Abstract
A historical theory of rational norms claims that, if we are supposed to think rationally, this is because it is biologically normal for us to do so. The historical theorist is committed to the view that we are supposed to think rationally only if, in the past, adult humans sometimes thought rationally. I consider whether there is any plausible model of rational norms that can be adopted by the historical theorist that is compatible with the claim that adult human beings are subject to rational norms, given certain plausible empirical assumptions about our history and capabilities. I suggest that there is one such model: this model centres on the idea that a procedure is rational if it has been endorsed (or at least not rejected) by mechanisms that have the function to ensure that the subject learns to reason in a way that approaches a certain kind of optimality.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Abrams P. 2001. 'Adaptationism: Models and Scenarios'. In: Orzack S. and Sober E. (eds), pp. 273-302.
Anderson J. 1991. 'Is Human Cognition Adaptive?'. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 14: 471–485.
Cheng P., Holyoak K., Nisbett R. and Oliver L. 1986. 'Pragmatic Versus Syntactic Approaches to Training Deductive Reasoning'. Cognitive Psychology 18: 293–328.
Cherniak C. 1986. Minimal Rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
Clark A. 1987. 'The Kludge in the Machine'. Mind and Language 2: 277–300.
Cohen L.J. 1981. 'Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?'. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 4: 317–370.
Dennett D. 1987. 'Making Sense of Ourselves'. In: Dennett D. (ed.), The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass, pp. 83–101.
Dretske F. 1988. Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
Dretske F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
Dupré J. (ed.) 1987. The Latest on the Best. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
Emlen J.M. 1987. 'Evolutionary Ecology and the Optimality Assumption'. In: Dupré J. (ed.), pp. 163-177.
Eshel I. and Feldman M.W. 2001. 'Optimality and Evolutionary Stability'. In: Orzack S. and Sober E. (eds), pp. 161-190.
Evans J. and Over D. 1996. Rationality and Reasoning. Psychology Press, Hove, UK.
Fong G., Kranzt D. and Nisbett R. 1986. 'The Effects of Statistical Training On Thinking About Everyday Problems'. Cognitive Psychology 18: 253–292.
Gigerenzer G. 1996. 'On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahneman and Tversky (1996)'. Psychological Review 103: 592–596.
Gigerenzer G. and Todd P. 1999. 'Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox'. In: Gigerenzer G. and Todd P. et al. (eds), Simple Heuristics That make Us Smart. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 3–34.
Gilchrist G. and Kingsolver J.G. 2001. 'Is Optimality over the Hill'. In: Orzack S. and Sober E. (eds), pp. 219-241.
Goodman N. 1983. Fact Fiction and Forecast. 4th edn. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass.
Kahneman D. and Tversky K. 1996. 'On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions'. Psychological Review 103: 582–591.
Kitcher P. 1987. 'Why Not the Best?'. In: Dupré J. (ed.), pp. 77-102.
Lewontin R. 1987. 'The Shape of Optimality'. In: Dupré J. (ed.), pp. 151-159.
Lycan W. 1981. '“Is” and “Ought” in Cognitive Science'. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 4: 344–345.
Manktelow K. and Over D. 1987. 'Reasoning and Rationality'. Mind and Language 2: 199–219.
Millikan R. 1984a. Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
Millikan R. 1984b. 'Naturalist Reflections on Knowledge'. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65: 315–334.
Millikan R. 1989. 'In Defence of Proper Functions'. Philosophy of Science 56: 288–302.
Neander K. 1995. 'Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning'. Philosophical Studies 79: 109–141.
Nozick R. 1993. The Nature of Rationality. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Oaksford M. and Chater N. 1994. 'A Rational Analysis of the Selection Task as Optimal Data Selection'. Psychological Review 101: 608–631.
Orzack S. and Sober E. (eds) 2001. Adaptationism and Optimality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Papineau D. 1993. Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
Price C. 2001. Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Rescher N. 1988. Rationality. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Simon H. 1956. 'Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment'. Psychological Review 63: 129–138.
Simon H. 1972. 'Theories of Bounded Rationality'. In: Radner C. and Radner R. (eds), Decision and Organization. North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, pp. 161–172.
Smith E.A. 1987. 'Optimization Theory in Anthropology: Applications and Critiques'. In: Dupré J. (ed.), pp. 201-249.
Sober E. 1981. 'The Evolution of Rationality'. Synthese 46: 95–120.
Stein E. 1996. Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Stich S. 1990. The Fragmentation of Reason. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
Stich S. and Nisbett R. 1980. 'Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning'. Philosophy of Science 47: 188–202.
Taylor S.E. 1989. Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind. Basic Books, New York.
Tversky A. and Kahneman D. 1973. 'On the Psychology of Prediction'. Psychological Review 80: 237–251.
Tversky A. and Kahneman D. 1983. 'Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgement'. Psychological Review 90: 293–315.
Wason P. 1968. 'Reasoning About A Rule'. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 20: 273–281.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Price, C. Rationality, biology and optimality*. Biology & Philosophy 17, 613–634 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022556019609
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022556019609