Abstract
This paper takes a recently published text and, in examining it closely, argues that it exemplifies trends within feminist scholarship in law, which might be characterised asestablishing a form of orthodoxy. The paper explores some of the ways in which thiso rthodoxy is constructed and presented, and argues that it is characterised by a commitment both to `grand theory' and Hegelian dialectics. The adoption of this model of work seems to offer a chance to hold together the triangular figure of women/theory/law reform. The paper will argue that, whilst this model is clearly a valid choice, and attractive to feminist scholars in the promise it seems to hold, the model is not to be presumed but rather should be examined and considered in terms of its potential for feminist scholarship. Both within its own terms, and as part of the construction of an orthodoxy, the paper will argue that it is in fact problematic and that feminist scholarship would be better served by seeking an alternative theoretical model. An alternative is suggested, using the work of Deleuze, but it is acknowledged that this will require the acceptance of a very different theoretical configuration from that suggested by the triangular model of women/theory/lawreform.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Auchmuty, R., “Agenda for a Feminist Curriculum”, Legal Studies 23/3 (2003), 377–401.
Badiou, A., “What is Love?”, Umbr(a) Journal of the Center for the Study of Psychoanalysis and Culture (1996).
Badiou, A., Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (London: Verso, 2002).
Beer, G., Darwin's Plots, Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth Century Fiction (London: Ark, 1983).
Bottomley, A. et al., “Dworkin, which Dworkin?”, Journal of Law and Society 47 (1987).
Bottomley, A. & Conaghan, J. (eds.), Feminist Theory and Legal Strategy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
Bottomley, A., “Feminism, the Desire for Theory and the Use of Law”, in Sourcebook for Feminist Jurisprudence, ed. H. Barnett (London: Cavendish, 1997a).
Bottomley, A., “Lessons from the Classroom: Some Aspects of the ‘Socio’ in ‘Legal’ Education”, in Socio-Legal Studies, ed. P. Thomas (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997b).
Bottomley, A., “Theory is a Process not an End: A Feminist Approach to the Practice of Theory”, in Feminist Perspectives on Law and Theory, eds. J. Richardson & R. Sandland (London: Cavendish Press, 2000), 25–51.
Conaghan, J., “Reassessing the Feminist Project in Law”, Journal of Law and Society 27 (2000), 351–385.
Cornell, D., Rosenfeld, M. & Carlson, D.G. (eds.), Hegel and Legal Theory (New York: Routledge, 1991).
Deleuze, G. & Parnet, C., Dialogues (London: Athlone, 1987).
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus (London: Athlone, 1988).
Drakopoulou, M., “Women's Resolutions of Law Reconsidered: Epistemic Shifts and the Emergence of Feminist Legal Discourse”, Law and Critique 11 (2000a), 47–71.
Drakopoulou, M., “The Ethic of Care, Female Subjectivity and Feminist Legal Scholarship”, Feminist Legal Studies 8 (2000b), 199–226.
Grosz, E., Architecture from the Outside (Cambridge: M.I.T., 2002).
Lecercle, J-J., Philosophy Through the Looking Glass (London: Hutchinson, 1985).
Moore, N., “Concepts and Localities: Badiou, Deleuze and Law”, Studies in Law and Philosophy 31 (2004), 141–171.
Naffine, N., Law and The Sexes (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990).
Naffine, N., “In Praise of Legal Feminism”, Legal Studies 22/1 (2002), 77–101.
Richardson, J. & Sandland, R. (eds.), Feminist Perspectives on Law and Legal Theory (London: Cavendish Press, 2000).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bottomley, A. Shock to Thought: An Encounter (of a Third Kind) with Legal Feminism. Feminist Legal Studies 12, 29–65 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:FEST.0000026078.52409.a6
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:FEST.0000026078.52409.a6