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What's Yours is Mine: Rent-Seeking and the Common Law

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Abstract

The paper develops a rent-seeking theory of the common law.The general finding is that the law's form depends on thecomparative advantage each group has in production versusappropriation generally, and appropriation via litigation inparticular. The model generates new interpretations ofdevelopments in United States common law, and is used both tosupplement and to criticize two dominant theories of such law,the efficiency theory associated with the law and economicsmovement and that generated by critical legal studiesscholars.

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  1. Department of Economics, Wright State University, Dayton, OH, 45435-0000, U.S.A.

    Evan Osborne

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  1. Evan Osborne
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Osborne, E. What's Yours is Mine: Rent-Seeking and the Common Law. Public Choice 111, 399–415 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014912314741

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