The area bombing of Germany in World War II: an operational research perspective

Abstract

This paper analyses the origins and implementation of British bombing policy with regard to Nazi Germany from an operational research perspective. It demonstrates that the campaign of area attack on the German civilian population, inaugurated by Bomber Command in 1942, was validated in part by the misapplication of operational research, leading to a strategic air offensive, of limited value both in terms of its impact on the German war economy and on the morale of industrial workers. The article also emphasises that on the two occasions on which Bomber Command's resources were diverted from area attack in favour of precision targets (the anti-U Boat war and Operation Overlord), the views of civilian operational researchers had proved decisive. Finally, the article raises the issue of the effectiveness and independence of Bomber Command's Operational Research Section in the face of the entrenched views on bombing policy held by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Arthur Harris.