Abstract
With a growing number of citizens living abroad, incentives and strategies to reach diasporas have become increasingly important for political actors. National political parties respond to new competitive transnational environments and engage with citizens living outside their country of origin. However, compared to traditional national party organisations, we know little about parties going abroad and what affects varieties in transnational instruments. To address this question, I compare transnational infrastructures of all parliamentary parties in Switzerland, Germany and Austria. By examining official party documents and information from party secretaries and representatives, I evaluate how parties reach external citizens and analyse factors that correspond with their organisational models. I find that internet voting from abroad does not increase the scope and extent of the analysed parties’ physical infrastructure, whereas the ability to donate correlates with more investment into formal party branches abroad. In addition, I argue that larger institutionalised parties are more likely to invest in formal transnational infrastructure, and that left–right wing ideology and populism have little impact on organisational models across the selected countries.
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Introduction
Citizenship has often been perceived as membership of a socio-political community within a defined territorial-jurisdictional boundary (Sassen 2008). In this so-called Westphalian state system (Caramani and Grotz 2015), citizenship rights have been tied to a congruence between nationality and territorial sovereignty, but this system may become antiquated. Over the past decades, higher levels of mobility have raised questions about the democratic representationand political participation of non-resident citizens (Lafleur 2013; Kernalegenn and Van Haute 2020a, b). In 2020, an estimated 281 million people (about 3.6% of the world’s population) lived in a state other than their country of origin (McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou 2021). This is an increase of nine million since 2019, and 128 million people more than in 1990.
Nowadays, political will formation and democratic participation are no longer exclusively based on the congruence of place and citizenship (Sassen 2008). Citizens often retain their rights when they move abroad, which includes the ability to vote (Bauböck 2003). Globally, over 149 states have introduced voting rights for non-resident citizens (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a, b) but their legal enfranchisement does not account for differences in voting rights and the implementation of them. Variations occur as countries may apply restrictions related to time spent abroad, type of election in which non-resident citizens can participate, voter registration, and the procedures for casting a vote from abroad (Ellis et al. 2007; Lappin 2016). In their database on external voting rights and restrictions, Wellman et al. (2023) address and acknowledge a range of variations in extraterritorial voting rights, while stating that by 2020, around 127 countries have organised voting from abroad in at least one national election.
In light of increased numbers of citizens living abroad, it is timely to ask what varieties of transnational party organisations exist and what factors are connected to the parties’ implementation of transnational models. I include 22 parties of different size, institutionalisation, and ideology represented in the national parliaments in Switzerland, Austria, and Germany. In the selected countries, we find large diasporas with eligible voters having the right to vote from abroad, although differences in voter registration, participation rights, and funding exist (see Table 1), which in turn may influence the parties’ outreach incentives. The aim of this foremost explorative research is therefore to understand what infrastructures national parties set up to reach external citizens and how certain factors at different levels of analysis correspond with organisational varieties. Hence, the paper is based on publicly available party documents supplemented by information received from party secretariats and representatives.
To examine different organisational structures and potential factors interrelated with the establishment of specific models, this study uses a broad range of available and measurable indicators to analyse first the level of transnational party infrastructure and organisational varieties—differing in their formality and the rights transferred by the national parties to external members (Rashkova and van der Staak 2020). Second, for the analysis of corresponding factors, at the macro-level, I evaluate the legal rules regarding donations and voting from abroad. At the meso-level, I include party size and institutionalisation, and at the micro-level, I distinguish between populist parties and their mainstream competitors (Zulianello 2020, Albertazzi and van Kessel 2021). This endeavour leads to conclusions on correlations between external factors at different levels of analysis and varieties in physical transnational party infrastructure.
Whereas many studies offer crucial insights into the diasporas’ side of citizenship rights and transnational politics (e.g., Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015; Escobar et al. 2014; Goldberg and Lanz 2021), I focus on the supply side of the transnational connection between non-resident citizens and national political parties and ask: How do national political systems connect citizens living abroad with their home country and ensure their representation? Similarly to Paarlberg’s research, I understand transnational outreach “as a reflection of party organisation and infrastructure” (2019, p. 540). As such, the paper provides an intra—and cross-country comparison but the study does neither include why parties decide to engage abroad, nor does it include their finances, digital infrastructure, or individual objectives. Such information is either difficult to obtain, or the collection of the data would go beyond the scope of this research.
In the following sections I briefly outline the current state of research in the areas of transnational citizenship and party organsations before focusing on debates surrounding varieties in transational party infrastructure and organisational levels. In the following sections, I outline the indicators and hypotheses to assess factors corresponding with the varities of transnational party infrastructure at different analytical levels. The next section includes an overview of the analysed parties and an explantion how I measure the parties’ transnational arrangements. I then evaluate and compare the levels of existing physical party infrastructure and organisational varieties and analyse the different aspects that are linked with the national parties’ outreach models before I conclude with a discussion of the results, the study’s limitations and potential avenues for further research.
Transnational citizenship rights and party organisations
Citizen mobility has far-reaching implications for political rights and party outreach. The concept of granting external citizens social and political rights in their country of citizenship became prominent in the 1980s and 1990s and gained more track over the following decades (Nohlen and Grotz 2000; Burgess 2014). The scholarly literature on transnational representation has essentially developed into two different fields.
