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Frictions in Project-Based Supply of Permits

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Abstract

Emissions trading in climate change can entail large overall cost savings and transfers between developed and developing countries. However, the search for acceptable JI or CDM projects implies a deviation from the perfect market framework used in previous estimations. Our model combines the search market for projects with a frictionless permit market to quantify the supply-side frictions in the CO2 market. We also decompose the effects of frictions into the effects of search friction, bargaining, and bilateralism. A calibration using previous cost estimates of CO2 reductions illustrate changes in cost savings and allocative implications.

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Correspondence to Juha Virrankoski.

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Liski, M., Virrankoski, J. Frictions in Project-Based Supply of Permits. Environmental and Resource Economics 28, 347–365 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:EARE.0000031060.86739.28

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:EARE.0000031060.86739.28

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