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The Radical Constructivist View of Science

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Abstract

From the constructivist perspective, science cannot transcend thedomain of experience. Scientific theories are seen as models that helpto order and manage that domain. As the experiential field expands,models are replaced by others based on novel conceptual constructs. Thepaper suggests the substitution of ‘viability’ or ‘functional fit’ forthe notions of Truth and objective representation of anexperiencer-independent reality. This by-passes the sceptics'incontrovertible arguments against certain real-world knowledge andproposes the Piagetian conception of cognition as the function thatgenerates ways and means for dealing with the world of experience.

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von Glasersfeld, E. The Radical Constructivist View of Science. Foundations of Science 6, 31–43 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011345023932

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