The first track evaluates the extension of citizenship rights beyond national territories and—on the demand side—external citizens’ motivations to participate in political processes in the country of origin (Bauböck 2009; Lafleur 2011; Caramani and Grotz 2015). Some studies also evaluated transnational party outreach from a diaspora perspective and demand side of political transnationalism, for example the size and type of communities abroad (Paarlberg 2017), non-resident citizens’ voting preferences (Goldberg and Lanz 2021; Turcu and Urbatsch 2023), or factors of mobilisation (Burgess and Tyburski 2020).
The second field concerns political institutions as the suppliers of political information and channels of representation for migrant citizens (Benz and Stutzer 2004; Detterbeck 2012; Strijbis 2014). This second research strand has tended to focus on the relationship between political parties and immigrant voters. Lesser attention has been paid to non-resident citizens, which is surprising as diasporas are a challenge for national political parties. To fulfil their role as a link between the state and citizens (Friedman and Kenig 2021), they compete in an arena that exceeds national boundaries. This transnational party engagement is often examined using a macro-level lens, such as national legal frameworks and participation rights (Lappin 2016), or micro-level dimensions, such as the party’s ideology (Joppke 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019), financial resources and individual objectives (Rashkova 2020). Fewer studies seem to have included supply side factors at the meso-level of analysis (van Haute and Kernalegenn 2021), such as party institutionalisation and size, which may correspond with the varieties of networks and adapted levels of transnational infrastructure to connect political and civil societies (Yabanci 2016). Little is known about the organisational varieties of parties’ transnational infrastructure to engage with citizens abroad, and the factors that correspond with their chosen models.
Whereas some studies include both the demand and the supply side of transnational politics, I focus on political parties’ outreach across national borders and aim to provide a comprehensive picture on transnational organisations, including all three analytical levels. By adding meso-level factors, I strive to offer detailed answers on how different parties engage with non-resident citizens.
Parties’ going abroad: differences in transnational organisations
According to the classic party literature, political parties evolved as the central actors of representation for social groups in democratic entities. Traditional party types, such as cadre or elite parties, mass parties (Duverger 1951), catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966), or cartel parties (Katz and Mair 1995) have in common that they usually operate within national boundaries. However, the extension of the democratic sphere across national borders offered new challenges and opportunities for national parties (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a, b). With the emergence of transnational civil societies and changing connections to their home country,Footnote 1 political parties are compelled to develop transnational outreach strategies (Rashkova and van der Staak 2020). Intriguingly, direct engagement is often seen as more effective than online campaigns (Karp et al. 2008) and it is therefore essential to examine the extent to which parties invest resources for a physical transnational presence in form of branches operating abroad.
The few existing works on transnational party operations have commonly addressed two inter-related questions: Why and how do parties decide to go abroad? Research on parties going abroad indicate that they largely follow a cost–benefit logic when deciding to set up transnational organisations (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019). Party engagement abroad is mainly influenced by juxtaposing potential advantages against investments. However, it is the scope and type of investment to reach external citizens, which still constitutes a puzzle in political party research. In line with utilitarian assumptions, parties are assumed to establish branches abroad if the benefits outweigh the costs (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019; Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2021). As such, why parties engage abroad may be influenced by how close the election is, external voting rights, voter turnout among non-resident citizens (Meseguer and Burgess 2014), the number and density of external citizens (van Haute and Kernalegenn 2021), their voting behaviour (Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015; Goldberg and Lanz 2021), parties’ individual objectives—such as fundraising, campaigning, or voter mobilisation (Rashkova and Van Der Staak 2020), or maintaining ties with the ethnic community (Friedman and Kenig 2021).
Less attention has been paid to the organisational structure of parties abroad (van Haute and Kernalegenn 2021). Paarlberg (2017) emphasises that we need to understand how parties reach external citizens beyond campaign events as their engagement could indicate a broader development of new party organisations. To examine the varieties of parties’ engagement with non-resident citizens, scholars analyse the level and scope of transnational party infrastructure and their link to the national party (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019; Gherghina and Soare 2020; von Nostitz 2021). However, the majority of these studies focus on larger parties and single country studies, when assessing influential factors at different levels of analysis. Gherghina and Soare (2020, p. 13) analysing four Romanian parties, find highly formalised and extensive party branches, concentrated in large European capitals. They argue, at the meso-level, variations in how much autonomy national parties allow their external branches, range from fairly independent to centralized power at the party’s head quarter. In addition, they posit that some parties are not campaigning for voter mobilisation but to increase their legitimacy. Similarly, Friedman and Kenig (2021) demonstrate that Israeli parties engage abroad despite most citizens not being allowed to vote or donate from abroad. Instead of vote-seeking, these parties would focus on maintaining ties with the Jewish diaspora, influence Zionist organisations abroad, and improve their own domestic position by promoting Israel internationally.
