm, Agri-Green Consulting Ltd, for technical and operational support. The selection of this firm went along with financial assistance from Israel for implementation of the project and to cement Israel-Kenya relations. In September 2014, the government awarded Agri-Green Ltd the contract at KES 14.5 billion (USD 145 million), which was later revised down to KES 7.2 billion (USD 72 million). Popular opinion has it that the contract may have been deliberately overpriced for personal gain.
The launch of the project elicited much excitement and expectations that a previously ‘forgotten’ space could become the engine for national food security. However, this anticipation would soon turn into heated criticism and resistance, particularly from coastal Kenya, where the project is located. Expectations of job opportunities for young people were disappointed, leading to feelings of betrayal and deception, as elite-owned consulting firms controlled even the lowest jobs, like bush clearing. From the onset of the project, there was strong centralized management, which meant lack of ownership and support at the local level. Such grievances quickly led to crime and insecurity, as armed groups in the region expressed their displeasure over the agricultural investment. The location of the project next to the Tsavo East National Park also meant that a new frontier for human-wildlife conflict was created, coupled with increasing cases of poaching. This begs the question whether the state and other stakeholders bothered to consider the possible consequences of such a massive investment. It would appear that fascination with the scheme blinded its founders to the realities on the ground: ongoing conflicts between Orma pastoralists and the management of Galana-Kulalu ADC ranches over grazing land; human-wildlife conflicts; challenges of service delivery; poverty and poor education (NIB 2015).
Other contextual and politico-economic factors that are blamed for the slow pace of the project and its eventual collapse include poor road networks, mismanagement of funds, and lack of basic amenities like electricity, potable water and health facilities.Footnote 28 Indeed, this marginalized area had deep-seated problems and social inequalities that needed serious state intervention before setting up such a huge project. However, it seemed as though there was a rush to push the financing through to demonstrate that the political regime was working towards its development goals. The ease with which billions of shillings were disbursed within a very short period of time in contrast to the quality of work done became the greatest point of public concern. For example, the Senate Agricultural Committee probing the stalled Galana-Kulalu model farm learnt that the government paid KES 580 million for bush clearing on only 10,000 acres of land, a job that was apparently done to a poor standard.Footnote 29 According to NIB, at least KES 6.1 billion was paid to the contractor out of which KES 2.55 billion was paid by the government of Kenya.Footnote 30 The lack of tangible results for the money spent raised public suspicion, as noted in a national newspaper:
The project was a good idea but now it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that it ended up being a cash cow for a few individuals… the expected production from the project turned out to be about a quarter of what had been expected. This, after more than Sh5 billion has been spent on the project. How could a project to be carried out on 1.75 million acres and having the engagement of a firm from Israel – which is renowned for its success in dryland agriculture and advanced irrigation techniques – have failed?Footnote 31
Some critics have interpreted this feeling of deception among the inhabitants of the region as a deliberate strategy by the state to undermine development in coastal Kenya and thus weaken its political relevance. The NIB links the failure of the project to the lack of capacity on the side of the contractor, Agri-Green Consulting Ltd, yet the firm had a strong record of delivering similar projects in worse ecological conditions and it was the responsibility of NIB to vet the firm’s capacity before awarding the contract. Israel’s envoy to Kenya, Noah Gendler, resigned after barely two years in the job, noting that he had ‘failed to add value to the country’. He linked the failure to political and economic sabotage, particularly by farmers and their politicians in Kenya’s maize growing areas, and pitiless cartels involved in maize importation, both of whom thrive on shortages that allow them to reap billions. The scheme, according to him, was the first ever in the history of Israel’s government-to-government development projects to fail.Footnote 32 Despite the failure, neither the government nor the contractor has accounted for the billions of shillings lost.
Notwithstanding the big promises made by the state and the high expectations of the local communities, Galana-Kulalu adds to the list of failed large-scale irrigation projects in Kenya. A similar story comes from the Napuu II irrigation scheme in Turkana County, which seems to have even intensified hunger.Footnote 33 Likewise, the Tana Delta Irrigation Project, which was funded through the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), failed to achieve its intended promise, though the Tana and Athi Rivers Development Authority (TARDA) invested KES 70 million (US$ 700,000) to rehabilitate the collapsed scheme.Footnote 34 The Perkerra irrigation scheme is also reportedly on the brink of collapse due to insufficient water supply. Nevertheless, NIB continues to line up dozens of large irrigation projects for funding, whilst facing a political tussle revolving around the governance and management of projects in specific devolved units.
The example of Galana-Kulalu illustrates how the state originally envisioned massive agricultural investment as promising quick economic and social transformation, which then became overcomplicated and suffered from a lack of accountability and other institutional deficiencies. As a response, the state and some politicians sold part of the scheme to private investors, convinced an international partner to participate in providing technical solutions, and attracted foreign donor assistance. The over-ambitious imaginations around the project blinded its makers to unintended consequences, accountability or possible failures. Similarly, in their review of three large dams in West Africa, Bazin et al. (2017) note that decisions to invest in large dams and irrigation schemes are not always based on realistic hypotheses. Instead, they argue, initial design studies often rely on overestimated assessments of irrigable potential or economic performance of irrigation projects, or under-estimate their cost and the time needed to realize them, in order to make the economic case for a project. For Kenya, such has been the game, where rushed projects end up failing due to contextual and political economy factors.