Abstract
The present paper analyses the evolution of costly cooperation in a multi-group population. Building on insights first developed in modern biology the idea of viscous population equilibria is introduced (a population is said to be viscous when a (sub)population of players is spatially or genetically clustered). A simple model then analyses how the combined effect of viscosity within multiple subgroups and different levels of between-group segregation influences the evolution of cooperation. The results suggest that a key issue in the evolution of cooperation is the shifting balance between the need to protect cooperators and propagation of the tendency to cooperate.
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Knudsen, T. The Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations. Constitutional Political Economy 13, 129–148 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015321818551
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015321818551