Other authors focus on cross-country comparisons that strive to find common denominators and differences of party strategies across the European party landscape. Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei (2019, p. 630) argue that party branches abroad range in their organisational variety “from staffed offices to a list of contact persons per country of residence on the website of the party”. Rashkova and van der Staak (2020) examined outreach strategies of several large parties in France, Germany, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States. Their study focuses both on the actual infrastructure and on legal frameworks, the organisational manner, and the objectives that provide incentives for parties to operate abroad. They find two dominant structures. The first is a more centralised transnational organisation with formal rules and the some influence within the national party. The other model involves local organisations, which often have informal status and the power resting firmly with the national party. Comparing large parties in Germany, France, and the UK, von Nostitz (2021) evaluates the scope and size of their transnational party branches. According to his study, France has the highest number of party branches, while German parties have the lowest. German parties predominately operate in Europe, while French parties have a large network outside the European continent. The scope and size of UK party branches abroad is rather mixed. Conservatives have considerably more international branches than Labour and more of them being located outside of Europe.
Factors corresponding with transnational party organisations at different levels of analysis
I examine political parties’ outreach arrangements at different levels of analysis in three countries with large heterogenous diasporas that have the right to vote from abroad. As Table 1 shows, in Switzerland (10.93%), Austria (7.38%), and Germany (4.5%), significant shares of national citizens live abroad. In Germany, non-resident citizens can vote in legislative elections only, while in Switzerland and Austria, citizens abroad are allowed to vote in legislative elections, presidential elections, as well as referendums. The majority of Swiss, Austrian, and German non-resident citizens are eligible to vote but fewer of them are registered (Switzerland: 207,375, Austria: 61,113, Germany: 128,929), which is a prerequisite to participate in national elections. Despite the relatively extensive voting rights in Austria and Switzerland, we only see a fairly high voter registration in Switzerland, whereas in Germany and Austria only a fraction of non-resident citizens are registered voters. This raises questions of how political parties mobilise non-resident citizens because their strategies influence transnational voter turnout even when controlling for institutional barriers, socio-demographic characteristics of non-residents, and the political context (Burgess and Tyburski 2020). In addition, these large untapped pools of external voters may motivate national parties to reach citizens abroad.
Before outlining corresponding factors at different levels of analysis, it is worth noting that political parties have different incentives to form organisations abroad (Paarlberg 2019; Gherghina and Soare 2020). This study’s hypotheses focus on physical organisational units that are related to the respective parties. It would go beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the entirety of organisational networks of each party, such as individual connections, social media presence and collaborations with non-political clubs (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei (2019).
The macro-level: legal constraints for non-resident citizens
At the macro-level, many countries legally allow external voting or offer some provisions that enable electoral participation (Rashkova 2020; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019). However, not all states, including some of the stable democratic countries in Western Europe (von Nostitz 2021), recognise unrestricted voting from abroad. In Denmark, Ireland and Malta, for example, residency is required to enjoy all electoral rights while in other countries, such as Germany and the UK, time-related constraints for non-residents’ transnational voting apply (Lappin 2016). While legal constraints may not stop the parties’ engagement abroad, they could affect the scope and extent of transnational party organisations.
In the three selected states, voting from abroad is allowed but the participatory modes differ and could also influence parties’ motivations to invest in transnational infrastructure. External citizens can either vote by post (in Austria and Germany) or by post and e-votingFootnote 2 in some parts of the country (in Switzerland). Although Swiss centre-left and centre-right parties were concerned about the security of e-voting (Østergaard-Nielsen et al. 2019), many voters appreciate the opportunity to vote via internet. Studies indicate both a high willingness of Swiss non-resident citizens to use e-voting and a higher turnout where they are allowed to cast their votes electronically (Pleger and Mertes 2018; Germann 2021). This may be due to the fact that e-voting reduces costs (time and money) for non-resident citizens when casting their vote (Hutcheson and Arrighi 2015; Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). These findings lead to the assumption that parties invest in institutionalised transnational infrastructure where e-voting is legally allowed because, despite security concerns, their engagement could result in facilitated vote-seeking and electoral advantages due higher turnouts.
H1a
Parties in countries that allow e-voting are more likely to maintain a high level of physical party infrastructure abroad with formal rules and rights for non-resident party members.
In addition, with the exception of Austria, parties are also allowed to receive donations from abroad—but in Germany, the amount is restricted to 1000€. This is an important aspect as party branches abroad are often expected to seek donations from members and to organise fundraising events (Collard and Kernalegenn 2021). Whereas parties may still decide to operate abroad, denying access to these financial sources could impact the parties’ objectives and organisational planning (Rashkova and van der Staak 2020). As von Nostitz (2021) argues, different legal frameworks and voting constraints may—at the macro-level—influence the organisational varieties of transnational party branches. He argues that the national parties’ organisational links and control over transnational branches is the highest where parties anticipate the most benefits in terms of vote-seeking and donations (von Nostitz 2021, p. 1). In light of the available literature presented above, I make the following assumption:
H1b
Parties in countries that allow unrestricted donations from abroad are more likely to maintain a high level of physical party infrastructure abroad with formal rules and rights for non-resident party members.
The micro-level: ideologies of political parties
Turning to the micro-level of analysis, recent research on the connection between populism and external voting preferences shows that the emigrants’ more cosmopolitan mindset may result in ideological self-selection, which could incentivise populist parties to operate in a more limited capacity abroad as they expect a lower mobilisation potential (Turcu and Urbatsch 2023). Analysing non-resident voters’ support for right-and left-wing populist parties, Umpierrez de Reguero and Jakobson (2023) find that citizens abroad tend to vote more for left-wing populists compared to voters living in their country of origin, but differences in support for populist parties and voting preferences between domestic and external voters also depend on country-of-residence-specific factors (Szulecki et al. 2023).
