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The Impact of Global Capital Market Exposure and Stable Ownership on Investor Relations Practices and Performance of Japanese Firms

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Abstract

This paper examines whether greater exposure to global capital markets, stable share ownership, and group affiliation of Japanese firms have any impact on the quality of their investor relations practices (IR) and market-value added (MVA). The results indicate that foreign ownership and foreign listings are positively associated with IR. Foreign listings are also positively associated with MVA. However, stable ownership and group affiliation do not seem to have any impact on IR. These findings suggest that Japanese firms that are more exposed to global capital markets are more likely to adopt shareholder-oriented policies rather than stakeholder-oriented policies.

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Yoshikawa, T., Gedajlovic, E.R. The Impact of Global Capital Market Exposure and Stable Ownership on Investor Relations Practices and Performance of Japanese Firms. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 19, 525–540 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020569609552

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