Abstract
The purpose of this article is to understand the distinctively human behavior from Aristotelian ethics and evolutionary science to offer a perspective of what it means to act rationally. We argue that this way of acting is characterized by a decision informed by the analysis of whether or not it is worth pursuing an end, and by certain means, which takes place through a weighting of consequences from the body of knowledge that the person has so far We also argue that such a process can occur quickly (and requiring a less cognitive effort) or slowly (and demanding more cognitive effort), depending on whether or not the person has previous experiences of choices that have generated good consequences in the type of context presented; What does it mean for a person to have or not rational heuristics established in their minds, which are those that are connected to the most current network of “whys” and that has been consolidated precisely because they have proven effective in pointing out what is best to do in that kind of context. Finally, we apply the perspective we are offering to evidence three imprecise notions about “acting rationally”.
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Notes
This is a view to some extent also defended by Kant, who defends the fixation of original meanings of terms (Kant, 2020, p. 244).
This criticism also applies to more recent efforts such as the Positive Psychology movement, which failed to rescue Aristotle’s philosophy (see Kristjánsson, 2013).
Pinker (2021, p. 97) hypothesizes about the emergence of a “hidden” layer of neurons responsible for making possible internal representations of reality. In our view, such a layer would specifically make it possible to elaborate explanations and act based on them, which means a new way of interacting with reality.
Our view is aligned with the view of subjective utilitarianism, which identifies the best act as the one that meets the agent’s epistemic perspective (Galvão, 2005, p. 24).
Probably through a more precise interpretation based on the perspective of evolutionary psychology.
At least begin the process of unifying psychology bearing in mind the fact that evolutionary psychology, although it has empirical support and a base of established consensus (such as that the human mind is a product of evolution), is still in an early stage of development (see also Zagaria et al. 2020).
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Flavio Osmo and Maryana Madeira Borri developed the proposed perspective and reviewed the manuscript.
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Osmo, F., Borri, M.M. The Essence of What it Is to Act Rationally: A Perspective on Distinctively Human Action Based on Aristotelian Philosophy and Evolutionary Science. Integr. psych. behav. (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-024-09831-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-024-09831-1