Beside the focus on non-resident citizens’ voting preferences, some studies highlight the importance of populist party outreach (Burgess and Tyburski 2020; Umpierrez de Reguero and Jakobson 2023). Although radical right populist parties are often not very supportive of external voting rights (Østergaard-Nielsen et al. 2019), campaigns abroad may provide important information and influence the diasporas voting behaviour in their favour (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a, b). In this context, some studies argue that right-wing parties are more motivated to connect with external citizens (Joppke 2003), while some found institutionalised populist parties on both the centre-right and left being more capable of engaging with emigrants (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019). Other studies claim that left–right ideologies do not guide decisions to engage abroad (Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2021).
Generally, the precise connection of party ideology and their propensity to establish transnational organisational structures to reach non-resident citizens appears, to date, rather unclear. Here, research on domestic party organisations could deliver important insights. Recent studies show that populist radical right parties are prone to maintain mass organisations, which include a centralised organisation, formal infrastructure, strong rootedness on the ground and close connections with the grassroots (Favero 2021; Hatakka 2021; Sijstermans 2021; Zulianello 2021). Considering these findings, H2 argues the following:
H2
Populist parties are more likely to maintain a high level of physical party infrastructure abroad with formal rules and rights for non-resident party members.
The meso-level: party size and institutionalisation
Looking at the meso-level, many studies evaluated transnational operations and strategies of larger institutionalised mainstream parties. Such research is important as formality and size of political organisations constitute intermediary factors and are linked to existing structural and individual factors (Yabanci 2016). It is important to note here that party institutionalisation can include internal and external actors (Yabanci 2016). It is important to note here that party institutionalisation can include internal and external features (Harmel et al. 2018). Internal institutionalisation refers to ‘routinised’ intra-party processes by which the party acts according to regular formalised procedures, and ‘value infusion’, which depicts the party member’s willingness to identify with, and commit to the party. External institutionalisation denotes the society’s perceptions of the party’s ability to last. Previous studies argue that bigger and more institutionalised national parties are more likely to invest in formal and extensive transnational operations (Dalton et al. 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019; Collard and Kernalegenn 2021) as they often command over a developed and refined party structure, which facilitates engagements abroad. Similarly, von Nostitz (2021) finds formal organisational links and a high level of control among larger parties in France, Germany and the UK. Transnational branches often develop on the initiative of individuals (Collard and Kernalegenn 2021), but rapidly become institutionalised when the national political party takes control (Jakobson et al. 2021). They then become more strongly linked to the central party office (Gherghina and Soare 2020) and sometimes offer non-resident members the opportunity to exert influence on national party politics (Rashkova and van der Staak 2020).
This research provides important insights but the predominant focus on bigger parties complicates broader assumptions as small parties are often excluded from these comparisons. As opposed to bigger parties that operate with formal organisations, some smaller parties may draw on less institutionalised, cost-effective networks to establish a transnational party infrastructure. Examples include the Greens in France or M5S in Italy (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019), or NEOS in Austria. With these available studies in mind, I formulate the following hypotheses.
H3
Large institutionalised parties are more likely to maintain a high level of physical party infrastructure abroad with formal rules and rights for non-resident party members.
Data and method
I analyse transnational organisations from a total of 22 parties in Switzerland (11 parties), Austria (5 parties) and Germany (6 parties). All parties are represented in the lower houses of their respective national parliaments—the Nationalrat in Switzerland, the Nationalrat in Austria, the Bundestag in Germany. Table 2 provides an overview of the analysed parties, their size (seats in the national parliament) and which are classified as populist parties according to Zulianello (2020).
To assess the level of existing physical party infrastructure, previous works counted the existing number of local party branches, their distribution and the size of their membership (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019; von Nostitz 2021). I follow these previous studies and further evaluate if national parties maintain an international section that serves as the organisational unit for all branches abroad. For the sake of completeness, I provide the number of members abroad (if known) and party-affiliated foundations and academies, but will not include these institutions in the overall assessment. These institutes offer educational activities and serve as transnational communication channels (Dakowska 2002) for political parties. However, they are legally independent from the affiliated parties and are not specifically targeting citizens living abroad.
To examine the parties’ organisational varieties, previous studies assessed the level of organisation and the branches’ links to the national party organisation (Rashkova and van der Staak 2020). Alluding to previous research, I examine the formality of the organisational structure abroad and the links to the national office. The level of a party’s transnational infrastructure is measured by the registration procedure of external branches, the membership status of external citizens, the external branches rules and procedures and their type of activities. The level of links to the national party assessed by evaluating if members have formal rights and a certain influence in the party’s national organisation, if branches receive financial support from the national party, and if they are allowed to send delegates to national party assemblies in the home country. Table 3 shows the indicators used to evaluate transnational party infrastructure. In brackets is the ranking for each aspect.
