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CEO Share Ownership and Firm Value

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Abstract

This study examines the effect of CEO ownership on firm performance. The findings suggest that CEO ownership and firm performance are jointly determined. Firm performance affects CEO ownership positively and in turn, CEO ownership has a positive effect on firm performance. Our results also show that firms managed by founder CEOs have better performance and that the CEO duality structure is beneficial in a turbulent environment.

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Tan, R.S.K., Chng, P.L. & Tan, T.W. CEO Share Ownership and Firm Value. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 18, 355–371 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010601912422

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