Abstract
Since the terrorist attacks on Lockerbie and in the U.S.A. in September 2001, there has been a growing awareness of the risk to aviation and other forms of transport from terrorism. This has spurred governments and international organizations to develop strategies to reduce the risk of such attacks. This paper explores the expanding range of regulatory initiatives that have emerged in aviation, maritime and other forms of transport since 9/11.
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Terrorist attacks have taken on a more global perspective and over the last 15 years have claimed to be religiously inspired. In 1980, only two out of 64 terrorist groups were categorized as largely religious in motivation, while in 1995, nearly half of the identified terrorist groups were classified as religiously motivated (26 out of 56). Moore, John. Public Broadcasting Service website: Frontline: Target America: The Evolution of Islamic Terrorism, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/modern.html.
The U.S. has responded by producing a comprehensive report that portrays the threat from radical Jihadists as becoming more widespread, diffuse, difficult to monitor (and therefore more deadly) and increasingly homegrown. A proliferation of micro-actors sometimes referred to as small autonomous groups or “cells” have emerged that are less capable, less predictable and rather difficult to monitor. They operate using advanced technologies found on the internet, at training bases and using military equipment. These groups have latched on to using existing criminal networks to assist them with travel and avoid detection (United States Department of State, 2006).
There is an argument that suggests Osama Bin Laden is orchestrating attacks on ships, aircraft and embassies and that a plethora of groups are empathizing with Al Qaeda. A lot of terrorist activity appears to be emanating from preachers in Pakistan with many of the operatives in Europe believed to have been trained by Madrassas based in Pakistan. These terrorists are known as Islamic Extremists and are motivated by the perversion of their religion. They have been largely encouraged by Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. While Bin Laden and Al Qaeda ideological leaders may not actually direct acts of terrorism there has emerged a number of organizations that are sub-contractors or empathize with acts of terrorism. There has been a growth of strategically significant networks that support the flow of foreign terrorists to Iraq. There is also the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that continue to provide training, financial and political support directly to Lebanese Hezbollah, HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives who all seek to disrupt the peace process.
Prior to 9/11 it was estimated that Al Qaeda spent around half a million dollars to mount the operation. “The Milken Institute calculated that the cost directly attributable to the outrage was in excess of $100 billion, including life insurance, damage to property and the loss of production. The cost of damage to property alone was estimated at between $9 and $13 billion” (see George and Whatford, 2002).
Each report will be given to the national authority that will have to answer and give the measures taken to remedy the identified deficiencies. An annex goes into further detail on what the common standards are to be, that is, airport planning requirements, access control, screening, surveillance, patrols and other physical controls. It lays down in outline requirements for the demarcated areas of airports such as airport security, passengers and cabin baggage. It further briefly lays down requirements for Hold Baggage, security and protection of cargo, in-flight security measures, staff recruitment and training and security equipment. It must be reinforced these requirements are tersely laid down. House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee whose report was published on 18 January 2006.
“The U.S. and foreign rail operators have taken similar actions to secure rail systems since 9/11. The March 11 2004 Madrid attacks produced a further response.” P.45 The GAO also identified three rail security practises – covert testing, random screening of passengers and their baggage, and centralized research and testing- utilized by foreign operators or their governments (Passenger Rail Security GAO-05-851, P.45).
The Uranium Information Centre based in Melbourne reported that around 20 million packages of all sizes containing radioactive materials are routinely transported worldwide annually, on public roads, railways and ships, including purpose-built ships. They have also produced a diagram of a purpose-built ship that shows some of the elaborate security measures in place. These vessels use robust and secure containers. Most of the ships are owned by a subsidiary of British Nuclear Fuels plc, Pacific Nuclear Transport Ltd. The U.S. also appears to have fewer inhibitions. The website of the Government of Nevada gives its nuclear waste transportation routes for its “highway and rail routes most likely to be used to transport high-level nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain, Nevada” including a detailed route for each state through the U.S. (The Uranium Information Centre, 2005).
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George, B., Whatford, N. Regulation of Transport Security Post 9/11. Secur J 20, 158–170 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.sj.8350062
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.sj.8350062