To compare these organisational varieties and the level of physical transnational party infrastructure, I look at party programmes and official statutory documents from all parties selected for the study.Footnote 3 Where information was not available in written form, I reached out to party secretaries and representatives to obtain the missing data.Footnote 4 The indicators presented in Table 3 will be rated to establish a categorisation of the parties’ levels of physical transnational infrastructure and their organisational models. First, I rate the level of political parties’ infrastructure “high” if parties have an international organisation and a party branch or contact abroad. I rate them “medium” when they have either party branches/contacts or an international organisation, and “low” if they have no infrastructure. Secondly, I rate the level of a party’s transnational organisation “high” under the condition that a party has registered external branches with official members or representatives according to the party statutes—as opposed to supporters or activists-, institutionalised rules and regular procedures. For this study I place importance on routinised, regular activities within the branches abroad, such as informal meetings with other members, campaigns, and official assemblies (Jakobson et al. 2021). The level of links to the national party is rated “high” if members have formal rights and a certain influence in the party’s national organisation. Financial support from the national party is not a necessary requirement as this information is often not disclosed or made available by parties. Eventually, this leads to a typology of organisational varieties with four dimensions as presented in Table 4.
To the best of my knowledge, so far, no study has examine Swiss and Austrian parties’ transnational infrastructure and no research compared and classified all parties in the three countries selected for this research.
Analysis of transnational party organisations
The presented findings are based on official documents and information directly obtained from party representatives and secretariats. However, some information could not be obtained (indicated by n.a.), either because the party did not respond, information was not gathered by the party, or because of confidentiality.
Levels of existing physical party infrastructure
In Switzerland, five of the eleven parties represented in the National Council have no official party branches abroad. With the exception of die Mitte (the Centre) and the GPS these parties are rather small. Two parties—the PdA and the GPS—have no official external sections but are part of existing European and global networks (European Left 2021; Grüne Schweiz 2022). Five parties have international branches or sections. The GLP has recently founded the “GLP International” with 40 members. This is, according to its designated president (2022), the only foreign section of GLP Switzerland. The Centre has an international organisation that acts as an association for interested individuals but is not a formal organisation. The FDP Switzerland has an international section called “FDP International”, with around 200 members but no branches abroad, according to the general secretary (2022). Instead, the party cooperates with the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and maintains a global network of 14 contact persons. The SP also cooperates with other social democratic parties and relies on the “SP International” to reach out to the currently 155 external members. The SP international includes seven official branches, so-called antennas, in Europe, Africa and North America and a network of 24 contact persons around the world. Similarly, the SVP operates a large international network. According to the managing director (2022) the “SVP International” has about 400 members, spread around the globe. Currently, three branches in Central America and Africa (the one in Spain recently closed), and 4 country contacts in Europe exist.
In Austria, parties seem less invested in implementing their own international infrastructure. Instead, they run state supported “academies” namely: Dr. Karl Renner-Institut (SPÖ); Politische Akademie (ÖVP); Freiheitliches Bildungswerk (FPÖ); Grüne Bildungswerkstätte (Greens), and NEOS Lab (NEOS). These academies are in charge of the training and education of party elites (Dolezal et al. 2012) and maintain international cooperations without specifically targeting Austrians living abroad. Apart from these academies, few parties maintain transnational infrastructures. The ÖVP and the FPÖ have no international party organisations. The Austrian Greens, like the Swiss Greens, are part of global and European networks. The SPÖ has, according to the party’s international secretary, an international organisation with several branches abroad, of which the one in Brussels is the most active. However, the number of members is unknown. NEOS is the only party with a clearly developed international organisation called “NEOS X”. According to their speaker, NEOS X has 24 representatives and around 100 members abroad. Some members form groups with several members but most have only 1–2 and are no separate organisational units.
German parties, like their Austrian counterparts, rely on political Stiftungen (foundations) as transnational communication channels (Dakowska 2002). The main goal of these foundations is the “development of democracy and the strengthening of civil society inside and outside of Germany” (Pierobon 2017, p. 81). These foundations are: The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung affiliated to the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Christian Democratic Union, CDU), the Heinrich Böll Stiftung affiliated to the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (Free Democratic Party, FDP), the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (the Left), and the Desiderius Erasmus Foundation (Alternative for Germany, AfD). The foundations affiliated with the SPD (over 100 international offices), the CDU (111), the CSU (52), the Greens (33), the Left (28) the FDP (38), operate several offices abroad (information retrieved from foundation websites), with the exception of the AfD.
Apart from political foundations, some German parties operate with transnational infrastructure. The “SPD International” has around 5000 members and consists currently of 13 recognised so-called ‘friendship groups’ and two local chapters. Members living in a country with no official representation will be served by the geographically closest group. The CDU has only one officially recognized foreign association in Brussels with 260 members, but maintains ‘friendship circles’ around the world, although their number is unknown. The Greens have three official local chapters—Brussels, London, and Washington DC—affiliated with local sections in Germany. The FDP Germany cooperates with other Liberal Parties in Europe within the ALDE network and maintains its own organisation—the “Auslandsgruppe Europa der FDP” (Europe Foreign Group of the FDP, AGE) based in Brussels, which supports two local branches in Paris and Switzerland. The Left cooperates with the International Left and has one grassroots organisation in Brussels, while the AfD has no official branch abroad. For a general overview, Table 5 provides information of the parties’ rated level of physical transnational infrastructure.Footnote 5
Organisational varieties of party infrastructure
This section focuses on various types of organisational models of transnational party infrastructures. According to Rashkova and van der Staak (2020) the party abroad can be analysed based on their level of organisation and its links to the national party.
