Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Debates on Scientific Realism Today: Knowledge and Objectivity in Science

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Varieties of Scientific Realism

Abstract

Debates on realism in science concern two main questions: whether theoretical knowledge is possible, and whether it is objective. Today, as in the past, the possibility of theoretical knowledge is often denied because of the empirical underdetermination of theories. Realists rely on explanatory power, theoretical virtues, and instrumental but theory-free observation to solve this problem. Besides, they use the no miracles argument for the truth of successful theories. Antirealists, however, deny that explanation is either necessary or possible, and that is a cue to truth. Moreover, they reject realism and the cogency of the no miracles argument by the pessimistic induction from the falsity of past successful theories. Some realists reply that there is a radical discontinuity between past science (largely off-track) and current science (basically sound). But this reply is at best insufficient, and most realists prefer to restrict their commitment to selected parts or features of theories, both past and present. Forms of “selective realism” are entity realism, structural realism, deployment realism and semirealism, but also the verisimilitude research program and the restricted-domain approach. Realists need criteria to identify the true components of theories, and a noteworthy candidate is essential involvement in functionally novel and surprising predictions. The second main question is a special instance of the old debate between realists and relativists or idealists: according to antirealists science cannot be objective, because of its inherently “perspectival” nature, characterized by a priori and subjective factors. On the contrary, perspectival realists argue that the specific “viewpoints” within which scientists must work do not prevent them to discover objective features of reality.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See Heisenberg 1955: 20; Agazzi 1969: 361, 368, 372 ff.; Agazzi 2014: 310–311, 403–407; Toraldo di Francia 1976; Dalla Chiara , Toraldo di Francia 1999: 93–96; Dorato 2007: 172, 203–204; Fano, Macchia 2015: 74. According to Kuhn (1962: ch. 9) this idea was “prevailing” in his time.

References

  • Agazzi, Evandro. 1969. Temi e problemi di filosofia della fisica. Milano, Manfredi (2nd ed. Roma: Abete 1974).

    Google Scholar 

  • Agazzi, Evandro. 1979 Proposta per una nuova caratterizzazione dell’oggettività scientifica. In E.Agazzi, Problemi di epistemologia contemporanea, Lanciano: Itinerari, pp. 31–61.

    Google Scholar 

  • Agazzi, Evandro. 2014. Scientific Objectivity and its Contexts. Cham: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alai, Mario. 1989. A Critique of Putnam’s Anti-realism. Ann Arbor, Mi.: U.M.I. Online: http://www.proquest.com/products-services/dissertations/.

  • Alai, Mario. 1990. L’equivoco del “realismo interno” di Hilary Putnam. Rivista di Filosofia LXXXI, 2: 263–290.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alai, Mario. 1994. Modi di Conoscere il Mondo. Milano: Franco Angeli.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alai, Mario. 2005. Dal realismo scientifico al realismo metafisico. Hermeneutica: 167–189.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alai, Mario. 2006. Science and Non-Observable Reality. In The Controversial Relationships between Science and Philosophy: A Critical Assessment, ed. G. Auletta: 211–250. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alai, Mario. 2008. Σώζειν τά φαινόμενα. Realistic and Antirealistic Attitudes in Natural Science. Isonomia, http://isonomia.uniurb.it/vecchiaserie/2008alai.pdf.

  • Alai, Mario. 2009. Realismo scientifico e realismo metafisico. In Fisica e metafisica, ed. Mario Alai, Giornale di Fisica 50, Suppl. 1: 19–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alai, Mario. 2010. Van Fraassen, Observability and Belief. In New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science, ed. Marcello D’Agostino, Giulio Giorello, Federico Laudisa, Telmo Pievani and Corrado Sinigaglia, 663–675. London: College Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alai, Mario. 2014a. Novel Predictions and the No Miracle Argument. Erkenntnis 79, 2: 297–326.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alai, Mario. 2014b. Defending Deployment Realism against Alleged Counterexamples. In Defending Realism. Ontological and Epistemological Investigations, ed. G. Bonino, G. Jesson, J. Cumpa: 265–290. Boston-Berlin-Munich: De Gruyter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alai, Mario. 2014c. Why Antirealists Can’t Explain Success. In Metaphysics and Ontology Without Myths, ed. F. Bacchini, S. Caputo and M. Dell’Utri: 48–66. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alai, Mario. 2014d. Explaining the Novel Success of Science. Metascience 23,1: 125–130.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alai, Mario. 2016. Resisting the Historical Objections to Realism: Is Doppelt’s a Viable Solution? Synthese: 1–24, DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1087-z.

