Abstract
This article shows that the eurozone crisis has reshaped the national economic policy space. The extent to which parties favour European integration, affects their positions on economic policies. These results stand in contrast to earlier studies that found limited effects of European integration on national party systems or found effects in other domains than the economic realm. The article focuses on economic decision-making in the Netherlands between 2006 and 2012. The economic left/right dimension no longer suffices to understand the economic policy positions of political parties: party positions on important welfare state reforms do not follow the left/right line of conflict, but rather a reform line of conflict that divides parties from the left and the right into pro-European reformers oriented at sustainability of the welfare state and Eurosceptic defenders of the existing welfare state. The measurement of party positions is based on the self-positioning of parties on hundreds of economic policies that they submit to the Netherlands Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Notes
Italy has had its own particular eurozone crisis experience when the Fourth Berlusconi government was replaced by a technocratic government under pressures of international markets. Belgium has its own unique multiparty system with a strong linguistic cleavage. Malta finally is the only true two-party system in the Eurozone.
Since 2010 the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) has assessed the environmental effects of the manifestos, which are incorporated in the same report.
These items are: 1. Economic Left/Right Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending and a leaner welfare state: extreme left (0) and extreme right (10). 2. Position on improving public services versus reducing taxes: strongly favours improving public services (0) and strongly favours reducing taxes (10). 3. Position on deregulation: Strongly opposes deregulation of markets (0) and strongly supports deregulations of markets (10). 4. Position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor: Strongly favours redistribution (0) and strongly opposes redistribution (10).
The left-wing items are centralization, market regulation, economic planning, corporatism, protectionism, Keynesian economics, controlled economy, nationalization, Marxism, social justice, welfare: pro, education: pro and labour groups: pro. The right-wing items are decentralization, free enterprise, protectionism: con, productivity, infrastructure, economic orthodoxy, welfare: con, Education: con and labour groups: con. The scalability of this model is not tested separately for the Dutch case, as the scale was developed on basis of a large-N inductive analysis.
The question: Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. ‘Libertarian’ or ‘postmaterialist’ parties favour expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. ‘Traditional’ or ‘authoritarian’ parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.
The questions are: 1. How would you describe the general position on European integration that the party leadership took over the course of 2010? 2. What position did the party leadership take over the course of 2010 on the following policies? The internal market (that is, free movement of goods, services, capital and labour).
Except for the Partij voor de Dieren (Party for the Animals, PvdD), which has never submitted its manifestos to the CPB. In 2006, the SGP only participated in the calculation of budgetary effects and not in the calculation of socio-economic effects. The PVV did not participate in the CPB-process in 2006.
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Otjes, S. How the eurozone crisis reshaped the national economic policy space: The Netherlands 2006–2012. Acta Polit 51, 273–297 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2015.11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2015.11