In Switzerland, the SVP and the SP have both formally registered branches abroad with official members as part of their international division. However, the “SP international” is only accessible for members of the national party. The branches of both parties operate according to formal rules and organise regular activities, such as annual conventions and social gatherings, according to the party secretaries (2022). Both international sections have a representative in the national parties’ leadership committees and send delegates to national general assemblies. The SVP international has the same status as a cantonal branch within the national party but is solely financed by membership fees and donations, while the SP international receives additional financial support from the national party. The FDP International has no officially registered branches with rules and regular activities but operates with contact persons and offers official membership to citizens living abroad. The FDP’s international section has some influence over the national parties’ policies by sending four delegates to the general assembly and by having the head of the international section as a representative within the national party’s president conference. However, the party does not provide information on financial support (FDP 2022b). The Centre International has no registered branches, nor branches abroad and offers only online meetings to members. Similar to the FDP, becoming a member of the Centre international means also national party membership. However, external members have no rights or influence over the party’s domestic policies and send no delegates to national party bodies (Die Mitte 2020). The national party supports the international organisation with personnel resources. The GLP international is a network that offers official membership status, regular meetings for members, and—similar to the SVP—has the same status as a cantonal branch. According to its president (2022), this means that members of GLP International are part of the party as a whole and can exercise their rights through representation on the Executive Committee of GLP Switzerland or the national Assembly of Delegates. The GLP International is financed by membership fees and donations, and receives support from the national party for specific projects. All other parties (GPS, EVP, LdT, Solidarity, PdA, and EDU) have no formally registered branches with official members, rules, and activities. However, some parties mention that members abroad can register (EDU Statutes 2023), constitute as a cantonal party (EVP Statutes 2017), or join a cantonal party from abroad (GPS Statutes 2021).
In Austria, the SPÖ has three officially registered branches abroad. NEOS hosts a network of groups and contact persons, which are not formally registered. In both parties, members abroad are also official members of the national party, either directly (NEOS) or they are assigned to the Viennese provincial organisation (SPÖ). NEOS X and the institutionalized local branches of the SPÖ international organise regular online and in-person meetings. Members in both parties have the same rights as national party members. They can send delegates to members’ assemblies, have a delegate in national party leadership council, and are allowed to help develop the party programme. While the SPÖ only supports specific projects of international branches, NEOS does finance the international branch with a few 1000 Euro per year. In contrast the FPÖ, the Greens, and the ÖVP have no official branches with members and regular activities. Members abroad have no specific rights or influence over the parties’ domestic policies or receive financial support from the national party.
In Germany, all parties but the AfD have officially registered branches with official members and regular activities, although their links to the national party organisations differ. “SPD International” is the umbrella association of all SPD friendship groups. Organisationally, it is located at the SPD Regional Association Berlin—with the exception of the local sections in Brussels and Luxembourg that are linked to the party district Aachen in North Rhine Westphalia and the district Saarbrücken in Saarland respectively (SPD London 2023). The SPD International sends one advisory delegate to the federal party conference. The CDU consist of several friendship circles and one foreign section. It’s only official chapter abroad in Brussels is directly assigned to the CDU federal executive committee in Berlin. The foreign associations recognized by the National Executive Board can send one delegate each to the National Party Congress (CDU 2019). The German Greens’ local chapters in Washington (affiliated with Berlin-Mitte), Brussels (Aachen) and London (Berlin Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg) are connected to German district associations (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen London 2019). Members living abroad have the same rights as national members and can participate in delegate assemblies and working groups, although this is not always feasible due to distance according to a leadership member of the section in Washington. The FDP’s Foreign Group Europe (Auslandsgruppe Europa) is located in Brussels and has affiliated local sections in Switzerland and Luxemburg (FDP AGE 2023). The AGE’s general assembly elects two delegates for the national party conference. All other foreign groups each send one non-voting representative elected by the general assembly of the AGE to the national party conference (FDP 2022d). The Left also has official branches—so-called grassroots organisations (Basisorganisationen, BO) in Brussels and Greece, which are part of the Berlin-Mitte district association (Die Linke 2018). The party does not mention a formal representation of members living abroad but allows all members to participate in events, elections, votes and party committees (Die Linke Bundessatzung 2022).
Table 6 presents a summary and classification of the parties’ organisational varieties. The table shows that 50% (11) of the analysed parties maintain either none, or only informal transnational party organisations without rights in their home country (low/low). Eight parties operate with formally structured party branches that have official rights in their home country (high/high). In Switzerland, I find two parties that maintain low levels of organisation but with strong links to the national party (low/high). Both, the FDP and the GLP operate with an informal transnational organisation with rights in their home country. In Germany, we find the only example for a formal transnational party organisation without strong links to the national party (high/low). The Left has officially registered branches with regular activities for externals, but these members have no influence over the party’s national politics, nor are they represented by delegates in the national assembly.
