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Paper keepers or policy shapers? The conditions under which EP officials impact on the EU policy process

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Comparative European Politics Aims and scope

Abstract

The Lisbon Treaty has substantially extended the co-legislative rights of the European Parliament (EP). This raises the general question of how the EP organizes itself internally in order to be able to maximize its input into the legislative process. In the quest of information processing, it is likely that officials inside the EP gain in importance. The article thus aims to clarify the conditions under which these EP officials impact on the EU policy process and as such can influence policy outcomes. The analysis is based on case studies from five different policy domains. The observations reflect that under certain conditions EP officials play a steering role in the EU decision-making process. As such they can have a significant impact on the policymaking process, defying the dualistic Weberian approach according to which politicians take decisions and officials merely implement.

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Notes

  1. The respective context is the study of voting behaviour in the United States.

  2. All interviews are anonymous as requested by the interviewees. Some are referred to as officials or representatives of their institution, others – who insisted on absolute anonymity – are referred to as officials from one of the EU institutions.

  3. We thus selected dossiers where the EP had co-legislative rights prior to the Lisbon Treaty and where the OLP was introduced by way of Lisbon.

  4. For more detailed analysis of these negotiations, see f.e. Brandsma and Blom-Hansen (2012).

  5. Nanotechnology makes it possible to manipulate structures at nanometre scale (one-billionth of a metre). In practical terms, nanotechnology can for instance be used to change fat, sugar or salt levels while retaining the full taste (Mahoney, 2010).

  6. See Benedetto (2013) for an analysis that challenges the assumption that the EP and the Council are on an equal footing as regards the budget.

  7. The Committee has 21 days to negotiate a common text. If this fails, the Commission has to come up with a new draft budget. Once a text is agreed by the Conciliation committee both Council and Parliament have 14 days to approve or reject it. If by 1 January, the first day of the budgetary year, the budget has not been approved, the Union works with 1/12 each month of the budget of the year before.

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Interviews

  • Interview 1 with a representative of one of the Member States, Brussels, 7 February 2012.

  • Interview 2 with a representative of one of the Member States, Brussels, 22 February 2012.

  • Interview 3 with an official from one of the EU institutions, Brussels, 16 March 2012.

  • Interview 4 with an MEP, Brussels, 13 April 2012.

  • Interview 5 with an MEP, Brussels, 16 May 2012.

  • Interview 6 with an official of the European Parliament, Brussels, 03 May 2012.

  • Interview 7 with an official of the European Parliament, Brussels, 16 May 2012.

  • Interview 8 with an official of the European Parliament, Brussels, 17 May 2012.

  • Interview 9 with an official of the European Parliament, Brussels, 24 May 2012.

  • Interview 10, with an official of the European Parliament, Brussels, 25 May 2012.

  • Interview 11, with an official from one of the institutions, Brussels, 12 April 2011.

  • Interview 12, with an official of the European Parliament, Brussels, 27 May 2011.

  • Interview 13, with a representative of one of the Member States, Brussels, 14 April 2011.

  • Interview 14, with an official of the European Parliament, Brussels, 02 May 2011.

  • Interview 15, with an official from one of the institutions, Brussels, 10 June 2011.

  • Interview 16, with an official from one of the institutions, Brussels, 24 June 2011.

  • Interview 17, with a representative of one of the Member States, Brussels, 13 March 2012.

  • Interview 18, with a representative of one of the Member States, Brussels, 17 April 2012.

  • Interview 19, with an official from one of the institutions, Brussels, 12 December 2011.

  • Interview 20, with an official from one of the institutions, Brussels, 06 August 2012.

  • Interview 21, with an official of the European Parliament, Brussels, 26 July 2012.

  • Interview 22, with an official of the European Parliament, Brussels, 31 October 2012.

  • Interview 23, with an official from one of the institutions, Brussels, 25 April 2012.

  • Interview 24, with an official of the European Parliament, Brussels, 31 October 2012

  • Interview 25, with an official of the European Parliament, Brussels, 19 October 2012.

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Correspondence to Christine Neuhold.

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Neuhold, C., Dobbels, M. Paper keepers or policy shapers? The conditions under which EP officials impact on the EU policy process. Comp Eur Polit 13, 577–595 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2014.7

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