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Interactive Multiple‐Criteria Methods for Reaching Pareto Optimal Agreements in Negotiations

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Abstract

The common features of two interactive methods that can be used in multiple-party negotiations over continuous issues are studied. One method is based on finding jointly improving directions to the parties to move along and the other on making constraint proposals to the parties. The history and the related literature on the subject is briefly surveyed in order to position the methods within the field. The basic similarities and differences together with the possibility to use them jointly are studied from the point of view of single negotiation text concept. Potential application areas including facilitation agents in distributed artificial intelligence are suggested.

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Ehtamo, H., Hämäläinen, R.P. Interactive Multiple‐Criteria Methods for Reaching Pareto Optimal Agreements in Negotiations. Group Decision and Negotiation 10, 475–491 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012297813663

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