Discussion
With the extension of citizenship rights beyond the national arena (Schlenker and Blatter 2014), the role of political parties as channels for information, representation, and mobilisation of non-resident citizens becomes more important. In this context, my study evaluates what transnational infrastructure exists within Swiss, Austrian and German parties to operate abroad and how it is organised. Obviously, not all parties have the same approach to connect with citizens living abroad (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a, b; Gherghina and Soare 2020). Physical party infrastructures, and organisational varieties differ across parties and countries. This study presents the first explorative comparison of transnational infrastructure of all parties represented in the national parliaments of the three selected countries. Table 7 offers a summary of the findings.
Overall, the analysis yields a range of interesting findings. First of all, despite the large untapped pool of potential voters in each country, the number of parties offering a high level of transnational infrastructure to reach and mobilise external citizens is fairly moderate (8/22 parties). Many parties in Switzerland, Austria and Germany (10/22), keep only a low level of physical transnational party infrastructure.
Rashkova and van der Staak (2020) argue that parties use information about the size and type of the national communities living abroad in order to consider in what manner they want to operate abroad. In all three selected countries, we find large heterogenous diasporas with few registered voters, which should mitigate this influence on the selected parties’ willingness to invest in transnational organisations. However, previous studies (Germann 2021) state that postal voting and especially e-voting increase voter turnout among external citizens. It would therefore make sense for parties to invest where the voting procedure has been legally facilitated, despite potential security concerns (Østergaard-Nielsen et al. 2019). However, looking at the scope and extent of transnational infrastructure, I do not find higher or more formal levels in Switzerland, where e-voting is partially implemented, as would have been expected according to H1a. At this macro-level of analysis, despite allowing e-voting and a resulting higher turnout (Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020), Swiss parties are—overall—not more invested in establishing extensive formal organisations to reach external citizens than in Austria and Germany. Reasons could be found in parties’ utilitarian approaches, where they not only evaluate voter turnout but also the individual electoral choices among emigrants (Goldberg and Lanz 2021), their (lack of) attachment to the home country and interest in politics, registration procedures for long-distance political participation (Burgess and Tyburski 2020), the moral legitimacy to vote from abroad (Szulecki et al. 2021), or the fact that postal voting also reduces the voters’ costs (Hutcheson and Arrighi 2015) and therefore offers similar incentives for German and Austrian parties to reach non-resident citizens. In addition, e-voting in Switzerland was never available for the whole country and recently re-applied only in certain cantons. Due to security concerns, internet voting was suspended between 2019 and 2023, which potentially impacts negatively on the trust and willingness of non-resident citizens to use it (Pleger and Mertes 2018; Germann 2021). These concerns could prevent parties from engaging more in transnational operations.
Looking at the macro-level and legal frameworks as a possible influence may also prove important regarding donations to parties from the community of non-resident citizens. The more restrictive voting constrains and the 1000€ cap on donations from abroad in Germany did not deter the SPD, CDU/CSU, and the FDP to set up extensive formal transnational organisations with rights for external citizens to influence internal party policies. However, in Austria, where donations from abroad are not permitted (Republik Österreich Parlament 2019), only the recently founded NEOS and the SPÖ invest in structures to reach external citizens. Whereas, NEOS takes a relatively cost-effective approach by relying on an extensive network of contact persons according to NEOS X speaker Martin Wallner, Maria Maltschnig, the Director of the Karl-Renner-Institute (see Online Appendix) outlines that the SPÖ operates with three official branches abroad. In Switzerland, parties are not faced with similarly restrictive legal frameworks, which could partly explain the SVP’s and SP’s willingness to invest in a more costly and formal transnational structure with official sections abroad. However, other Swiss parties did not follow this strategy. In sum, and in line with previous research (von Nostitz 2021), legal rules on donations may have a certain influence but with the available data, H1b cannot be confirmed.
At the micro-level of analysis, hypothesis H2, which argues that populist parties are more likely to invest in extensive formal physical party infrastructure, can also not be confirmed. While the Swiss SVP invests heavily in its transnational organisation, the German AfD, and the Austrian FPÖ maintain a low and informal level of transnational infrastructure. The populist The Left in Germany has two official branches abroad but their members are not formally able to influence the party’s domestic politics. These findings confirm that neither far-left or far-right ideologies, nor populism correspond with increased engagement abroad (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019; Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2021). Mass party approaches with populist parties investing in organisations with roots on the ground and regular activities (Albertazzi and van Kessel 2021) may—in many countries—still be confined within national boundaries. However, further research could also look into the voter preferences of diasporas from the selected countries to obtain a more encompassing picture on the relation of populism and non-resident citizens (Turcu and Urbatsch 2023; Umpierrez de Reguero and Jakobson 2023).
The results further show that, at the meso-level, the proportion of parties investing in high levels of formal transnational infrastructure and rights for members abroad is comparatively lower in countries with many smaller domestic parties. In Switzerland with eleven parties in the national parliament, almost half of them (EVP, LdT, Solidarity, PdA, EDU) are very small in size, regionally oriented, and lack the resources to reach external citizens. Interestingly, I find that some of the larger parties in the sample also show fewer incentives to establish transitional infrastructures, such as the Centre in Switzerland, the ÖVP and the FPÖ in Austria, as well as the Green parties across all selected countries—conceivably because they are part of established Green party networks. Some parties are not very small but rather new with a still developing infrastructure, such as the AfD in Germany, or the GLP in Switzerland. However, this reasoning does not apply to NEOS in Austria, which was only founded in 2012 and maintains an extensive transnational infrastructure with formal rights for members abroad. This indicates that NEOS may have reacted to its opponents’ practices and not only adopted but even surpassed the rivals’ strategies to reach external citizens, using a structure based on contact persons that fits the party’s needs (Gherghina and Soare 2020).