  • Alai, Mario. Forthcoming. The Metaphysical Scope of the New Realism: Confronting Eco’s and Parrini’s Strictures”. In New Perspectives on Realism, ed. L. Taddio, K. W Molìn: 9–31. Milano: Mimesis International.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alai, Mario, Buzzoni, Marco and Tarozzi, Gino (eds.). 2015. Science between Truth and Ethical Responsibility. Evandro Agazzi in the Contemporary Scientific and Philosophical Debate. Cham: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aronson, Jerrold L., 1984. A Realist Philosophy of Science. London: The Macmillan Press, New York: St. Martin’s Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bird, Alexander. 2015. Is there meta-scientific knowledge? Against both the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic meta-induction. Draft.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, Rudolf. 1923. Uber die Aufgabe der Physik und die Andwendung des Grundsatze der Einfachstheit. Kant-Studien 28: 90–107.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, Rudolf. 1928. Der logische Aufbau der Welt. Berlin-Schlachtensee: Weltkreis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, Rudolf. 1936. Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science 3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Celsus, A. C., 1935, De Medicina, Prooemium, Loeb Classical Library edition, vol. II., http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/L/Roman/Texts/Celsus/Prooemium*.html.

  • Chakravartty, Anjan. 1998. Semirealism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A29 (3): 391–408.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chakravartty, Anjan. 2007. A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable. Cambridge: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, Paul M. and Hooker, Clifford A. (eds.) 1985. Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism. Chicago: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clarke, Steve and Lyons, Timothy D. eds. 2002. Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science. Scientific Realism and Commonsense. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cruse, Pierre, and Papineau, David. 2002. Scientific Realism Without Reference. In The Problem of Realism, ed. Michele Marsonet: 174–189. Aldershot-Burlington: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dalla Chiara, M. Luisa and Toraldo di Francia, Giuliano. 1999. Introduzione alla filosofia della scienza. Roma-Bari: Laterza.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demopoulos, William, and Friedman, Michael. 1985. Critical notice: Bertrand Russell’s The Analysis of Matter: its Historical Context and Contemporary Interest. Philosophy of Science 52: 621–639.

    Google Scholar 

  • Devitt, Michael. 1984. Realism and Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dilworth, Craig. 1981. Scientific Progress. Dordrecht: Kluwer (Springer 20084ed.).

    Google Scholar 

  • Dilworth, Craig. 2015. The Perspectivist Conception of Science. In Alai, Buzzoni, and Tarozzi, (eds.) 2015: 21–25. Cham: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Doppelt, Gerald. 2007. Reconstructing Scientific Realism to Rebut the Pessimistic Meta-induction. Philosophy of Science, 74: 96–118.

    Google Scholar 

  • Doppelt, Gerald. 2011. From Standard Scientific Realism and Structural Realism to Best Current Theory Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 42: 295–316.

    Google Scholar 

  • Doppelt, Gerald. 2013. Explaining the Success of Science: Kuhn and Scientific Realists. Topoi, 32: 43–51.

    Google Scholar 

  • Doppelt, Gerald. 2014. Best Theory Scientific Realism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 4: 271–291.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dorato, Mauro. 2007. Cosa c’entra l’anima con gli atomi? Roma-Bari: Laterza.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duhem, Pierre. 1906. La théorie physique. Son objet et sa structure. Paris: Rivière.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fahrbach, Ludwig. 2011. Theory Change and Degrees of Success. Philosophy of Science, 78: 1283–1292.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fano, Vincenzo. 2005. Comprendere la scienza. Un’introduzione all’epistemologia delle scienze naturali, Napoli: Liguori.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fano, Vincenzo and Macchia, Giovanni. 2015. Scientific Progress. In Alai, Buzzoni, and Tarozzi, (eds.) 2015: 65–80. Cham: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferraris, Maurizio. 2012. Manifesto del nuovo realismo, Roma-Bari: Laterza.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fine, Arthur. 1984. The Natural Ontological Attitude. In J. Leplin (ed.) 1984: 83–107.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fine, Arthur. 1986. Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Instrumentalist Attachments to Science”, Mind 95: 149.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fine, Arthur. 1991. Piecemeal Realism. Philosophical Studies 61: 79.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, Michel. 1966. Les mots et les choses. Paris: Gallimard 1966.

