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Sociology (communication arising)

The puzzle of human cooperation

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Abstract

Humans often defy rational-choice theory by cooperating in simple dilemma games1, a paradox that has been explained by theories of kin selection2, reciprocal altruism3 and indirect reciprocity (reputation)4. Fehr and Gächter claim that human cooperation remains an evolutionary puzzle because people will cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people whom they may not meet again, and without any gain in reputation ('strong reciprocity')5 — that is, when existing theories do not seem to apply. However, we argue that those theories are rejected for the wrong reasons and that the paradox may therefore be imaginary. This has implications for whether punishment is crucial to promoting cooperation5,6,7,8.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, 02138, Massachusetts, USA

    Dominic D. P. Johnson

  2. Department of Zoology, Charles University, 128 44 Prague 2, Czech Republic

    Pavel Stopka

  3. Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3UQ, UK

    Stephen Knights

Authors
  1. Dominic D. P. Johnson
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  2. Pavel Stopka
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  3. Stephen Knights
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Correspondence to Dominic D. P. Johnson.

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Johnson, D., Stopka, P. & Knights, S. The puzzle of human cooperation. Nature 421, 911–912 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1038/421911b

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