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Organizing for Public Policy Effect: Aggregate Affiliated Interests in the American States*

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Abstract

Recent advances in the study of organizations suggest that various environmental characteristics should affect the structural characteristics of interest groups. We explore this thesis using a data set of lobbying in the American states. We use OLS regression to determine the effect of variables to measure the concepts of societal system, political culture, lobbyist registration, and state expenditures. We find that the most important variable is the total number of state lobbying efforts. In addition, as the number of lobbying increases among the states we found that a larger proportion of lobbying has been conducted by interest groups acting on their own, instead of creating affiliated aggregates. In addition, adding more variables does not increase the explanative value of the model.

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Hunter, K.G., Brunk, G.G. & Wilson, L.A. Organizing for Public Policy Effect: Aggregate Affiliated Interests in the American States*. Public Organization Review 2, 117–139 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016060628017

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