In sum, including the meso-level of analysis proved very insightful. The findings point towards a combination of two factors—size and institutionalisation—that correlate with the establishment of a formal physical infrastructure to reach external citizens. Predominantly larger and well-established parties—with the exception of NEOS—like the SVP, the SP, and the FDP in Switzerland, the SPÖ in Austria, the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the FDP in Germany invest considerably in rules-based transnational organisations with rights for external members. Whereas their models (ratio of branches or contact persons abroad), size and geographical location differ (see Online Appendix), their engagement confirms previous research (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019), arguing that larger and better-institutionalised national parties invest more in transnational approaches that ensure considerable formal rights for external party members. These findings would then largely confirm H3.
This analysis reveals important correlations between previously understudied factors at different levels of analysis. Further research could further focus on national legal frameworks, diaspora-related issues, or parties’ individual objectives, and their connection to different levels of physical infrastructure, as well as the organisational varieties implemented by parties to reach citizens abroad. Another strand of research could also assess digital activities, which national parties undertake to engage abroad.
Conclusion
This paper offers an important contribution to a better understanding of the supply side of transnational political engagements, by asking how much political parties invest in reaching non-resident citizens. Much of the existing literature focuses on parties and citizenship rights in domestic contexts but globalisation, increasing mobility and migration strategies (e.g., Favero 2019), and external citizenship rights challenge the traditional understanding of the relationship between territorial borders, citizenship and the delineating of national populations’ electoral rights and duties (Bauböck 2009; van Haute and Kernalegenn 2021). Importantly, the study does not account for variables (socio-economic characteristics, voting preferences, size of diaspora per country, length of stay abroad, etc.) pertaining to the various non-resident citizens’ communities. Including this perspective would have been beyond the scope of this study.
I compare 22 parties represented in the national parliaments in Switzerland, Austria, and Germany—three countries with large diasporas and low voter registration. The thorough comparison leads to several country-specific findings at different levels of analysis. In Switzerland, smaller regionally orientated parties do not invest in transnational infrastructure. Similarly, in Germany, the big mainstream parties—SPD, CDU/CSU, and FDP—are highly investing in formal transnational outreach. Other parties, with the exception of the AfD, have also sections abroad but do not grant the same rights and duties to non-resident members. In contrast, in Austria, only the well-established SPÖ and the relatively new NEOS built a formal transnational infrastructure with rights and influence for party members abroad. Looking at the macro-level, one reason could be that donations from non-resident party members are legally not allowed in Austria, which reduces incentives for parties to invest in transnational infrastructure (von Nostitz 2021).
While political ideology and populist views do not matter, party institutionalisation and size play a role. At this meso-level of analysis, it is often the larger and well-established parties that have the resources and the structure to expand across borders. Naturally, these organsiations show certain varieties regarding rights and duties for external members but a general pattern occurs nevertheless. Where parties invest in formally organised physical outreach structures, they also provide rights and influence to party members living abroad.
This study analysed how parties reach out to external citizens. Hence, the limitations are obvious as the question why they do it remains unanswered. First, further qualitative research should look into a comparison of the dominant components of the parties’ individual cost–benefit calculations and how they influence the decision-making process on why, and also where parties invest with specific organisational models to reach citizens living abroad. Secondly, while this paper analyses official party structures, further research could evaluate the role played by the party-affiliated—but nominally independent—foundations and academies in Austria and Germany in engaging with non-resident citizens. Third, this study focusses on a comparison across all parties in three countries. Further studies could focus on fewer parties but include further legal and political variables (e.g., democracies vs non-democracies) that may influence their transnational organisations and juxtapose these findings with the demand side—the non-resident voters.
Notes
I use the expressions “home country” and “country of origin” to emphasise the connection of territory and citizenship rights and to avoid potential confusion of “home” with feelings of belonging or attachment to a territorial level (Favero 2019).
In this study, e-voting means voting online by using the internet.
Switzerland: Die Mitte (2020, 2023), EDU (2019, 2023), EVP (2017, 2023), FDP (2022a, 2022b), GLP (2014, 2020), GPS (2021, 2023), LdT (2022a, 2022b), PdA (2007, 2021), solidaritéS (1997), solidaritéS Vaud (2016), SP (2012, 2022), SVP (2018, 2019).
Austria: FPÖ (2011, 2019), Grüne (2001, 2017), NEOS (2021, 2023), ÖVP (2015, 2022), SPÖ (2018a, 2018b).
Germany: AfD (2016, 2022), Allianz 90/Die Grünen (2020, 2022), CDU (2019), CDU/CSU (2021), CSU (2019), Die Linke (2011, 2022), FDP (2022c, 2022d), SPD (2007, 2021).
See Online Appendix for a list of questions and contacted party secretaries.
See Online Appendix for a detailed overview of national parties’ existing international organisations, number of external party branches and contact persons, the size and location of their external community, and affiliated foundations.
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Favero, A. How to reach external citizens? Comparing varieties of transnational party infrastructure. Acta Polit (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-024-00344-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-024-00344-8