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Feedback Competitive Advertising Strategies with a General Objective Function

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Abstract

We introduce a general objective function, which incorporates competitive situations, such as conservative, punitive, and predatory advertising. Linking together the particular situations into a two-parameter family of max–min problems, and using the Lanchester model to describe the dynamics of the market, a bilinear-quadratic differential game is obtained. For this game, we find saddle-point feedback time-invariant advertising strategies and show when these strategies are Nash equilibrium strategies. In an empirical application involving duopolistic competition in the cola market, we find evidence of a punitive motivation for the advertising strategies.

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Fruchter, G., Erickson, G.M. & Kalish, S. Feedback Competitive Advertising Strategies with a General Objective Function. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 109, 601–613 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017567805831

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017567805831

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