Abstract
The task of explaining the impact of tacit knowledge on the results of negotiation has challenged research for decades. The approach presented here merges different perspectives in negotiation analyses and results in a proposal of a general framework for identification of tacit knowledge interventions in systematic support procedures. From a mediation perspective, one considers many parties looking for the selection of one, commonly accepted, decision from an infinite set of feasible decisions constrained by joint and separate individual conditions. The parties are interdependent in transforming soft and tacit individual perceptions into deliberate models and procedures. They evaluate potential compromise outcomes in the face of the conflicts in own and others’ criteria. Basic ideas underlying the models of negotiation combined with the concept of tacit knowledge serve to investigate the process of scanning background knowledge as a source of deliberate models. A conceptual framework for this setting is justified, and exemplified for linearly constrained multicriteria models of negotiation problems supported by linear programming algorithm.
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Szapiro, T. (2021). Negotiation Process Modelling: From Soft and Tacit to Deliberate. In: Kilgour, D.M., Eden, C. (eds) Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49629-6_36
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49629-6_36
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