    Google Scholar 

  • French, Steven. 2011. Metaphysical underdetermination: Why Worry? Synthese 180, 2: 205–221.

    Google Scholar 

  • French, Steven. 2014. The Structure of the World. Oxford: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • French, Steven and Ladyman, James. 2003a. Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure. Synthese 136: 31–56.

    Google Scholar 

  • French, Steven and Ladyman, James. 2003b, The Dissolution of Objects: between Platonism and Phenomenalism. Synthese 136: 73–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • French, Steven and Ladyman, James. 2011. In Defence of Ontic Structural Realism. In Scientific Structuralism, ed. Alisa Bokulich and Peter Bokulich: 25–42. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman. Michael. 1983. Foundations of Space-Time Theories, Chicago: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frigg, Roman and Votsis, Ioannis. 2011. Everything you Always Wanted to Know about Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1 (2): 227–276.

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere, Ronald N. 1988. Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere, Ronald N. 2006. Scientific Perspectivism. Chicago: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Glymour, Clark 1980. Theory and Evidence. Princeton, NJ.: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodman, Nelson. 1978. Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis-Cambridge: Hackett.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, Ian. 1983. Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hardin, Clyde L., and Rosenberg, Alexander. (1982). In Defence of Convergent Realism. Philosophy of Science, 49: 604–615.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heisenberg, Werner. 1955. Das Naturbild der heutigen Physik. Hamburg: Rohwolt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hempel, Carl G. 1952. Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hempel, Carl. G. 1958. The Theoretician’s Dilemma. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2: 37–98.

    Google Scholar 

  • Howson, Colin. 2000. Hume’s Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoyningen-Huene, P. 2011. Reconsidering the Miracle Argument on the Supposition of Transient Underdetermination. Synthese 180: 173–187.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ivanova, Milena (ed.) Scientific Semi-Realism. PhilPapers. http://philpapers.org/browse/scientific-semirealism.

  • Kincaid, Harold, 2008. Structural Realism and the Social Sciences. Philosophy of Science, 75: 720–731.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kosso, Peter. 1992. Reading the Book of Nature. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Cambridge: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher, Philip. 1993, The Advancement of Science, Oxford: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Theories. Chicago: The University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ladyman, James. 1998. What is Structural Realism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29: 409–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ladyman, James. 2002. Understanding Philosophy of Science, London, New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ladyman, James. 2011. Structural Realism versus Standard Scientific Realism: the Case of Phlogiston and Dephlogisticated Air. Synthese 180: 87–101.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ladyman, James. 2014. Structural Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/.

  • Ladyman, James and Ross, Don, with Spurrett, David and Collier, John 2007. Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalised. Oxford: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lange, Marc. 2002. Baseball, Pessimistic Inductions and the Turnover Fallacy. Analysis, 62: 281–285.

    Google Scholar 

  • Latour, Bruno. 1998. Ramses II est-il mort de la tubercolose? La Recherche.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, Larry. 1981. A Confutation of Convergent Realism. Philosophy of Science 48: 19–49. Repr. in D. Papineau (ed.) 1996: 107–138.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, Larry. 1984a. Explaining the Success of Science. In Science and Reality: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science, ed. James T. Cushing, Cornelius F. Delaney and Gary M. Gutting: 83–105. Notre Dame: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, Larry. 1984b. Discussion: Realism without the Real. Philosophy of Science, 51: 156–162.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, Larry. 1996. Beyond Positivism and Relativism. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, Larry, Leplin, Jarrett. 1991. Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination. Journal of Philosophy 88: 449–472.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, Larry, Leplin, Jarrett. 1993. Determination Underdeterred: Reply to Kukla. Analysis 53: 8–16.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leplin, Jarrett (ed.). 1984. Scientific Realism, Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leplin, Jarrett. 1987. Surrealism. Mind 96: 519.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, Peter. 2001. Why the Pessimistic Induction is a Fallacy. Synthese, 129: 371–380.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lipton, Peter. 1991. Inference to the Best Explanation. London: Routledge (20042).

