Abstract
Presented here is a novel graphical, structural, and functional model of the embodied mind. Despite strictly adhering to a physicalistic and reductionist approach, this model successfully resolves the apparent contradiction between the thesis regarding the causal closure of the physical realm and the widely held common-sense belief that the mental realm can influence physical behavior. Furthermore, it substantiates the theory of mind-brain identity while shedding light on its neural foundation. Consciousness, viewed as an epiphenomenon in certain respects, simultaneously possesses causal potency. These two aspects operate concurrently through distinct brain processes. Within the paper, particular emphasis is placed on the significance of qualia and emotions, accompanied by an explanation of their phenomenal nature grounded in the perceptual theory of emotions. The proposed model elucidates how autonomous agents can deliberate on various action scenarios and consciously select the most optimal ones for themselves, considering their knowledge of the world, motivations, preferences, and emotions.
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Notes
Here, the term “direct perception” is used in a different sense than the commonly understood meaning according to Gibson's Theory of Direct Perception. Gibson's theory does not satisfy many researchers, and especially the “ecological optics” introduced by him raise doubts as to its explanatory power. The term “direct perception” I propose refers to the complex process of comparing patterns of signals transmitted from receptors with patterns previously fixed in memory. This is a departure from Gibson's assumptions (1950). I introduce this notion to distinguish this kind of primary, direct perception from the secondary perception of impressions generated by lower sensory fields stimulated by backward signals from the upper brain layers, as will be explained in the following sections.
Dreams testify to the automatism of cognitive processes. The action in the dream takes place automatically. We have practically no influence on it. Even strong feelings of fear or excitement do not allow us to avoid unwanted situations or continue with wanted ones. The activations of the semblions spontaneously form a chain of events. However, sometimes we remember them, and then we can use dream memories like other life experiences.
Rodrigo Díaz (2021) conducted experimental testing of the subtraction argument to investigate whether emotions require bodily reactions. Research has shown that, subjectively, in the assessment of the tested persons, bodily reactions are not inseparable from the experienced feelings. However, the arguments of Panksepp and Solms remain more convincing given the subjective nature of these studies.
This changes our understanding of phenomenal sensations. Pennartz, for example, continues to claim (2022) that phenomenal experience is created at the highest level of representation. However, the opposite is true. This experience comes about through the lower sensory layers.
This analysis of planning and decision-making methods requires distinguishing between automatic, drive, reflexive or instinctive action and conscious action, which results from deliberation and planning. We deal with the drive or instinctive actions in situations when logical analysis is impossible due to the necessity to make immediate decisions or when our knowledge is insufficient to make rational decisions. This situation applies to almost the entire animal world, the behavior of which is determined by direct perception and executive consciousness.
Papineau infers from the so-called laws of physics. However, he forgets that they are only models of reality. We have no evidence that there are any time-reversible processes in nature. The existence of such phenomena would violate the fundamental CPT symmetry.
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Galus, W. Mind–brain identity theory confirmed?. Cogn Neurodyn (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11571-023-09992-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11571-023-09992-6