Abstract
It is often asserted that the Italian Constitutional Court is not independent of the Executive and Legislative branches of the government in Rome. We offer a view of independence that is congruent with bodies such as constitutional courts. We argue that the evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, however poor it may be, indicates that the Italian Constitutional Court is as independent as any other corresponding constitutional or supreme court of democratic countries. The evidence is not directly conclusive because the question, in the end, is not whether the judges, one by one, are independent, but whether the Court is independent. The evidence we offer pertains mostly to judges. If judges are independent, as that evidence seems to indicate, the Court is a fortiori even more independent.
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References
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Breton, A., Fraschini, A. The Independence of the Italian Constitutional Court. Constitutional Political Economy 14, 319–333 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:COPE.0000003861.45073.45
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:COPE.0000003861.45073.45