    Google Scholar 

  • Lyons, Timothy D. 2002. The Pessimistic Meta-Modus Tollens. In Clarke, Lyons (eds.): 63–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lyons, Timothy D. 2006. Scientific Realism and the Stratagema de Divide et Impera Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 57: 537–560.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lyre, Holger. 2011. Is Structural Underdetermination Possible? Synthese 180, 2: 235–247.

    Google Scholar 

  • Magnus, P.D. and Callender, Craig. 2004. Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy. Philosophy of Science 71 (3): 320–338.

    Google Scholar 

  • Massimi, Michela. 2012. Scientific Perspectivism and its Foes. Philosophica 84: 25–52.

    Google Scholar 

  • Massimi, Michela. 2016. Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. doi:10.1111/phpr.12300.

  • Maxwell, Grover. 1970. Theories, Perception, and Structural Realism. In Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, ed. R. Colodny: 3–34. Pittsburgh: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McMullin, Eranan. 1984. A Case for Scientific Realism. In Leplin (ed.): 8–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Muller, Frederick A. 2011. Withering Away, Weakly. Synthese 180, 2: 223–233.

    Google Scholar 

  • Musgrave, Alan. 1985. Realism vs. Constructive Empiricism. In Churchland and Hooker (eds.) 1985: 197–221.

    Google Scholar 

  • Musgrave, Alan. 1988. The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism. In Realism and Relativism in Science, ed. R. Nola: 229–252. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Musgrave, Alan. 2006–2007. The ‘Miracle Argument’ for Scientific Realism. The Rutherford Journal 2. http://www.rutherfordjournal.org/article020108.html.

  • Nanay, Bence. 2013. Singularist Semirealism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2): 371–394.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nanay, Bence. 2016. Entity Realism and Singularist Semirealism. Synthese online. DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1179-9.

  • Nickles, Thomas. Forthcominga. Perspectivism versus Copernicanism. Axiomathes.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nickles, Thomas. Forthcomingb. Strong Realism as Scientism: Are We at the End of History? In Science Unlimited? The Challenges of Scientism, ed. M. Boudry, M. Pigliucci. Chicago: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1886. Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft. Leipzig: C. G. Naumann.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1901. Der Wille zur Macht. Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werthe. hrsg. v. Ernst Horneffer, August Horneffer und Peter Gast. Leipzig: C. G. Naumann.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 1987. Truthlikeness, Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 1998. Verisimilitude: the Third Period. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49.1: 1–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 1999. Critical Scientific Realism, Oxford: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nola, Robert. 2002. Realism Through Manipulation. In Clarke, Lyons (eds.): 1–23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oddie, Graham. 1986, Likeness to Truth, Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Papineau, David (ed.). 1996. The Philosophy of Science. Oxford: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perrin, Jean. 1913. Les atomes. Paris: Alcan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peters, Dean. 2014. What Elements of Successful Scientific Theories are the Correct Targets for “Selective” Scientific Realism? Philosophy of Science 81: 377–397.

    Google Scholar 

  • Poincaré, Henry. 1902. La science et l’hypothèse. Paris: Flammarion. Engl. transl. Science and Hypothesis. New York: Dover Publications 1952.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, Karl R. 1963. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Psillos, Stathis. 1999. Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. London-New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Psillos, Stathis. 2011a. Choosing the Realist Framework. Synthese 190: 301–316.

    Google Scholar 

  • Psillos, Stathis. 2011b. The Scope and Limits of the No-Miracles Argument. In The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, ed. Friedrich Stadler et al. Vol. II: 23–35, Cham: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Hilary. 1975a. Mathematics, Matter and Method. Philosophical Papers vol. 1. Cambridge: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Hilary. 1975b. Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: Mind Language and Reality. Cambridge: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Hilary. 1975c. The Meaning of ‘Meaning’. In Putnam 1975b: 215–271.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Hilary. 1975d. Language and reality. In Putnam 1975b: 272–290.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Hilary, 1978a. Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Boston-London-Henley: Routledge&Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Hilary, 1978b. Realism and Reason. In Putnam (1978a): 123–140.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Hilary. 1978c. Equivalenza. In Enciclopedia Einaudi, vol. V: 547–564. Torino: Einaudi. Engl. transl.: Equivalence. In Putnam 1983: 26–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Hilary. 1981. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Hilary. 1994. Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: an Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind. The Journal of Philosophy XCI, n. 9, 445–517.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Hilary. 2012. Philosophy in an Age of Science. Cambridge, Mass.- London: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, Willard V.O. 1951. Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60: 20–43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rees, Paul. 2012. A Critique of The Arguments for Scientific Realism. Reading: Cranmore Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rescher, Nicholas. 1987. Scientific Realism: A Critical Reappraisal. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, Bertrand. 1927. The Analysis of Matter. London: Routledge Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Saatsi, Juha. 2016. Replacing Recipe Realism. Synthese, First Online, 2016. DOI:10.1007/s11229-015-0962-3.

