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Veto players, party government and policy-making power

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Comparative European Politics Aims and scope

Abstract

Veto theory suggests that policy stability will ensue when there are a number of policy-diverse veto players (VPs) in a policy-making system. Its propositions on policy stability and change can be easily extended to policy-making power. This paper uses veto theory to explain variation in prime ministerial power. Using new and independent data on prime ministerial power, it is found that VP theory can explain some of the variations in prime ministerial power. However, because most VPs in parliamentary democracies are vulnerable to removal, veto theory is unlikely to explain all variation – even with perfect data. It is suggested that this should lead one to investigate the nature of power relations within parliamentary core executives rather than to the rejection of veto theory.

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Notes

  1. There is a connection between control of the agenda and the veto though the two are conceptually distinct. Control of the agenda does make one a VP as if one can prevent an item from being considered or a decision made, one has a veto on that item. However, to be a VP it is not necessary to be able to put items on the political agenda, but if the sole VP has no control of the agenda, effecting policy change will be impossible. This is illustrated by a former Taoiseach (Irish prime minister) who when asked whether he had a veto on issues, responded by saying ‘yes, if there's something you’re totally against you can control it…you can control it by not allowing it onto the [cabinet] table’ (private interview).

  2. In oversized coalitions some parties may be dispensable, in which case they are not VPs, and can only form VPs when they coalesce with another government party to form the balance of power. It is possible for opposition parties to support proposals dispensing with the need of a government party, but such ‘rolling’ majorities are a rarity.

  3. I use the data from Woldendorp et al (1993, 1998) and the EJPR yearbooks. Where there are a number of economic ministers, I take the most senior. If none is obviously more senior, I use the one who has the title minister for finance, and if none has this title, then I use the minister who is minister for the budget.

  4. Effective number of parties in government, ENPG=1/Σs i 2 where s i is the proportion of the government's parliamentary seats held by the ith party.

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  1. School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin, 9, Ireland

    Eoin O’Malley

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O’Malley, E. Veto players, party government and policy-making power. Comp Eur Polit 8, 202–219 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2008.29

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