Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

A Case of Mind/Brain Identity: One Small Bridge for the Explanatory Gap

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Based on the technique ofpressure blinding of the eye, two types of after-image (AI) were identified. A physicalist or mind/brain identity explanation was established for a negative a AI produced by moderately intense stimuli. These AI's were shown to be located in the neurons of the retina. An illusory AI of double a grating's spatial frequency was also produced in the same structure and was both prevented from being established and abolished after establishment by pressure blinding, thus showing that the location was not more central. The illusory AI was predicted from the knownnon-linearity in the retina and this is the first case of a clear cut type-type identity of a sensation and a neural process. Some implications for the concepts of the explanatory gap between neurology and consciousness and multiple neural realizations of conscious states and topic neutrality are discussed.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Anstis, S., B. Rogers, and J. Henry: 1978, ‘Interactions between Simultaneous Contrast and Coloured Afterimages', Vision Research 18, 899–911.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. M.: 1968, A Materialist Theory of Mind, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong. D. M.: 1980, The Nature of Mind, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. M. and N. Malcolm: 1984, Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind, Blackwell, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bechtel, W. and J. Mundale: 1999, ‘Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States', Philosophy of Science 66, 175–207.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bigelow, J., J. Collins, and R. Pargetter: 1990, ‘Colouring in the World', Mind 99, 279–288.

    Google Scholar 

  • Block, N. and J. Fodor: 1980, ‘What Psychological States are Not', in N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 237–250.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boghossian, P. A. and J. D. Velleman: 1989, ‘Colour as a Secondary Quality', Mind 98, 81–103.

    Google Scholar 

  • Borst, C. V.: 1970, The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, St.Martin's Press, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bradley, M. C.: 1964, ‘Critical Notice: Philosophy and Scientific Realism', in J. J. C. Smart (ed.), Australasian Journal of Philosophy XLI, 262–283.

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. and F. C. Jackson: 1996, The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Blackwell, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, K. T.: 1968, ‘The Elecroretinogram: It's Components and their Origins', Vision Research 8, 633–677.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. J.: 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford Univesity Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Craik, K. J. W.: 1940, ‘Origin of Visual After-images', Nature 145, 512.

    Google Scholar 

  • Craik, K. J. W. and M. D. Vernon: 1941, ‘The Nature of Dark Adaptation', British Journal of Psychology 32, 62–81.

    Google Scholar 

  • Day, R. H. and W. R. Webster: 1989, ‘Negative Afterimages and the McCollough Effect', Perception and Psychophysics 46, 419–424.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J.: 1997, ‘Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after all these Years', Philosophical Perspectives 11, 149–163.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heil, J.: 1999, ‘Multiple Realizability', American Philosophical Quarterly 36, 191–208.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, F. C.: 1977, Perception, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, F. C. and P. Pettit: 1990, ‘Causation in the Philosophy of Mind', Philosophy and Phenomonological Research L, 195–214.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J.: 1993, Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine, J.: 1983, ‘Materialism and Qualia: the Explanatory Gap', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64, 354–361.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine, J.: 1994, ‘On Leaving out What it's Like', in M. Davies and G. W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 121–136.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W. G.: 1987, Consciousness, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macdonald, C.: 1992, Mind-Body Identity Theories, Routledge, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malsburg, Von der C.: 1995, ‘Binding in Models of Perception and Brain Function', Current Opinion in Neurobiology 5, 520–526.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, T.: 1998, ‘Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-body Problem', Philosophy 73, 337–352.

    Google Scholar 

  • Place, U. T.: 1956, ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?', British Journal of Psychology XLVII, 44–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Place, U. T.: 1970, ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?', in C. V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, St. Martin's Press, London, pp. 42–51.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H.: 1980, ‘The Nature of Mental States', in N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume One. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA., pp. 223–231.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rorty, R.: 1970, ‘Mind-body Identity, Privacy and Categories', in C. V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, St. Martin's Press, London, pp. 187–213.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenthal, D. M.: 1976, ‘Mentality and Neutrality', Journal of Philosophy LXXIII, 386–415.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shaffer, J.: 1970, ‘Could Mental States be Brain Processes?', in C. V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, St. Martin's Press, London, pp. 113–122.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sherrington, C.: 1947, The Integrative Action of the Nervous System, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Singer, W. and C. M. Gray: 1995, ‘Visual Feature Integration and the Temporal Correlation Hypothesis', Annual Review of Neuroscience 18, 555–586.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smart. J. J. C.: 1959, ‘Sensations and Brain Processes', Philosophical Review LXVIII, 141–156.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smart, J. J. C.: 1995, ‘“Looks Red” and Dangerous Talk', Philosophy 70, 545–554.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stufflebeam, R. S. and Bechtel, W.: 1997, ‘PET: Exploring the Myth and the Method', Philosophy of Science 64, S95–S106.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, C.: 1970, ‘Mind-body Identity, a Side Issue?', in C. V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, St. Martin's Press, London, pp. 231–241.

    Google Scholar 

  • Treisman, A.: 1996, ‘The Binding Problem', Current Opinion in Neurobiology 6, 171–178.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Orden, G. C. and K. R. Paap: 1997, ‘Functional Neuroimages Fail to Discover Pieces of Mind in the Parts of the Brain', Philosophy of Science 64, S85–S94.

    Google Scholar 

  • Virsu, V. and P. Laurinen: 1977, ‘Long-lasting Afterimages Caused by Neural Adaptation', Vision Research 17, 853–860.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiskrantz, L.: 1986, Blindsight: A Case Study and Implications, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, Monash University, Clayton, Vic, Australia, 3800

    W. R. Webster

Authors
  1. W. R. Webster
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Webster, W.R. A Case of Mind/Brain Identity: One Small Bridge for the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 131, 275–287 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015726204005

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015726204005

Keywords

Search

Navigation