  • Sankey, Howard. 2008. Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science. Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schlick, Moritz. 1938. Form and Content. An Introduction to Philosophical Thinking. In Schlick, Gesammelte Aufsätze 1926–1936, ed. F. Waisman. Wien: Gerold.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schurz, Gerhard. 2011. Structural Correspondence, Indirect Reference, and Partial Truth: Phlogiston Theory and Newtonian Mechanics. Synthese 180: 79–85.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smart, John J.C. 1963. Philosophy and Scientific Realism, London: Routledge&Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smart, John J.C. 1968. Between Science and Philosophy: New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, Ernest. 1991. Knowledge in Perspective. Selected Essays in Epistemology. Cambridge: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stanford, Kyle P. 2000. An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science. Philosophy of Science 67: 266–284.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stanford, Kyle P. 2006. Exceeding Our Grasp. Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stanford, Kyle P. 2013. Underdetermination of Scientific Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/.

  • Suppe, Frederick. 1977. The Structure of Scientific Theories. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Teller, Paul R. Pan-Perspectival Realism Explained and Defended. http://philosophy.ucdavis.edu/people/fzteller/site/truth-page.

  • Toraldo di Francia, Giuliano. 1976. L’ indagine del mondo fisico. Torino: Einaudi.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Fraassen, Bas C. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Fraassen, Bas C. 1985. Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science. In Churchland and Hooker (eds.) 1985: 245–307.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Fraassen, Bas C. 2002. The Empirical Stance, Yale: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vattimo, Gianni and Rovatti, Pier A. (eds.). 1983. Il pensiero debole. Milano: Feltrinelli.

    Google Scholar 

  • Votsis, Ioannis. 2011a. Saving the Intuitions: Polylithic Reference. Synthese 180: 121–137.

    Google Scholar 

  • Votsis, Ioannis. 2011b. The Prospective Stance in Realism. Philosophy of Science 78:1223–1234.

    Google Scholar 

  • Votsis, Ioannis. 2012. Putting Realism in Perspectivism. Philosophica 84: 85–122.

    Google Scholar 

  • White, Roger. 2003. The Epistemic Advantage of Prediction over Accommodation. Mind 112 (448): 653.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1956, Language, Thought, and Reality, Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wigner, Eugene P. 1967. Remarks on the Mind-Body Question. In Wigner, Symmetries and Reflections. Bloomington, In.: Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Worrall, John. 1989. Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? Dialectica 43:99–124.

    Google Scholar 

  • Worrall, John. 1994. How to Remain (Reasonably) Optimistic: Scientific Realism and the ‘Luminiferous Ether’. PSA 1994. vol. 1., ed. M. Forbes and D. Hull: 334–342. East Lansing, Mi.: Philosophy of Science Association.

    Google Scholar 

  • Worrall, John. 1995. Il realismo scientifico e l’etere luminifero. In Realismo/antirealismo, ed. Alessandro Pagnini: 167–203. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

    Google Scholar 

  • Worrall, John. 2011. Underdetermination, Realism and Empirical Equivalence. Synthese 180, 2: 157–172.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright, John. 2002. Some Surprising Phenomena and Some Unsatisfactory Explanations of Them. In Clarke and Lyons (eds.): 139–153.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright, John. 2013. Explaining Science’s Success. Understanding How Scientific Knowledge Works. Durham: Acumen.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I thank EvandroAgazzi and Vincenzo Fano for valuable suggestions.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Università degli Studi Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy

    Mario Alai

Authors
  1. Mario Alai
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mario Alai .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Universidad Panamericana , Mexico City, Mexico

    Evandro Agazzi

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Alai, M. (2017). The Debates on Scientific Realism Today: Knowledge and Objectivity in Science. In: Agazzi, E. (eds) Varieties of Scientific Realism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51608-0_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation